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HOW DO JUDGES DECIDE DIVORCE CASES?
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF
DISCRETIONARY DECISION MAKING
MARSHA GARRISON*
Judges today have more discretion in divorce cases than in
any other field of private law. Although the extent of judicial
discretion at divorce is highly controversial, little information on
the results of discretionary decision making has been available.
In this Article, Professor Marsha Garrison describes and
analyzes the results of an empirical study of judicial decision
making in New York during the decade following the adoption of
a new divorce law that expanded judicial discretion and changed
the legal standards governing alimony and property distribution at
divorce. She reports evidence supporting both discretion's critics
and its champions: Some types of decisions made by judges were
highly predictable and quite consistent with the statutory madate;
others were altogether unpredictable, or evidenced the intrusion of
private values into the decision-making process. In interpreting
these results, Professor Garrison concludes that discretionary
decision making was influenced by the relative clarity and novelty
of the governing statutory provision, as well as social and public
opinion trends. Based on the research findings, she makes a
number of reform proposals aimed at striking a better balance
between rule and discretion in divorce decision making.
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INTRODUCTION
Divorce law has traditionally relied on judicial wisdom to achieve
fair results. Instead of bright-line rules, legislatures have typically
given judges in the divorce court almost unlimited discretion, bounded
only by indeterminate standards or lists of factors that may be
considered. Judicial discretion has also been enhanced by the rarity
1996]
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of jury trials in divorce cases; in almost all divorce actions the judge
both determines the facts and interprets the law.1
During the past two decades, judicial discretion in divorce cases
has expanded. Title-based property division has been succeeded by
discretionary distribution principles rather than new bright-line rules.2
The adoption of gender-neutral divorce laws has similarly enhanced
the role of judicial discretion in custody and alimony decisions? In
some states, judicial discretion in awarding alimony has been further
expanded as a result of the removal of fault barriers to an alimony
award4 and the development of durational alimony as an alternative
to a permanent award.5 Only in the area of child support, as a result
of directives from the federal government,6 has judicial discretion
been curtailed.
1. See HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES 540 (2d ed. 1988) ("Divorce cases are usually tried to the court without a jury,
since historically they resembled suits in equity rather than actions at law."). Jury trials
are not even available in most states. See il at 540 n.16.
2. Forty-three states now mandate equitable division of marital property. See
Timothy B. Walker, Family Law in the Fifty States: An Overview, 25 FAM. L.Q. 417, 445-
46 tbl. IV (1992).
3. The development of gender-neutral standards was spurred by the Supreme Court's
decision in Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979), in which an alimony statute that authorized
alimony for wives only was found unconstitutional. Although the Supreme Court has
never addressed the constitutionality of a gender preference in custody disputes, many
state courts have overruled such rules, either on constitutional grounds or on the basis of
conflict with a best interests of the child principle. See, e.g., Ex parte Devine, 398 So. 2d
686 (Ala. 1981) (holding rule unconstitutional); Johnson v. Johnson, 564 P.2d 71 (Alaska
1977) (holding that rule violates the best interests principle), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1048
(1978); Bazemore v. Davis, 394 A.2d 1377 (D.C. 1977) (en banc) (same).
4. By 1992, only four states had alimony rules under which an award was barred by
marital misconduct; 29 states had adopted alimony rules that prohibited the consideration
of marital fault in the determination of an award. See Walker, supra note 2, at 462-63 tbl.
VII.
5. Alimony was traditionally awarded until the death or remarriage of the recipient.
By contrast, durational or "rehabilitative" alimony is awarded for a fixed time period.
One survey conducted during the mid-1980s reported statutes or case law on durational
alimony in 33 states. Alan M. Grosman & Kathleen G. Heirich Casey, Rehabilitative
Alimony: Myth and Reality, in NEW CONCEPTS IN ALIMONY MAINTENANCE & SUPPORT
1, 23-40 (A.B.A. Sec. Fain. L. 1984).
6. In 1984, Congress enacted legislation that required each state to adopt numerical
child support guidelines by October 1987. Child Support Enforcement Amendments of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-378, § 18(a), 98 Stat. 1305, 1321-22 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 667 (1988)). In 1988, Congress mandated that the child support guidelines adopted in
each state presumptively establish the appropriate child support obligation in all child
support proceedings. Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, § 103, 102 Stat.
2343, 2346 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 667 (1988)). Adherence to federal standards is
required for continued federal funding of a state's Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) program. 45 C.F.R. § 301.10 (1994).
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The expansion of judicial discretion in divorce cases has met with
decidedly mixed reviews. Some commentators have claimed that
indeterminate standards produce decisions that are inconsistent,
expensive, and biased against women.7 Others have argued that
bright-line rules are too broad, too rigid, and too insensitive to case
variation to govern divorce decision making.8
Although the debate over judicial discretion in divorce cases
often replicates the larger controversy among legal scholars about the
relative merits of discretion versus rules,9 the divorce context is a
particularly important one, both because judges wield more extensive
discretion in divorce cases than in other types of civil litigation ° and
because of the frequency of divorce proceedings. Americans today
are more likely to experience divorce than any other type of civil
7. For representative criticism of discretionary standards in child custody ad-
judication, see David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes
in Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REV. 477, 479-90 (1984); Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments:
Against the Best Interest of the Child, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1987); Robert H. Mnookin,
Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1975, at 226. For representative criticism of discretionary
standards in property and support adjudication, see infra sources cited in notes 27-29.
8. See, e.g., Joan M. Krauskopf, A Theory for "Just" Division of Marital Property in
Missouri, 41 MO. L. REv. 165,175-76 (1976) (favoring discretion in property division); Carl
E. Schneider, Discretion, Rules, and Law: Child Custody and the UMDA's Best-Interest
Standard, 89 MICH. L. REV. 2215, 2298 (1991) (concluding that discretion should be
retained in custody adjudication).
9. The literature on the rules versus discretion controversy is extensive and wide-
ranging, encompassing the views of legal philosophers, social scientists, and economists.
For some noteworthy examples from the perspective of legal philosophy, see, e.g.,
AHARON BARAK, JUDICIAL DISCRETION (1989); STEVEN J. BURTON, JUDGING IN GOOD
FAITH (1992); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); D.J. GALLIGAN,
DISCRETIONARY POWERS: A LEGAL STUDY OF OFFICIAL DISCRETION (1986);
FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF
RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE (1991); George P. Fletcher, Some
Unwise Reflections About Discretion, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1984, at 69; Kent
Greenawalt, Discretion and Judicial Decision: The Elusive Quest for the Fetters That Bind
Judges, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 359 (1975). For economic analyses, see, e.g., Colin S. Diver,
The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65 (1983); Isaac Ehrlich &
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257
(1974); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 612
(1992). For social science perspectives, see the various essays contained in THE USES OF
DISCRETION (Keith Hawkins ed., 1992).
10. See infra note 26 and sources cited therein.
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litigation." Fairness to the many families affected by divorce law
demands standards that achieve predictable and consistent outcomes.
Evaluation of the arguments about judicial discretion at divorce
has been hampered, however, by the paucity of data on how judges
make decisions under current discretionary standards. Although there
has been considerable research on divorce outcomes over the past two
decades, 2 research focusing on judicial decision making at divorce
has been rare. We know almost nothing about the characteristics of
the decision-makers, the cases they decide, or the impact of appellate
courts. As to the outcomes produced by the judicial process, the
evidence consists of a handful of reports that suggest contradictory
conclusions. 3
In order to decide how much discretion judges should have, we
need better information about the results of current discretionary
decision making: Do judges rely on many factors in reaching a
decision or only a few? Do judges agree on which factors are
11. See Lee E. Teitelbaum & Laura DuPaix, Alternative Dispute Resolution and
Divorce: Natural Experimentation in Family Law, 40 RUTGERS L. REV. 1093, 1112 n. 74,
1116 (1988) (describing research on state court caseloads and reporting that "[d]ivorce and
its incidents are, for most disputants, the only occasion on which they will come into
contact with law in its formal sense").
12. See ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON WOMEN IN THE COURTS, REPORT ON THE
FINANCIAL IMPACT OF DIVORCE IN RHODE ISLAND (1991) (on file with author);
BARBARA BAKER, ALASKA WOMEN'S COMM'N, FAMILY EQUITY AT ISSUE: A STUDY OF
THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF DIVORCE ON WOMEN AND CHILDREN (1987) (on file
with author); LESLIE J. BRETT ET AL., WOMEN AND CHILDREN BEWARE: THE
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF DIVORCE IN CONNECTICUT (1990) (on file with author);
GLORIA STERIN & JOS. M. DAVIS, DIVORCE AWARDS AND OUTCOMES: A STUDY OF
PATTERN AND CHANGE IN CUYAHOGA COUNTY, OHIO, 1965-1978 (1981); LENORE J.
WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA (1985); Marsha Garrison,
Good Intentions Gone Awry: The Impact of New York's Equitable Distribution Law on
Divorce Outcomes, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 621 (1991); James B. McLindon, Separate But
UnequaL- The Economic Disaster of Divorce for Women and Children, 21 FAM. L.Q. 351
(1987); Barbara R. Rowe & Jean M. Lown, The Economics of Divorce and Remarriage for
Rural Utah Families, 16 J. CONTEMP. L. 301 (1990); Barbara R. Rowe & Alice M. Morrow,
The Economic Consequences of Divorce in Oregon After Ten or More Years of Marriage,
24 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 463 (1988); Karen Seal, A Decade of No-Fault Divorce: What
It Has Meant Financially for Women in California, FAM. ADVOC., Spring 1979, at 10;
Charles E. Welch, III & Sharon Price-Bonham, A Decade of No-Fault Divorce Revisited:
California, Georgia, and Washington, 45 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 411 (1983); Heather R.
Wishik, Economics of Divorce: An Exploratory Study, 20 FAM. L.Q. 79 (1986). For
comparable research findings outside the United States, see, e.g., JOHN EEKELAAR &
MAVIS MACLEAN, MAINTENANCE AFTER DIVORCE (1986) (England); Margaret Harrison
et al., Payment of Child Maintenance in Australia: The Current Position, Research
Findings, and Reform Proposals, 1 INT'L J.L. & FAM. 92 (1987) (Australia).
13. See infra notes 37-40 and sources cited therein.
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important and their relative weights? Does the pattern of decision
making vary depending on factors such as the judge's age, sex,
experience, or location? Does it exhibit consistent biases based on
litigant characteristics such as gender or social class? Do judicial
decisions differ from the results of settled cases? Do the cases judges
decide differ from the typical divorce action? Only when we know
how judges make decisions, and how their decisions affect the
settlement process, can we decide whether and how judicial discretion
should be curtailed.
One reason for the lack of evidence on these questions is that
judicial divorce decisions are in fact a rarity; the vast bulk of cases are
settled. 4 Divorce researchers, in attempting to portray overall
outcomes, have thus understandably given short shrift to judges.
While the outcomes of settled cases might reveal the impact of
indeterminate rules on the settlement process, researchers have
typically described only aggregate data; my recent research on the
impact of New York's 1980 Equitable Distribution Law"5 was the
first to assess the predictability and range of divorce outcomes. 6
In this article I describe and analyze the results of an empirical
study of judicial decisions on alimony, property distribution, and child
support, dating from a major statutory reform in the research state's
alimony and property distribution rules in 1980 to that reform's tenth
anniversary. My analysis suggests that the exercise of discretion is a
complex phenomenon: Depending on which of the various
discretionary decisions made by judges we focus, the research findings
provide evidence to support the claims of both discretion's critics and
champions. There is evidence of regional variation, class bias, the
intrusion of private values into the decision-making process, of utter
14. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 951 (1979) ("[T]he overwhelming majority of
divorcing couples resolve distributional questions concerning marital property, alimony,
child support, and custody without bringing any contested issue to court for ad-
judication."). Experts generally estimate that no more than 10% of divorce actions are
contested. See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 1, at 755; Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come
Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOc'Y REV. 95, 108
(1974); see also ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD:
SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 159 (1992) (finding that formal adjudication
occurred in approximately 1.5% of California divorce sample); Margaret F. Brinig &
Michael V. Alexeev, Trading at Divorce: Preferences, Legal Rules and Transactions Costs,
8 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 279,294 tbl. 11 (1993) (finding that 5.38% (Wisconsin) and
10.13% (Virginia) of sample divorce cases went to trial).
15. 1980 N.Y. Laws 281 (codified as amended at N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236B
(McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1995)).
16. Garrison, supra note 12, at 685-96, 706-11.
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unpredictability, and of highly predictable decision making consistent
with the statutory standard; there is evidence both to support and
contradict the claim of gender bias in judicial decision making; there
is evidence of settlement results that are highly consistent-and
inconsistent-with the decision-making patterns of judges.
In interpreting these results, I found that what at first glance
appears contradictory and chaotic in fact evidences the natural
evolution of discretionary decision making. While the claims on both
sides of the current debate over discretion in divorce cases typically
rely on a static, "snap-shot" perspective, my research results support
an alternate view of discretion as a dynamic, evolutionary
phenomenon that is guided by the legislature's directives (or lack
thereof), shaped by cumulative judicial experience, and set in a
shifting social context. While this is not a novel view of discretion-it
has been variously embraced by theorists writing from both a social
science and economic perspective' 7-it is one that is often neglected
in the debate over the appropriate role of discretion in divorce. It is
also a view of which we have had little empirical evidence.
In this article I offer empirical evidence on the results of
discretion and the influences to which it is subject. These data will,
I believe, enrich both the current debate over discretion in the context
of divorce and our general understanding of discretionary decision
making. Part I of the article describes the discretion available to
judges under current divorce laws, the origins of that discretion, and
the comparative advantages of discretionary standards and rules. Part
II describes the background against which the divorce decisions
studied were made: the law under which the cases were decided, the
judges who made the decisions, and the divorcing couples who
litigated. Part III describes my findings on judicial decision making,
before and after appeal, compares them with the settlement patterns
that emerged in my earlier research, and assesses the predictability of
judicial decisions. Part IV offers an interpretation of my specific
findings and discusses its implications for the debate over
discretionary decision making at divorce.
17. See, e.g., THE USES OF DISCRETION, supra note 9; Diver, supra note 9; Ehrlich &
Posner, supra note 9; Kaplow, supra note 9; Richard Lempert, Discretion in a Behavioral
Perspective: The Case of a Public Housing Eviction Board, in THE USES OF DISCRETION,
supra note 9.
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I. JUDICIAL DISCRETION AT DIVORCE: ITS EXTENT, ORIGINS,
AND ALTERNATIVES
A. Divorce Law: The Model of Equity
The statute books today grant judges almost unlimited discretion
in divorce cases. Consider, for example, New York's statutory rule
governing alimony. The statute specifies that
the court may order temporary maintenance or maintenance
in such amount as justice requires, having regard for the
standard of living of the parties established during the
marriage, whether the party in whose favor maintenance is
granted lacks sufficient property and income to provide for
his or her reasonable needs and whether the other party has
sufficient property or income to provide for the reasonable
needs of the other and the circumstances of the case and of
the respective parties.'8
The court is also directed, in determining the amount and duration of
maintenance, to consider ten factors that together take account of
spousal need, resources, contribution to the marriage, and economic
misconduct.' A catch-all clause additionally permits consideration
of "any other factor which the court shall expressly find to be just and
proper."' In sum, the statute directs the judge to base the alimony
18. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAWv § 236B(6)(a) (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1995).
19. The statute requires courts to consider:
1. the income and property of the respective parties including marital property
distributed pursuant to subdivision five of this part;
2. the duration of the marriage and the age and health of both parties;
3. the present and future earning capacity of both parties;
4. ability of the party seeking maintenance to become self-supporting and, if
applicable, the period of time and training necessary therefor;
5. reduced or lost lifetime earning capacity of the party seeking maintenance
as a result of having foregone or delayed education, training, employment,
or career opportunities during the marriage;
6. the presence of children of the marriage in the respective homes of the
parties;
7. the tax consequences to each party;
8. contributions and services of the party seeking maintenance as a spouse,
parent, wage earner and homemaker, and to the career or career potential
of the other party;
9. the wasteful dissipation of marital property by either spouse;
10. any transfer or encumbrance made in contemplation of a matrimonial action
without fair consideration ....
La
20. Id. § 236B(6)(a)(11).
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decision on an appraisal of the parties' past conduct, present needs,
and future life circumstances, but leaves the scope, methodology, and
use of that appraisal to judicial discretion.
The statute governing marital property distribution in New York
follows a similar pattern. The judge is directed to distribute the
property "equitably between the parties, considering the circumstan-
ces of the case and of the respective parties."21  Equity is to be
determined based on judicial consideration of twelve soup-to-nuts
factors plus the same catch-all clause.'
New York's rules are by no means atypical. Only seven states
require equal division of marital property or have adopted a
presumption in favor of equal division; the other forty-three
mandate "equitable" division, typically based on a lengthy factor list
21. Id. § 236B(5)(c) (McKinney 1986).
22. The factors are:
1. the income and property of each party at the time of marriage, and at the
time of the commencement of the action;
2. the duration of the marriage and the age and health of both parties;
3. the need of a custodial parent to occupy or own the marital residence and
to use or own its household effects;
4. the loss of inheritance and pension rights upon dissolution of the marriage
as of the date of dissolution;
5. any award of maintenance under subdivision six of this part;
6. any equitable claim to, interest in, or direct or indirect contribution made to
the acquisition of such marital property by the party not having title,
including joint efforts or expenditures and contributions and services as a
spouse, parent, wage earner and homemaker, and to the career or career
potential of the other party;
7. the liquid or non-liquid character of all marital property;
8. the probable future financial circumstances of each party;
9. the impossibility or difficulty of evaluating any component asset or any
interest in a business, corporation or profession, and the economic
desirability of retaining such asset or interest intact and free from any claim
or interference by the other party;
10. the tax consequences to each party;
11. the wasteful dissipation of assets by either spouse;
12. any transfer or encumbrance made in contemplation of a matrimonial action
without fair consideration;
13. any other factor which the court shall expressly find to be just and proper.
Id. § 236B(5)(d).
23. California, Louisiana, and New Mexico require equal division of marital property.
CAL. FAM. CODE § 2550 (West 1994); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2801(4)(b) (West 1991);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-7 (Michie 1994). Idaho, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin have
established an equal division presumption. IDAHO CODE § 32-712(1) (1990 & Supp. 1995);
TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.02 (West 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.080 (West
1994); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 766.31 (West 1995). For state-by-state categorization, see J.
THOMAS OLDHAM, DIVORCE, SEPARATION AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY
§ 13.02, at 13-8.1 n.9 (1994); Walker, supra note 2, at 445-46 tbl. IV.
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akin to that devised by the New York legislature.24 Alimony statutes
are more diverse in their details but equally uniform in their lack of
restrictions on judicial discretion in deciding whether alimony should
be awarded and in determining its duration and value.'
Today's alimony and property division rules, like current child
custody standards, thus invite the judge to evaluate each litigant's past
and to predict his or her future. They embody the ideal of th equity
court in their quest for individual justice. In pursuit of equity, they
grant the trial judge more discretion than does any other field of
private law.26
B. The Debate Over Discretion
In recent years many commentators have argued that judicial
discretion at divorce should be sharply curtailed. Some argue that
indeterminate standards have produced decisions that are arbitrary
rather than equitable.27 Others contend that discretionary standards
have resulted in decisions that generally favor husbands at the
expense of their wives and children.' Critics of judicial discretion
24. For a comparison of state standards, see Family L. Rep. Reference File-State
Divorce Laws (BNA) 401-53 (1993); OLDHAM, supra note 23, § 13.02, at 13-8.1 to 13-26.4.
For a list of states that mandate consideration of non-monetary contributions, economic
misconduct, and marital fault, see Walker, supra note 2, at 451-52 tbl. V.
25. For a comparison of state alimony rules, see Family L. Rep. Ref. File (BNA) 401-
53 (1993).
26. For similar views, see, e.g., Gary Crippen, The Abundance of Family Law Appeals:
Too Much of a Good Thing?, 26 FAM. L.Q. 85, 89 (1992) ("The uncertainty of many
family law standards is unique.") [hereinafter Crippen, Abundance]; Mary A. Glendon,
Fixed Rules and Discretion in Contemporary Family Law and Succession Law, 60 TUL. L.
REV. 1165, 1167 (1986) ("Family Law... is characterized by more discretion than any
other field of public law.").
27. See, e.g., OLDHAM, supra note 23, § 13.02(2), at 13-23 to 13-24; Glendon, supra
note 26, at 1168-72; Jane C. Murphy, Eroding the Myth of Discretionary Justice in Family
Law: The Child Support Experiment, 70 N.C. L. REV. 209, 219-26 (1991).
28. See, e.g., MARY A. GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 91-92
(1987) (claiming that judges tend to protect the former husband's standard of living at the
expense of ex-wives and children); WEITZMAN, supra note 12, at 194-214, 395-400
(describing and criticizing judicial attitudes toward economic decisions at divorce); Murphy,
supra note 27, at 218-19 ("[D]iscretionary standards... have resulted in retention by men
of a disproportionate share of family assets after divorce."); Deborah L. Rhode & Martha
Minow, Reforming the Questions, Questioning the Reforms: Feminist Perspectives on
Divorce Law, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 198-208 (Stephen D. Sugarman
& Henna H. Kay eds., 1990) [hereinafter CROSSROADS] (claiming that current rules
reinforce gender inequalities).
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also urge that bright-line rules would reduce the cost of divorce
litigation and foster settlement.2 9
Discretion's critics are undeniably right that vague rules increase
the likelihood that characteristics of the judge, the court, or the
community may affect case outcome." Nor can discretionary
standards provide as much certainty to litigants who want to settle
their cases as would rules;3 because the results of litigation are
uncertain, the parties are dependent upon the expertise of lawyers or
other experts in assessing their litigation prospects 2 and perhaps
more vulnerable to strong-arm negotiating tactics.33
29. See, e.g., OLDHAM, supra note 23, § 13.02(2), at 13-24 (concluding that current
discretionary rules discourage settlement); Glendon, supra note 26, at 1170 (concluding
that under current discretionary rules "the economically stronger party gains negotiating
leverage"); Stephen J. Brake, Note, Equitable Distribution vs. Fixed Rules: Marital
Property Reform and the Uniform Marital Property Act, 23 B.C. L. REV. 761, 788 (1982)
(arguing that a fixed rule system is preferable to equitable property distribution because
it "is inexpensive, predictable, and able to minimize the need for litigation").
30. See generally KENNETH C. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 3-26, 52-96, 215-33
(1969) (discussing potential for injustice when decision-maker possesses extensive
discretion). For empirical evidence on the impact of nonlegal factors on custody decision
making at divorce, see Jessica Pearson & Maria A. Luchesi Ring, Judicial Decision-Making
in Contested Custody Cases, 21 J. FAM. L. 703, 718-23 (1982-83) (reporting that younger
judges in urban areas were more likely to award custody to fathers than were older judges
in rural locations).
31. Most litigation models suggest a higher litigation rate when the law is uncertain.
See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes
and Their Resolution, 27 J. ECON. LIT. 1067, 1092-93 (1989); George L. Priest & Benjamin
Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1984) [hereinafter
Selection of Disputes]; George L. Priest, Measuring Legal Change, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
193, 197-200 (1987); Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis
Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55,56-58
(1982). For criticism of the thesis that uncertainty fuels litigation, see, e.g., Theodore
Eisenberg, Commentary on "On the Nature of Bankruptcy": Bankruptcy and Bargaining,
75 VA. L. REv. 205, 209-11 (1989); Peter H. Schuck, The Role of Judges in Settling
Complex Cases: The Agent Orange Example, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 337, 346 n.30 (1986).
32. See, eg., Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 14, at 979 (stating that under an
uncertain standard "[a] lawyer may be necessary simply for a person to learn what his
bargaining chips are"). For descriptions of the lawyer's role in the settlement process, see
Howard S. Erlanger et al., Participation & Flexibility in Informal Processes: Cautions from
the Divorce Context, 21 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 585, 590-602 (1987); Herbert Jacob, The
Elusive Shadow of the Law, 26 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 565,579-86 (1992); Marygold S. Melli
et al., The Process of Negotiation: An Exploratory Investigation in the Context of No-Fault
Divorce, 40 RUTGERS L. REV. 1133, 1144 (1988) [hereinafter Process of Negotiation];
Austin Sarat & William L.F. Felstiner, Lawyers and Legal Consciousness: Law Talk in the
Divorce Lawyer's Office, 98 YALE L.J. 1663, 1670-87 (1989); Austin Sarat & William L.F.
Felstiner, Law and Strategy in the Divorce Lawyer's Office, 20 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 93, 99-
125 (1986) [hereinafter Law & Strategy].
33. See, e.g., Erlanger et al., supra note 32, at 596-98 ("In divorce, the same flexibility
that allows generosity and creative arrangements also allows emotional intimidation, asset-
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But these inevitable aspects of discretion do not inexorably
produce arbitrariness, bias, or uncertainty. First of all, judicial
discretion at divorce is not as unlimited as statutory law alone would
suggest. Judges are also bound, in Cardozo's words, by "[a] thousand
limitations."34 The most obvious of these limitations is the appellate
court's power of reversal. In addition to this systemic restraint upon
judicial discretion, judges respond to precedent, to the informal norms
of the courthouse, and to those of the profession. These constraints
establish a perimeter beyond which judicial decisions are unlikely to
stray." It is possible that the boundaries imposed by appellate
courts and informal norms sufficiently limit judicial discretion so as to
ensure a fairly high level of consistency. Coupled with the mediating
function of lawyers, these limitations may provide as much guidance
to litigants and the settlement process as would a bright-line ap-
proach.36
Although the debate over discretion is central to divorce law
today, we have little evidence on how much inconsistency, bias, and
expense discretion has in fact produced. On the issue of inconsisten-
cy, the reports are contradictory. Some studies of child support
decisions report marked disparities in the results of like cases, the
decision-making patterns of different judges, and even the decisions
hiding, and the exertion of financial leverage."); Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 14,
at 978-80 (noting that discretionary rules disadvantage the more risk-averse party and offer
greater opportunities for strategic behavior).
34. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 61 (1924), quoted in Carl
E. Schneider, Discretion and Rules: A Lawyer's View, in THE USES OF DISCRETION, supra
note 9, at 47, 79.
35. For more detailed analysis of these constraints, see Martha Feldman, Social Limits
to Discretion: An Organizational Perspective, in THE USES OF DISCRETION, supra note 9,
at 163, 174-83; Schneider, supra note 34, at 79-88. For descriptions of the judicial
socialization process, see, e.g., Lenore Alpert et al., Becoming a Judge: The Transition
from Advocate to Arbiter, 62 JUDICATURE 325 (1979); Robert Carp & Russell Wheeler,
Sink or Swim: The Socialization of a Federal District Judge, 21 J. PUB. L. 359 (1972).
36. For a detailed exposition of this position in the context of custody decision making,
see Schneider, supra note 8, at 2252-60, 2290-93. The substitution of bright-line rules for
vague standards does not necessarily decrease litigation. See Gary Crippen, Stumbling
Beyond the Best Interests of the Child- Reexamining Child Custody Standard-Setting in the
Wake of Minnesota's Four Year Experiment with the Primary Caretaker Preference, 75
MINN. L. REV. 427, 452-59 (1990) (finding that custody litigation rate did not decrease
after replacement of best interests test with primary caretaker presumption). Nor does the
replacement of a bright-line rule with a vague standard necessarily increase litigation. See,
e.g., Lenore J. Weitzman & Ruth B. Dixon, Child Custody Awards: Legal Standards and
Empirical Patterns for Child Custody, Support and Visitation After Divorce, 12 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 473, 501-05 (1979) (finding that custody litigation rate did not increase after
replacement of maternal presumption custody rule with best interests test).
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of a single judge.37  But other reports describe child support
decisions under discretionary standards as fairly predic-
table38-- almost as predictable, indeed, as reported outcomes under
determinate child support guidelines.39 On alimony40 and property
division" the data are also mixed. The claim of gender bias in
judicial decision making finds support in post-divorce income surveys,
which uniformly report that former wives and children in their
37. See JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, CHILD SUPPORT IN AMERICA 12 (1986) (finding that
among sample of fathers with one child earning between $145 and $155 per week, support
ordered ranged from $10 to $60 per week); Ann Nichols-Casebolt et al., Reforming
Wisconsin's Child Support System, in STATE POLICY CHOICES: THE WISCONSIN
EXPERIENCE 172, 176 tbl. 9.2 (Sheldon Danziger & John F. Witte eds., 1988) (finding that
awards ranged from zero to more than 100% of noncustodial parent's income); Kenneth
R. White & Thomas Stone, Jr., A Study of Alimony and Child Support Rulings with Some
Recommendations, 10 FAM. L.Q. 75,76-83 (1976) (finding that alimony and child support
awards to families in similar circumstances varied widely based on differing judicial
philosophies); Lucy M. Yee, What Really Happens in Child Support Cases: An Empirical
Study of Establishment and Enforcement of Child Support Orders in the Denver District
Court, 57 DENV. U. L. REv. 21, 27-30, 37-38 (1979) (finding that judicially ordered child
support varied widely).
38. MARYGOLD S. MELLI, CHILD SUPPORT AWARDS: A STUDY OF THE EXERCISE
OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION 41-42 (University of Wisconsin Institute for Research on
Poverty Discussion Paper 734-83) (1983) (finding that variation in child support orders
made by four judges was more a function of income differences than differing criteria);
Melli et al., supra note 32, at 1164 (finding that among samples including both stipulated
and judicially determined cases, the number of children, income of supporting parent, and
couple's estimated net worth accounted for almost 50% of variation in value of child
support).
39. See MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 14, at 120-23 tbl. 6.1, 156 tbl. 7.7 (finding
that 54% of variation in child support awards made under California's child support
guidelines was explicable; father's income and number of children were the most important
predictive variables).
40. Compare MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 14, at 124 (finding that 50% of
variation in alimony award values was explicable) and Robert F. Kelly & Greer L. Fox,
Determinants of Alimony Awards: An Empirical Test of Current Theories and a Reflection
on Public Policy, 44 SYRACUSE L. REv. 641,696-97 tbl. 3,700 (1993) (finding that alimony
decision was predictable in 96% of dual-earner and 91% of single-earner cases) with White
& Stone, supra note 37, at 80 (concluding that predictive alimony model could not be
developed because "[flew discernible trends appeared to exist in relation to each judge and
alimony").
41. Compare Suzanne Reynolds, The Relationship of Property Division and Alimony:
The Division of Property to Address Need, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 827, 854-55 (1988)
(reporting, based on survey of 138 judicial decisions, that judges seldom deviated from an
equal division of marital property except in extraordinary circumstances, typically involving
a spouse in poor health) with Harriet N. Cohen & Adria S. Hillman, Diagnosis Confirmed:
EDL Is Ailing, N.Y. ST. B. ASS'N FAM. L. REV. July 1985, at 3, 3 (reporting, based on
survey of 70 judicial decisions, that judges generally awarded wives less than 50% of the
marital property and de minimis shares of businesses and professional practices).
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custody have lower per capita incomes4 2 and living standards43 than
former husbands. But it ignores the substantial body of data showing
that, on average, wives fare better than husbands under discretionary
property distribution schemes.' As to the claims regarding the
42. BAKER, supra note 12, at i (finding that in Alaska divorce sample, wives' mean per
capita income fell by 33% while husbands' rose by 17%); BREt T ET AL., supra note 12,
at 7 (finding that in Connecticut divorce sample, wives' mean per capita income fell by
16%, while husbands' rose by 23%); Garrison, supra note 12, at 720-21 (finding that in
New York divorce sample, wives' mean per capita income fell by 32% while husbands'
rose by 82%); McLindon, supra note 12, at 392 (finding that in New Haven, Connecticut,
divorce sample wives' mean per capita income declined by 31% while husbands' increased
by 90%); Wishik, supra note 12, at 98 (finding that in Vermont divorce sample, wives'
mean per capita income fell by 33% while husbands' rose by 120%).
43. See WEITZMAN, supra note 12, at 337-43 (finding that one year after legal divorce,
divorced wives experienced a 73% decline in their standard of living while divorced
husbands experienced a 42% improvement); Greg J. Duncan & Saul D. Hoffnan, A
Reconsideration of the Economic Consequences of Marital Dissolution, 22 DEMOGRAPHY
485, 488 (1985) (finding that in the first year after divorce, the economic status of divorced
wives who did not remarry fell an average of 30%); Saul D. Hoffman & Greg J. Duncan,
What Are the Economic Consequences of Divorce?, 25 DEMOGRAPHY 641, 643-44 (1988)
(reporting that a recalculation of Weitzman's data suggests that the average decline in
divorced wives' standard of living was 33%); RHODE ISLAND ADVISORY COMMITTEE
REPORT, supra note 12, at 22-23 (finding that the average decline in standard of living of
divorced mothers with custody of minor children was 24%); Robert S. Weiss, The Impact
of Marital Dissolution on Income and Consumption in Single-Parent Households, 46 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 115 (1984) (finding that in the first year after divorce, the economic
status of divorced wives fell an average of 30%). For similar research findings outside the
United States, see, for example, EEKELAAR & MACLEAN, supra note 12, at 69-71 (United
Kingdom); Margaret Harrison et al., Payment of Child Maintenance in Australia: The
Current Position, Research Findings and Reform Proposals, 1 INT'L J.L. & FAM. 92, 101-06
(1987); see also Annemette Sorensen, Estimating the Economic Consequences of Separation
and Divorce: A Cautionary Tale from the United States, in ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF
DIVORCE: THE INTERNATIONAL PERSPECrIVE 263 (Lenore J. Weitzman & Mavis
Maclean eds., 1992) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL PERSPECrIVE] (surveying reports and
describing methodological issues in measuring changes in standard of living).
44. See STERIN & DAVIS, supra note 12, at 112 (finding that divorced wives in
Cuyahoga County, Ohio received an average of 77% of net worth when divorce based on
fault and 61% when divorce based on separation agreement); Garrison, supra note 12, at
673 tbl. 18 (finding that divorced wives in three New York counties received an average
of 55% of net worth); McLindon, supra note 12, at 383 (finding that divorced wives in New
Haven, Connecticut received an average of 68% of net worth); Rowe & Morrow, supra
note 12, at 475 (finding that divorced wives married for 10 or more years in three urban
Oregon counties received an average of 50% of net worth when home owned and 64%
when home not owned); Judith A. Seltzer & Irwin Garfinkel, Inequality in Divorce
Settlements: An Investigation of Property Settlements and Child Support Awards, in CHILD
SUPPORT ASSURANCE: DESIGN ISSUES, EXPECTED IMPACTS, AND POLITICAL BARRIERS
AS SEEN FROM WISCONSIN 79, 90 tbl. 4.2 (Irwin Garfinkel et al. eds., 1992) (finding that
the mean percentage of divorced mothers' total property award was 54%). But see
BAKER, supra note 12, at 8 (finding that divorced wives in Anchorage, Alaska received an
average of 29% of net worth when divorced by dissolution and 50% when divorced by
traditional procedure).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
impact of discretionary standards on the settlement process, there is
currently no direct evidence on how judicial decisions deviate, if at all,
from the patterns exhibited in settled cases. And, although there are
data supporting the claim that discretionary standards breed more
litigation than do rules,45 there is also evidence suggesting that
divorce litigants frequently reach settlement decisions with little
awareness of, or concern for, legal norms.46
Even if all the claims of discretion's critics are correct, evidence
showing that the substitution of bright-line rules would improve
matters is lacking. Rules, like discretion, entail inevitable disad-
vantages. The most obvious of these is inflexibility. Hard and fast
rules work well where there is broad consensus on the right results in
easily definable case categories. But where consensus is lacking or
where the boundaries between case categories are blurred, the price
of certainty may well be inequity. These concerns are particularly
acute in areas of the law that aim, as has divorce law, at individually
tailored results.
Consider the federal government's recent reform of criminal
sentencing.47 Prior to that reform, criminal sentencing was highly
discretionary. The judge was expected to make an individual
judgment, akin to that expected by divorce law, about the defendant's
past and future." Reforms were introduced because of a growing
perception that the result of discretion was inconsistency rather than
individual tailoring.49 These concerns, similar to those that have
been voiced in response to discretionary decision making at divorce,
45. See Brinig & Alexeev, supra note 14, at 294 tbl. II (reporting higher litigation rate
for Virginia divorce sample (indeterminate rules) than for Wisconsin divorce sample (more
certain rules)).
46. See, eg., Erlanger et al., supra note 32, at 600 ("Legal constraints are decidedly
less important [to divorce settlement than emotional and financial issues]; many parties
even disregard the advice of their attorneys."); Jacob, supra note 32, at 579-81,584-86 ("In
divorce it seems that attorneys do not typically conduct the negotiations [and] agreements
are often worked out in private with very little apparent law talk."); see also infra note 164
and sources cited therein (describing low rate of legal representation in divorce cases).
47. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-59,3561-66,3571-74,3581-86 (1994) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-98
(1988 & Supp. 1993)).
48. For a description of common law sentencing, see STANTON WHEELER ET AL.,
SITTING IN JUDGMENT: THE SENTENCING OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIMINALS (1988).
49. The literature is extensive. See, e.g., ALFRED BLUMSTEIN ET AL., RESEARCH ON
SENTENCING: THE SEARCH FOR REFORM (1983); MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL
SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1972); PIERCE O'DONNELL ET AL., TOWARD A
JUST AND EFFECTIVE SENTENCING SYSTEM: AGENDA FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM (1977);
ANTHONY PARTRIDGE & WILLIAM B. ELDRIDGE, THE SECOND CIRCUIT SENTENCING
STUDY: A REPORT TO THE JUDGES OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT (1974).
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led to the introduction of sentencing "guidelines" that reduce judicial
discretion in order to ensure more predictable, uniform punishments.
But the result of reform has been a new wave of criticism suggesting
that the cure has been worse than the problem."0 Sentences under
the guidelines are undeniably more predictable, but also, in the eyes
of many observers,5 much less fair.
C. Discretion vs. Rules: A Question of Values
A fundamental (and frequently overlooked) issue in the debate
over discretion at divorce is thus the model of justice upon which
divorce law rests. Should divorce law continue to strive for the results
of a Solomon or seek instead those of a tax code? The former
approach necessitates a large measure of discretion, the latter a large
number of rules.
The modern attack on discretion impliedly assumes that
individually tailored results are not a necessary, or perhaps even a
desirable, goal of divorce law. Certainly a radically different decision-
making model governs when marriage terminates through death
rather than divorce. Probate law nowhere permits judicial discretion
in the determination of spousal rights. Under both community
property and common law elective share rules, the surviving spouse's
entitlement is fixed and unvarying; individual circumstances such as
need, resources, marital contribution, and fault are irrelevant to case
50. See, e.g. FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMM., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS
STUDY COMMITTEE 135-43 (1990); Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing
Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 901 (1991); Daniel J. Freed,
Federal Sentencing in the Wake of the Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion
of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681 (1992); Gerald W. Heaney, The Reality of Guidelines
Sentencing: No End to Disparity, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 161 (1991); Stephen J. Schulhofer,
Assessing the Federal Sentencing Process: The Problem Is Uniformity, Not Disparity, 29
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 833 (1992); see also Michael Tonry, Twenty Years of Sentencing
Reform: Steps Forward, Steps Backward, 78 JUDICATURE 169, 171-72 (1995) (describing
level and sources of dissatisfaction with guidelines).
51. Only 7% of federal and state judges polled by the American Bar Association
indicated that the federal sentencing guidelines have worked "well" or "very well," while
51% said that they had worked "very poorly" or "somewhat poorly." Don J. DeBenedic-
tis, The Verdict Is In, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1993, at 79. Fifty-nine percent agreed with the
statement that "federal guidelines established to standardize prison sentences [should] be
scrapped." Id.
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outcome.51 Probate law thus strives for certainty at the expense of
individualized equity.
The stark contrast between divorce and probate law, both of
which regulate spousal economic rights at marital dissolution, invites
inquiry: Why are the rules so different? The most common
explanation focuses on the need for certainty in probate law, as
compared to the need for individualized results in family law.53 But
this, of course, restates the difference rather than explains it.
A more fundamental explanation can be found in the historical
foundations of these two bodies of law. Probate law derives from
property law; its primary goal has been the delineation of mechanisms
for the orderly transmission of powers and entitlements. Probate
law's quest for certainty thus reflects its focus on rights, their
protection, and their clarification.54 But the common law historically
granted wives55 and children56 virtually no property or support
rights. Divorce law, which emerged from ecclesiastical57 and welfare
law,58 was thus the exclusive province of fault-based remedies.
52. The surviving spouse's fractional share of the decedent's assets is specified with
finality by the legislature, as is the asset pool to which that fraction will apply. For a
description and comparison of spousal entitlements under community property and
common law rules, see, e.g., WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN, JR. ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS AND
ESTATES 116-27, 133-49 (1988).
53. See, e.g., Glendon, supra note 26, at 1167.
54. See Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577,577
(1988) (describing fixed property rules as "the very stuff of property: their great
advantage, or so it is commonly thought, is that they signal to all of us, in a clear and
distinct language, precisely what our obligations are and how we may take care of our
interests").
55. At marriage, the husband gained control of any property the wife owned
previously. The wife lost the ability to buy or sell land without her husband's consent, to
enter into contracts, or even to make a will. See CLARK, supra note 1, § 8.1, at 498-501;
RODERICK PHILLIPS, PUTTING ASUNDER: A HISTORY OF DIVORCE IN WESTERN
SOCIETY 374-75 (1988); ELIZABETH B. WARBASSE, THE CHANGING LEGAL RIGHTS OF
MARRIED WOMEN 1800-1861, at 7-29 (1987). After marriage, the wife's sole property
entitlement was dower, which entitled the wife who survived her husband to a life estate
in one-third of all real property owned by the husband during the marriage. CLARK, supra
note 1, § 8.1, at 500-01.
56. Although the common law recognized a father's right to his child's labor, it
accorded children no corollary right of support or inheritance except in the case of entailed
property. See Jacobus tenBroek, California's Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin,
Development, and Present Status, Part I, 16 STAN. L. REV. 257, 287-90 (1964). For
descriptions of the development of the child support obligation, see EEKELAAR &
MACLEAN, supra note 12, at 1-3, 19-31; tenBroek, supra, at 289-312.
57. For a detailed historical description of the religious background of divorce law, see
PHILLIPS, supra note 55, at 1-190.
58. For descriptions of the welfare law origins of divorce law support entitlements, see
EEKELAAR & MACLEAN, supra note 12, at 1-10, 19-22; tenBroek, supra note 56, at 262-63,
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Alimony, like the divorce decree itself, was available only to the wife
who had been wronged by her husband.59 Although child support
laws first arose to protect the public treasury rather than a
matrimonial victim,' divorce statutes enacted during the nineteenth
century6' merged the twin themes of public protection and remedial
justice.6" Alimony and child support were seen as compensation for
the virtuous wife and mother, punishment for the guilty husband and
father, and protection for the public against the specter of welfare
dependence.63 Divorce law's reliance on discretion thus reflects its
origins as an equitable remedy.
D. The Recent History of Divorce Reform: A Study in Paradox
It is possible to envision replacing discretion with rules today
because modem divorce law has shifted away from its traditional goal
300-06.
59. The alimony remedy, first developed by the English ecclesiastical courts, was
designed to provide recompense to the wife whose husband had both profited from
property that she had brought into the marriage and caused the dissolution of the marriage
itself. Alimony was from its inception an equitable remedy designed to mitigate the
harshness of common law property rules. See EEKELAAR & MACLEAN, supra note 12, at
6. For a description of the history and development of the alimony concept in American
law, see HOMER H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
420-27 (1st ed. 1968) [hereinafter CLARK, FIRST EDITION].
60. Child support was first identified as a legal obligation by the Elizabethan Poor
Laws. For descriptions of the Poor Law origins of English and American child support
laws, see EEKELAAR & MACLEAN, supra note 12, at 1-3, 19-31; Stefan A. Riesenfeld, The
Formative Era of American Public Assistance Law, 43 CAL. L. REV. 175, 199 (1955);
tenBroek, supra note 56, at 278-86.
61. The liberalization of rules governing access to divorce over the last couple of
centuries has been extensively documented. See, eg., LYNNE C. HALEM, DIVORCE
REFORM: CHANGING LEGAL AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES 27-51,233-83 (1980); PHILLIPS,
supra note 55, at 403-18; GLENDA RILEY, DIVORCE: AN AMERICAN TRADITION 34-49
(1991); LAWRENCE STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE: ENGLAND 1530-1987, at 149-59, 181-82
(1990).
62. For a detailed description of the Field Code provisions relating to family law and
their links with contemporary poverty law, see, e.g., tenBroek, supra note 56, at 291-317.
63. Public assistance schemes developed similar eligibility criteria. Benefits were
available only to the "worthy" poor, a group that excluded the wife who had abandoned
a husband without good cause. Even the mother's pension movement of the early
twentieth century extended welfare benefits only to widowed or abandoned mothers of
young children. See 2 CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
369-97 (Robert H. Bremner ed., 1971) (quoting extensively from contemporary accounts
of the mother's pension movement). For analyses of nineteenth century views on the link
between poverty and morality, see GERTRUDE HIMMELFARB, THE IDEA OF POVERTY:
ENGLAND IN THE EARLY INDUSTRIAL AGE (1983); Calvin Woodard, Reality and Social
Reform: The Transition from Laissez-Faire to the Welfare State, 72 YALE L.J. 286 (1962).
The classic history of American welfare policy during this era is ROBERT H. BREMNER,
FROM THE DEPTHS: THE DISCOVERY OF POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 204-68 (1956).
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of remedial, fault-based justice. The most obvious example of this
trend is the widespread introduction of "no-fault" divorce grounds.
A showing of marital fault is, in the vast majority of states, no longer
a requirement for obtaining a divorce;' divorce is thus a right rather
than a remedy. In a growing number of states, the role of fault has
also been dramatically curtailed in the determination of alimony6
and in property division.6
As the theme of fault in divorce law has waned,67 the theme of
dependency prevention has, not surprisingly, waxed. The redefinition
of alimony, from a remedy for the matrimonial victim to "main-
tenance" for the ex-spouse incapable of self-support is a prime
example of this shift in emphasis.6" Another lies in the area of child
support, where the federal government, pursuant to its authority over
public assistance programs for children, has mandated major revisions
of the traditional rules.69
64. Some form of no-fault divorce is today available in all states. See Fam. L. Rep.
Ref. File (BNA) 401-53 (1993). Only three states (Mississippi, New York, and Tennessee)
restrict no-fault divorce to cases involving spousal agreement. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-
5-2(1) (1994) (requiring joint petition with separation agreement); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW
§ 170(6) (McKinney 1988) (requiring husband and wife to live separate and apart for one
year pursuant to a separation agreement before no-fault divorce will be granted); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 36-4-101(12) (1991) (requiring separation agreement for couples with minor
children).
65. See supra note 4.
66. In a number of states, marital fault other than dissolution of marital assets may not
be considered in property division. See e.g., JOHN D. GREGORY, THE LAW OF
EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION § 9.03[1] (1989) (describing state rules). In other states, marital
fault may be considered by the decision-maker only when egregious. Id.
67. This development has produced a substantial critical literature. See, e.g., ALLEN
M. PARKMAN, NO-FAULT DIVORCE: WHAT WENT WRONG? (1992); MILTON C. REGAN,
JR., FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF INTIMACY 137-48 (1993); Elizabeth S. Scott,
Rational Decisionmaking about Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA. L. REV. 9, 10 (1990); Lynn
D. Wardle, No-Fault Divorce and the Divorce Conundrum, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 79, 79-80
(1991). For expanations of the declining role of fault in family law, see REGAN, supra, at
34-67; Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American Family
Law, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1803, 1833-70 (1985).
68. For descriptions and criticisms of this trend, see, e.g., Ann L. Estin, Maintenance,
Alimony, and the Rehabilitation of Family Care, 71 N.C. L. REV. 721 (1993); Joan M.
Krauskopf, Rehabilitative Alimony: Uses and Abuses of Limited Duration Alimony, 21
FAM. L.Q. 573 (1988); Mary E. O'Connell, Alimony After No-Fault: A Practice in Search
of a Theory, 23 NEW ENG. L. REV. 437 (1988); Katherine K. Baker, Comment, Contracting
for Security: Paying Married Women What They've Earned, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1193,
1202-12 (1988).
69. See ANDREA H. BELLER & JOHN W. GRAHAM, SMALL CHANGE: THE
ECONOMICS OF CHILD SUPPORT 1-6 (1993) (providing history of federal reforms); see also
Harry D. Krause, Child Support Reassessed, in CROSSROADS, supra note 28, at 169-74
(describing the federal requirements).
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The new emphasis on dependency prevention also enhances the
appeal of rules, as welfare law has, like divorce law, shifted away from
eligibility determinations based on moral judgment toward a neutral,
rule-based system of administration." It is thus no accident that the
new child support laws restrict judicial discretion, traditionally as
extensive for child support as for alimony determination and property
distribution,7' through numerical guidelines.72
Both the shift in divorce law away from fault-based outcomes and
the enhanced role of dependency prevention as a theme of divorce
law thus contribute to the growing appeal of rules: Neither the
protection of rights nor the administration of public benefits are today
thought to require individualized equitable judgments. But the
underlying shift in social values regarding marriage, gender roles, and
the family73 that is reflected in these divorce law trends also,
ironically, has enhanced the appeal of discretionary standards. The
abolition of gender-based standards in custody and alimony deter-
uination, and the elimination of title-based property distribution rules
and fault barriers to an alimony award, have all produced more,
rather than less, discretionary decision making.
Discretion has prevailed over rules because social consensus
about the right rules to apply to these decisions has been slow to
develop.74 The rapid acceptance of no-fault divorce laws simply did
70. For descriptions and analyses of this trend within public assistance law, see
KIRSTEN GR0NBJERG ET AL., POVERTY AND SOCIAL CHANGE 133-62 (1978); William H.
Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class in the Welfare System, 92 YALE L.J. 1198, 1200
(1983); William H. Simon, The Invention and Reinvention of Welfare Rights, 44 MD. L.
REV. 1, 35-37 (1985).
71. New York's prior child support law, for example, directed the judge to "give such
direction ... for the custody, care, education and maintenance of any child of the parties,
as, in the court's discretion, justice requires, having regard to the circumstances of the case
and of the respective parties and to the best interests of the child." N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW
§ 240(1) (McKinney 1986) (amended 1994).
72. For descriptions of the various numerical guidelines in effect, see CLAIRE B.
GRIMM & JANICE T. MUNSTERMAN, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, A
SUMMARY OF CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES (National Center for State Courts 1991); Irwin
Garfinkel & Marygold S. Melli, The Use of Normative Standards in Family Law Decisions:
Developing Mathematical Standards for Child Support, 24 FAM. L.Q. 157, 162-68 (1990).
73. For descriptions of these shifts, see e.g., ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF
THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE 85-112 (1985);
JOSEPH VEROFF ET AL., THE INNER AMERICAN: A SELF PORTRAIT FROM 1957 TO 1976
(1981); Arland Thornton, Changing Attitudes Toward Family Issues in the United States,
51 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 873 (1989).
74. The primacy of discretion may also reflect more general legal trends. Legal
theorists have seen a general tendency toward the expansion of judicial discretion during
the modem era and have noted that "[m]uch of the trend derives from modem legislation
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not produce consensus regarding divorce obligations and entitlements.
Differing paradigms of gender and marital roles, coupled with
competing visions of individual autonomy and commitment, have
instead produced controversy over custody standards,' alimony,76
and property division.77 This controversy over divorce law standards
is part of a much larger national debate on the issues of family,
gender, and individual responsibility, a debate that has been as
divisive as it has been impassioned." The "war over the family ' 79
has not been concluded, and it is thus unclear whether bright-line
rules can be drafted that would embody any genuine public consensus.
Legislatures today therefore confront a paradox in divorce law.
The declining role of fault, coupled with the increased importance of
dependency prevention as a theme of divorce law, argue in favor of
a rule-based system of justice. But the competing rules that have
emerged embody such vastly different, and emotionally charged,
which delegates very extensive powers to the judges to decide various questions as they
think fit, or as may seem just and equitable, rather than in accordance with pre-defined
and fixed rules of law." P.S. ATIYAH, LAW AND MODERN SOCIETY 36 (1983); see P.S.
ATIYAH, FROM PRINCIPLES TO PRAGMATISM: CHANGES IN THE FUNCTION OF THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS AND THE LAW (1978) [hereinafter ATIYAH, PRINCIPLES TO
PRAGMATISM]; GALLIGAN, supra note 9, at 72-84; ROBERTO M. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN
SOCIETY 192-200 (1976).
75. Compare, e.g., MARTHA A. FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE
RHETORIC AND REALITY OF DIVORCE 79-94, 180-84 (1991) (favoring primary caretaker
presumption) with Katharine T. Bartlett & Carol B. Stack, Joint Custody, Feminism and
the Dependency Dilemma, 2 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 9, at 35-41 (1986) (favoring joint
custody) and Elizabeth S. Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preferences, and Child Custody, 80
CAL. L. REv. 615, 630-43 (1992) (favoring custody standard based on replication of past
parental roles) and Schneider, supra note 8, at 2293-98 (favoring retention of best interests
standard).
76. Compare, e.g., Jane Rutherford, Duty in Divorce: Shared Income as a Path to
Equality, 58 FORDHAM L. REv. 539,577-90 (1990) (favoring universal permanent alimony
in amount that would equalize spouses' post-divorce living standard) with Ira M. ElIman,
The Theory of Alimony, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1, 53-74 (1989) (favoring alimony when spouse
makes marital investment resulting in post-marriage reduction in earning capacity if
decision is financially rational and results in increased marital income or if decision is
based on child care needs) and Jana B. Singer, Divorce Reform and Gender Justice, 67
N.C. L. REV. 1103, 1117-21 (1989) (favoring alimony based on marital duration).
77. Compare, e.g., FINEMAN, supra note 75, at 36-52, 175-80 (favoring need-based
equitable property distribution) with WEITZMAN, supra note 12, at 108 (favoring equal
property distribution).
78. See BRIGITTE BERGER & PETER L. BERGER, THE WAR OVER THE FAMILY:
CAPTURING THE MIDDLE GROUND (1983). For academic commentary on family law as
a means of promoting marital commitment and responsibility, see, e.g., GLENDON, supra
note 28, at 107-11; REGAN, supra note 67, at 93-117. On the role of family law in
promoting gender equality, see, e.g., FINEMAN, supra note 75, at 51-52, 173-76; SUSAN M.
OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 170-86 (1989).
79. See BERGER & BERGER, supra note 78.
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assumptions about the nature of marriage and parenthood that a grant
of judicial discretion has appeared to be the better part of legislative
valor.
E. Prospects and Problems in Reducing Judicial Discretion
The likely result of this paradox is legislative initiatives that aim
to channel, rather than eliminate, judicial discretion. Such channeling
can be accomplished in a variety of ways. Legislatures can: require
specification of the facts that justify the decision to facilitate review;
mandate, rather than merely invite, consideration of issues that are
deemed crucial; limit the issues judges may consider in reaching
decisions; delineate weights that factors should receive; or establish
presumptive outcomes. Nor need the choice be the same for all cases.
The legislature might restrict or even eliminate discretion in one
category of cases, while preserving it in others. The important
question for divorce law today thus is not whether rules should
replace discretion, but how discretion and rule should be balanced.80
This choice is not always an obvious one. Rule changes designed
to achieve one goal can produce unanticipated, or even contrary,
results. Consider California's adoption of an equal marital property
division rule to replace its prior equitable distribution regime.1 The
change was predicated upon the assumption that, under the old
regime, property was typically divided into relatively equal shares; the
new rule was thus expected to curb variation without altering overall
outcomes.82 But researchers later determined that women had
typically received more than half of the marital property under the
old law and that deferred distribution of the marital home in cases
involving minor children declined dramatically under the new one.83
The change in legal standards thus unexpectedly had a detrimental
impact on wives and children.
Unintended results can also occur, of course, when bright-line
rules are replaced with discretionary standards. New York's
80. For a similar perspective, see KENNETH C. DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION 151-58
(1975) ("Most practical problems about rule and discretion do not invite choosing between
rule and discretion; they invite choosing between one mix of rule and discretion and
another mix of rule and discretion.").
81. For descriptions of California's divorce law reform, see, e.g., HERBERT JACOB,
SILENT REVOLUTION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF DIVORCE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES
43-61 (1988); Herma H. Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce
and Its Aftermath, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 26-55 (1987).
82. See WEITZMAN, supra note 12, at 75.
83. Id. at 74; Seal, supra note 12, at 12.
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Equitable Distribution Law, which replaced a title-based property
distribution rule with an equitable distribution principle, was designed
to benefit divorced wives, who were thought to receive considerably
less property than husbands under the title-based distribution law.'
But because wives actually received, on average, slightly more net
property than did husbands under the old rules, 5 the new law had
little impact on the average property distribution.
These examples suggest that the right mix of rule and discretion
cannot be achieved without a detailed understanding of current
outcomes and the manner in which they are produced. An understan-
ding of judicial decision making can aid this inquiry in two important
ways: Judges' decisions reveal both the range of current results (and
thus the need for limitations on discretion) as well as the degree of
consensus about appropriate outcomes in particular case categories.
One key issue in determining the right mix of rule and
discretion, for example, is the extent to which judges actually employ
the extensive discretion they possess. Researchers in a variety of
contexts have noted the tendency of decision-makers to rely on a
small number of norms or key facts when determining case out-
comes. 6 If judges decide most divorce cases on the basis of such
routine norms-and there is evidence that comports with this
hypothesis7---the negative impact on individual equity from the
adoption of formal rules embodying these judicial norms should be
quite modest. If the results of settled cases are considerably more
variable than those of cases decided by judges, the advantages of a
rule reducing judicial discretion could also be substantial. If the
outcomes of settled cases are fully consistent with judicial decisions,
however, the advantages of a formal, bright-line rule would be slight.
84. For historical accounts of New York's divorce reform, see Isabel Marcus, Locked
In and Locked Out. Reflections on the History of Divorce Law Reform in New York State,
37 BuFF. L. REV. 375 (1988-89); Isabel Marcus, Reflections on the Significance of the
Sex/Gender System: Divorce Law Reform in New York, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 55 (1987);
Jessica C. Brynteson, Note, Recent Developments: Equitable Distribution in New York, 45
ALB. L. REV. 483, 486-90 (1980-81).
85. See Garrison, supra note 12, at 673-74 tbls. 18 & 19.
86. See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 80, at 150-51; RICHARD LEMPERT & JOSEPH SANDERS,
AN INVITATION TO LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 75-78 (1986); Lempert, supra note 17, at
185, 216-17. For a list of research reports, see infra note 358.
87. See Reynolds, supra note 41, at 854-55 (reporting, based on evaluation of 138
judicial opinions from six equitable distribution states, that judges rarely deviated from
equal property division except in extraordinary cases, which typically involved spousal
disability).
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Analysis of judicial decision making can also reveal the range of
factors relevant to case outcome, the level of agreement among judges
on the importance and ordering of those factors, and the extent to
which judges' private values influence results. Ift for example, judges
exhibit a high degree of consensus on the relevant case variables, but
that consensus is not reflected in settled cases, a bright-line rule
capturing judicial consensus would seem both achievable and useful.
If judicial decisions are highly variable, and more strongly correlated
with judicial characteristics than with the factors specified by the
legislature, the case for reducing judicial discretion in order to
promote consistency is also strong-but the inability of judges to
reach consensus suggests difficulty in fashioning a rule that will
achieve broad public support. f on the other hand, judges with
varied backgrounds, in different locations, consistently reach similar
results in similar cases, and those results are faithfully mirrored in
settled cases, it is not apparent that judicial discretion should be
curtailed at all.
An analysis of judicial decision making can also help us
determine the type and level of restraint to impose upon judicial
discretion in order to achieve desired results. If judicial decision-
making patterns shift significantly after a minor statutory limitation is
imposed, it is unlikely that major intrusions will be necessary to
achieve legislative goals. The impact of appellate case law can, of
course, be similarly measured. Analysis of judicial decision making
thus offers one of the best available methods for measuring how much
we need limitations on judicial discretion and how likely it is that
various limitations will work. Indeed, it is unlikely that legislative
change can be effective without such information.
Despite its importance, surprisingly little research on judicial
decision making at divorce is currently available." None of the
available research provides a unified look at economic entitlements;
child support, alimony, or property division are instead considered in
a vacuum. None describes the characteristics of the decision-makers
or the litigants. None compares the pattern of judicial decisions with
that of settled cases or analyzes the impact of appellate courts. None
tracks the pattern of decisions over time or through a change in the
applicable legal standard.
My research on judicial decision making under New York's
Equitable Distribution Law was designed to fill some of these gaps.
88. See supra notes 37-41 and sources cited therein.
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The next section describes the background against which the research
was conducted: the law, the research sample, the judges, and the
couples whose cases were decided.
II. THE DECISION MAKING BACKGROUND: THE LAW, THE
RESEARCH SAMPLE, THE JUDGES,
AND THE LITIGANTS
A. New York's Equitable Distribution Law
New York's Equitable Distribution Law89 was enacted in 1980
after almost a decade of public debate and legislative negotiation.0
At the time of the 1980 reform, New York had one of the most
traditional American divorce regimes. Most states had by this point
adopted equitable property distribution principles 9a and introduced
short-term, rehabilitative alimony;9 in a growing number the role of
fault in alimony determination had also been substantially limited.93
But, at the time of the reform, property division in New York was
based on title.94 Alimony rules were fault and gender based;95 they
contained no provision for short-term or rehabilitative alimony.
The reform brought New York's alimony and property division
rules into the new divorce law mainstream.96 The new alimony law
eliminated marital fault as a barrier to an alimony (renamed "main-
tenance" under the new statute) award,97 made the determination of
89. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236b (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1994).
90. See supra note 12 and sources cited therein.
91. In 1978 New York was one of only six states (Florida, Mississippi, New York,
Pennsylvania, Virginia, and West Virginia) that awarded property to the titleholder. Doris
J. Freed & Henry H. Foster, Jr., Divorce in the Fifty States: An Overview as of 1978, 13
FAM. L.Q. 105, 116-17 tbl. IV (1979).
92. See supra note 5.
93. Freed & Foster, supra note 91, at 118-26 tbl. V (listing trends that "downgrade
marital fault [in alimony determination]").
94. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 234 (McKinney 1977) (amended 1986).
95. Under the former law, only wives were eligible for alimony; a wife who was guilty
of misconduct sufficient to justify a divorce was not entitled to alimony. See id. § 236A.
96. The new law did not bring New York into the mainstream in terms of the grounds
for divorce. Although the majority of states had adopted some form of unilateral no-fault
divorce by 1980, New York did not. It remains one of a handful of states that permit
divorce only upon a showing of fault or spousal agreement. See supra note 64.
97. Compare N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236 (McKinney 1977) with 1980 N.Y. Laws
281(B)(6) (codified as amended at N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(6) (McKinney 1986 &
Supp. 1993)).
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alimony gender-neutral,9" and introduced the concept of short-term,
rehabilitative alimony;99 a detailed factor list was also added."°
The new property division legislation adopted the view of marriage
as an economic partnership in which both monetary contributions and
services as a spouse, parent, and homemaker contribute to the marital
estate; 1' it accordingly granted judges broad discretion to distribute
property acquired during the marriage based on a lengthy factor
list"° and without regard to title.'°
While the Equitable Distribution Law thus adopted a mainstream
approach to alimony and property division, New York courts, in
interpreting the new statute, have defined divisible property more
expansively than have other state courts. In contrast to all other
98. Compare N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236 (McKinney 1977) with 1980 N.Y. Laws
281(B)(6) (codified as amended at N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(6) (McKinney 1986 &
Supp. 1993)).
99. See 1980 N.Y. Laws 281(B)(6) (codified as amended at N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §
236(B)(6) (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1993)) (authorizing the court to determine the
"duration of maintenance" and listing as factors for consideration "the present and future
capacity of the person having need to be self-supporting" and "the period of time and
training necessary to enable the person having need to become self-supporting"); see also
1980 NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATIVE ANNUAL, MEMORANDUM OF ASSEMBLYMAN
GORDON W. BURROWS 130 [hereinafter ASSEMBLY MEMORANDUM] (describing the
objective of maintenance under the new statute as "award[ing] the recipient spouse an
opportunity to achieve independence").
100. Compare N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236 (McKinney 1977) (providing that "the court
may direct the husband to provide suitably for the support of the wife as, in the court's
discretion, justice requires, having regard to the length of the marriage, the ability of the
wife to be self-supporting, the circumstances of the case and of the respective parties")
with 1980 N.Y. Laws 281(B)(6) (codified as amended at N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 23603)(6)
(McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1993)) (listing 10 specific factors for the court to consider in
awarding spousal maintenance). An additional factor has been added since 1980, bringing
the current total to 11. 1986 N.Y. Laws 436-37, codified at N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW
§ 236(B)(6)(b)(5) (McKinney 1986).
101. See ASSEMBLY MEMORANDUM, supra note 99 (describing "basic premise" of
legislation as view that "modem marriage should be viewed as a partnership of coequals");
1980 N.Y. Laws 1863, GOVERNOR'S MEMORANDUM (describing premise of legislation as
view that marriage is an economic partnership).
102. 1980 N.Y. Laws 281 (codified as amended at N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(5)
(McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1993)). The original legislation contained nine factors plus a
catch-all clause; three more factors have since been added. Factor lists of this type are
now the norm. Walker, supra note 2, at 451-52 tbl. V.
103. Premarital property, gifts (except between spouses), inheritances, and personal
injury awards were classified as separate property and thus unavailable for distribution.
1980 N.Y. Laws 281 (codified as amended at N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236B(1) (McKinney
1988)). Most equitable distribution states have adopted similar classification schemes.
Walker, supra note 2, at 445-46 tbl. IV.
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appellate courts that have considered the issue,"° the New York
Court of Appeals held that a professional degree or license acquired
during the marriage constitutes divisible marital property;"'5 lower
courts have accordingly classified as divisible'0 6 assets that would be
indivisible elsewhere.' 7
Although New York's highest court defined marital property
expansively, it has offered mixed signals on non-economic
contribution to the marital partnership. The court held that the
increased value of one spouse's separate property accrued during the
marriage is subject to division when due, at least in part, to the
indirect contributions of the other as a spouse and homemaker." 8
But it also ruled that homemaking contributions do not necessarily
mandate an equal asset share.1°'
The impact of the new law on judicial decision making has been
highly controversial. Some women's advocates and divorce lawyers
have argued that many judges exhibit gender bias by undervaluing
104. For a listing of the cases and a description of their reasoning, see OLDHAM, supra
note 23, § 9.02[1].
105. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712 (N.Y. 1985).
106. See, e.g., Elkus v. Elkus, 572 N.Y.S.2d 901, 901 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (classifying
increased value of opera singer's career as marital property); Morimando v. Morimando,
536 N.Y.S.2d 701, 701 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (classifying license and certification as
physician's assistant as marital property); McGowan v. McGowan, 535 N.Y.S.2d 990, 990
(N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (classifying Master's degree in teaching as marital property);
Morrongiello v. Paulsen, 16 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1459, 1459 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990)
(classifying law degree as partly marital property where husband completed two years of
law school after marriage), modified, 601 N.Y.S.2d 121 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993); McAlpine
v. McAlpine, 539 N.Y.S.2d 680,681 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989), modified, 574 N.Y.S.2d 385 (N.Y.
App. Div.. 1991) (classifying Fellowship in Society of Actuaries as marital property).
107. See Lenore J. Weitzman, Marital Property in the United States, in INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE, supra note 43, at 132 tbl. 5.3 (summarizing state rules). Some states have
adopted rules that provide for monetary reimbursement to a spouse who has significantly
contributed to the other's acquisition of education during the marriage. Id.
108. Price v. Price, 503 N.E.2d 684 (N.Y. 1986). The New York statute, unlike
community property rules, does not specify that the title-holding spouse's efforts that
enhance the value of separate property during the marriage create divisible marital
property. On the contrasting community property rules, see, e.g., J. Thomas Oldham,
Separate Property Businesses That Increase in Value During Marriage, 1990 Wis. L. REV.
585, 587.
109. Arvantides v. Arvantides, 478 N.E.2d 199, 200 (N.Y. 1985) (upholding reduction
of wife's share of husband's dental practice from 50% to 25% based on the "modest
nature of plaintiffs contributions to the dental practice," and stating that since "the
plaintiff.., also received an award of maintenance, medical expenses, insurance benefits
and the more valuable of the two homes owned by the parties, the distribution cannot be
said to be inequitable").
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nonmonetary contributions to the marriage."' They have also
claimed that courts typically award wives de minimis shares of
professions and business assets, less than half of total marital
property, short-term alimony even after a long marriage, and
inadequate counsel fees."' Other experts describe these claims as
unfair and contend that judges have exercised their discretion
evenhandedly.'12
Although the charges on both sides have been largely based on
anecdote rather than empirical proof, the New York legislature was
sufficiently concerned about the claim that long-married wives were
typically awarded short-term alimony that, in 1986, it amended the
alimony provisions of the statute.'1 3  The amendments did not
reduce judicial discretion, however. Instead, they added new factors
designed to "inform the trial courts that long-term maintenance
awards were to be considered.""'  The impact of these
110. NEW YORK TASK FORCE ON WOMEN IN THE COURTS, REPORT 121 (1986)
[hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT] (finding that "[m]any lower court judges have
demonstrated a predisposition not to recognize or to minimize the homemaker spouse's
contributions to the marital economic partnership"); Harriet N. Cohen & Adria S.
Hillman, New York Courts Have Not Recognized Women as Equal Marriage Partners, 5
EQurr. DIST. RPTR., Mar. 1985, at 93,94 [hereinafter Cohen & Hillman, New York Courts]
(concluding, based on analysis of 70 reported decisions, that judges undervalue homemaker
contributions and exhibit gender bias); see also Georgia Dullea, Women's and Bar Groups
Fault Divorce Law, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1985, at Al (describing allegations of gender bias
in application of Equitable Distribution Law).
111. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 110, at 98-120 (describing testimony of
witnesses at public hearings and results of attorney survey); Cohen & Hillman, New York
Courts, supra note 110, at 94; Cohen & Hillman, supra note 41, at 3,4; Dullea, supra note
110, at Al.
112. See, e.g., TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 110, at 97-98 & n.160 (describing
testimony of witnesses at public hearings); id. at 109-18 (describing responses of attorney
survey respondents); Henry H. Foster, A Second Opinion: New York's EDL Is Alive and
Well and Is Being Fairly Administered, N.Y. ST. B. ASS'N FAM. L. REv. Apr. 1985, at 3,
4-5 (criticizing Hillman & Cohen as "deceptive when they manipulate New York cases to
fit a priori conclusions ... and ... unfair in their condemnations of the EDL and New
York courts").
113. See 1986 NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATIVE ANNUAL, MEMORANDUM OF AS-
SEMBLYWOMAN MAY W. NEWBURGER 356 (describing judicial misinterpretation of
maintenance provisions of equitable distribution law as basis for amendments); see also
1986 N.Y. Laws 3210, GOVERNOR'S MEMORANDUM (same).
114. Myrna Felder, Courts, Legislature Struggle to Answer Property Questions, N.Y. L.J.,
July 19, 1990, at 1, 4; see 1986 N.Y. Laws 436-37 (codified at N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §
236(B)(6) (McKinney 1986). The "where practical and relevant" limitation on the marital
standard of living factor was deleted, N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236B(6)(a) (McKinney
1986); "the ability of the ... [applicant] to be self-supporting" was added to the factor
requiring the court to consider "the time and training necessary ... to become self-
supporting," id. § 236B(6)(b)(4)); and two new factors were added. One of the new
factors required the court to consider "reduced or lost lifetime earning capacity of the
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amendments, like the Equitable Distribution Law itself, remains
controversial.'15
B. The Research Sample
My analysis of judicial decision making under the Equitable
Distribution Law is part of a larger research project aimed at
determining the impact of the change in legal standards upon divorce
outcomes."6 For analysis of the statute's overall impact, data were
drawn from the court files of approximately 900 divorces filed in 1978,
two years before enactment of the Equitable Distribution Law, and
from the files of approximately 900 divorces filed in 1984, four years
after the law's passage. In order to examine regional variation in case
outcomes, cases were selected in equal numbers from three diverse
counties: one from New York City, one from the suburban belt
surrounding it, and one representative of the mixed urban/rural
upstate region. 17  Analysis of the case data revealed that the
average property distribution varied little over the research period but
that the frequency and duration of alimony awards declined marked-
ly.118  Case outcomes for both time periods were also highly
variable; the passage of the law thus appeared to have little effect in
improving the consistency of results."9
Judicial decision making under the new statute could not be
analyzed through data from this sample because, as a result of the
extreme infrequency of divorce trials, it contained almost no judicial
decisions. A judicial case sample that represented decisions over a
longer period was also desirable in order to detect shifts in decision-
making patterns over time and the impact of the 1986 statutory
party seeking maintenance as a result of having foregone or delayed education, training,
employment, or career opportunities during the marriage," id. § 236B(6)(b)(5); the other
explicitly noted that the "court may award permanent maintenance," id. § 236B(6)(c)).
115. See, e.g., Cynthia Cooper, State's Lawyers Differ Over Law's Success in First Ten
Years, N.Y. L.J., July 19, 1990, at 1, 7 (reporting contrasting views of prominent divorce
lawyers on achievements of Equitable Distribution Law).
116. Most states adopted equitable property distribution principles gradually or altered
the grounds for divorce at the same time that standards governing property distribution
and/or alimony were changed. The passage of New York's Equitable Distribution Law
thus offered an unusual research opportunity to test the impact of change in divorce
entitlement rules upon divorce outcomes.
117. For more information on the research counties and relevant population
characteristics, see Garrison, supra note 12, at 643-48.
118. See id& at 675, 697-98.
119. See id. at 685-96, 706-11.
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amendments. A separate sample of judicial opinions was thus
compiled.
The judicial sample was assembled from decisions published
during the first ten years after the Equitable Distribution Law became
effective. All published trial court decisions on alimony and property
distribution in New York State were included.12°  Appellate
decisions were utilized to expand the sample: If an unpublished trial
court decision could be determined either from the appellate decision
itself or from the appellate record, the case was included in the
sample. This approach yielded a total of 383 decisions dating from
the statute's effective date of September 1, 1980, to September 1,
1990.121
It is impossible to ascertain to what extent this sample is
representative of the larger pool of judicial decisions, including those
that are both unreported and unappealed, or even what fraction of
the total it represents. New York State's Office of Court Ad-
ministration maintains no statistics on the number of trial court
decisions, the publication rate, or the appeals rate in divorce cases.
Nor is it possible to determine whether, or how, the outcomes and
decision-making patterns revealed in the sample might deviate from
those of the total pool of judicial decisions. Given the filtering effects
120. Sources of published decisions included, in addition to the official and West
reporters, the New York Law Journal and the Family Law Review, a publication of the
Family Law Section of the New York State Bar Association.
121. Because the records on appeal for appellate cases decided in 1990 were
unavailable at the time data collection terminated in August, 1992, only trial decisions
could be obtained for the year 1990. The number of 1990 decisions included in the study
was thus smaller than the total for each earlier year.
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of both publication' " and appeal,"z however, it is likely that some
deviation is present.
It is equally likely, however, that the decision-making patterns
exhibited in the judicial sample reveal many aspects of the larger
decision-making reality. The sample is large and extends over a ten-
year period. The cases come from all regions and judicial districts in
the state.124 (See Appendix, Figure Al.) Nearly two hundred
judges are represented. Moreover, it is from published opinions that
trial judges derive the legal principles that guide their decision
making; to stray too far from the norms of published opinion is to
invite appeal, reversal, and publication.
Published opinions also invite our attention because they
represent the public face of the law. Most observers of the divorce
process know no more about divorce decision making than what they
read in published opinions or glean from experience in a particular
court or locale. Journalists, legislators, law professors, and lawyers in
other areas of practice rely heavily upon published opinions. Even
the judge or lawyer who handles a high volume of divorce actions is
likely to know little more than what is available from published
opinions outside his or her geographic area. The body of published
opinions is thus the primary determinant of public and professional
opinion about divorce." 5
122. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, What Shapes Perceptions of
the Federal Court System?, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 527-28 (1989) (finding that success
rates in constitutional tort litigation varied significantly when published appellate decisions
were compared with district court cases litigated to trial); Susan M. Olson, Studying
Federal District Courts Through Published Cases: A Research Note, 15 JUST. SYS. J. 782,
782-83 (1992) ("Published cases are neither a representative sample of district court cases
nor a selection of all important cases."); Peter Siegelman & John J. Donohue III, Studying
the Iceberg From Its Tip: A Comparison of Published and Unpublished Employment
Discrimination Cases, 24 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 1133, 1133 (finding that published
employment discrimination cases differed from unpublished cases in significant and
predictable ways).
123. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Effects of Intent: Do
We Know How Legal Standards Work?, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1151,1191-93 (1991) (finding
that a cross-section of intent-based civil rights actions that had been appealed was not a
random sample of cases decided by opinion at the trial level); Selection of Disputes, supra
note 31, at 28-29 (finding that parties do not appeal a random cross-section of completed
cases).
124. The case distribution of the sample by judicial district roughly tracks the overall
distribution of litigation in New York. See STATE OF NEW YORK, THIRTEENTH ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATOR OF THE COURTS 22-23 tbl. 5 & 6 (1991).
125. See Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 122, at 502-04 (comparing perspectives of
nonjudicial observer of courts, trial court judge, and appellate judge).
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The judicial sample does offer, however, a larger and more
detailed vision of trial court activity than is available to the observer
who relies on published opinions for information about trial processes.
Most published opinions are authored by appellate courts, and thus
may focus narrowly on a particular aspect of the trial judge's order
without revealing either the decision as a whole or the background
information on which the trial judge relied. For appellate decisions
in the sample, this background information was obtained from
appellate records. Although appellate records are typically available
to the public in New York,"2 not even the most devoted student of
divorce practice is likely to examine one more than occasionally.' 27
While the sample is thus not ideal, it represents as complete a
picture of divorce decision making as we are likely to obtain.
Previous studies of judicial decision making at divorce have relied on
samples that were significantly smaller, less geographically and
judicially diverse, and more limited in time and background infor-
mation."s None of the earlier studies examined the entire range of
economic decisions, the impact of judicial characteristics upon
outcomes, or differences in the outcomes produced by judicial
decision in contrast to settlement.
C. Who Decides: The Judges
As it was rare for any judge to have decided more than one or
two of the sample cases,29 198 different decision-makers, from all
126. In New York, unpublished trial court decisions in divorce actions are not available
to the public without a court order. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 235(1) (McKinney Supp.
1986). Appellate records in divorce actions are public documents unless a court order is
entered declaring the record confidential. This practice is rare. In constructing the
sample, only nine cases were rejected because of confidential records. A list of these cases
is on file with the author.
127. Examination of these records is inhibited by significant publication delays and poor
indexing. The records for appeals filed prior to April 1984 are available in bound volumes,
but no uniform index to these records could be located. Records for later cases are
available on microfiche. As of September 1992, the microfiching of appeals decided in
1989 remained incomplete. Eleven 1989 cases were thus rejected because the records on
appeal were unavailable. As of September 1992, uniform yearly indices were available
only through 1986. For later cases, it was thus necessary to consult five or six different
"temporary" indices to find a particular case record; even then, some records could not
be found. A list of cases excluded because their records on appeal could not be located
is on file with the author.
128. MELLI, supra note 38; Process of Negotiation, supra note 32, at 1138-42; Reynolds,
supra note 41, at 844-52; White & Stone, supra note 37, at 75-76; 'fee, supra note 37, at
21-22.
129. Sixty percent of the judges decided one sample case, 17% two, 12% three, 7%
four, 2.5% five, and 3% more than five. The three most frequently represented judges
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parts of New York State, are represented. While the size and
geographic range of the group might suggest a fair amount of diversity
among the judges, in many respects they were a remarkably
homogeneous group. Overwhelmingly, they were male, "sixtyish,"
and the product of a local education. Only 7% of the judges were
female. Only 18% were under the age of fifty-five; 48% were
clustered between the ages of fifty-five and sixty-four.13 Eighty-five
percent attended either college or law school at a school in or near
the community in which they sat as a judge; more than half attended
both college and law school locally. 3'
The judges exhibited more diversity in the extent of their judicial
experience (see Table 1), and in their political party and religious
affiliations. 3 2
(thirteen cases, ten cases, and nine cases) all served in special divorce parts in New York
City's busiest courts, and thus appear to be overrepresented because of the sheer volume
of divorce actions each adjudicated. The affirmance rate for these three judges was not
significantly different from that of the entire group.
130. Their mean age was 60.6 years; their median age was 61.0 years (n=185).
131. Fifty-three percent (n=175) attended both college and law school locally.
Seventeen percent attended a college with a national reputation; 15% attended a regional
college outside the judge's area; and 69% attended a local college (n=164). Twenty-four
percent attended a law school with a national reputation; 4% attended a regional law
school outside the judge's area; and 72% attended a local law school (n=175).
132. Information on religious affiliation was available for less than half (n=92) of the
judges, however.
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TABLE 1: JUDICIAL EXPERIENCE OF JUDGES WHO DECIDED
SAMPLE CASES, AT END OF RESEARCH PERIOD
(SEPTEMBER, 1990)
Years of Judicial Experience % Cumulative
(n=184) %
0 - 4 years 7% 7%
5 - 9 years 13% 19%
10 - 14 years 36% 56%
15 - 19 years 26% 82%
20 - 29 years 16% 98%
30 + years 3% 100%
Median Years of Experience 14.0
Mean Years of Experience 14.6
In contrast to the judges' age,133 sex,IM education,135 and judicial
experience, 136 party 3  and religious affiliation were strongly and
significantly correlated with the location of their courtrooms. Fifty-
four percent of judges for whom political party affiliation could be
determined 138 were Republican and 46% Democratic; given the
dominance of the Democratic Party in New York City and of the
133. The judges' average age was 62.8 in New York City (n=49), 61.6 in the suburban
counties surrounding New York City (i.e. Nassau, Suffolk, and Westchester) (n=67), and
58.2 in upstate counties (n=69).
134. Female judges (n=14) were not disproportionately concentrated in any single area
of the state. Thirty-six percent were located in New York City, 29% in suburban counties,
and 36% in upstate counties.
135. Fifty-nine percent of New York City judges (n=46) attended both college and law
school locally, as compared to 52% of suburban judges (n=63) and 50% of upstate judges
(n=66). The average educational status score of New York City judges (n--43) was 3.8, as
compared to 4.2 for suburban judges (n=61) and 3.7 for upstate judges (n=64).
136. The average length of judicial experience was 14.9 years for New York City judges
(n=45), 14.2 years for suburban judges (n=69), and 14.4 years for judges in upstate counties
(n=70).
137. Chi-square=44.13359 D.F.=2; p<.00001.
.138. n=155. Although the vast majority of the judges represented in the sample were
elected, the common practice of cross-endorsement, see THE FUND FOR MODERN COURTS,
JUDICIAL ELECrIONS IN NEw YORK: VOTER PARTICIPATION AND CAMPAIGN FINANCING
OF STATE SUPREME COURT ELECTIONS: 1981, 1982 AND 1983 (Oct. 1984) (on file with
author), prevented determination of political party affiliation in some cases.
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Republican Party in upstate New York, it is not surprising that 88%
of New York City judges were Democrat and 75% of upstate judges
were Republican." 9
Religion, too, was highly correlated with geography."4 Overall,
53% of the judges identified themselves as Catholic, 23% as Protes-
tant, and 24% as Jewish. Protestant judges were disproportionately
concentrated in upstate counties, Jewish judges in New York City, and
Catholic judges in the suburban counties.14 ' As a result, the
religious composition of the judiciary from each region was quite
different. 42
Given the lack of published data on the characteristics of the trial
court judiciary in New York, the extent to which the sample judges
are representative of their peers on the trial bench is not altogether
clear.43 It was possible to obtain information on the age and sex of
New York State judges active during 1992;'" on these bases, the
judges in the sample are a fairly representative group.141
139. Sixty-seven percent of the suburban judges (n=57) were Republican.
140. Chi-square=21.37957 D.F.=4; p=.00027.
141. Among judges identified as Protestant (n=20), 65% were located in upstate
counties, 20% in the suburban counties, and 15% in New York City. Among judges
identified as Catholic (n=48), 50% were located in suburban counties, 40% upstate, and
10% in New York City. Among judges identified as Jewish (n=24), 50% were located in
New York City, 29% in suburban counties, and 21% in upstate counties.
142. Among those judges for whom religious affiliation could be determined, in New
York City (n=20), 60% were Jewish, 25% Catholic, and 15% Protestant. In the suburban
counties (n=35), 69% were Catholic, 20% Jewish, and 11% Protestant. In the upstate
counties (n=36), 51% were Catholic, 35% Protestant, and 14% Jewish.
143. Demographic information on judges represented in the sample was obtained from
a variety of sources: M.L. HENRY, JR., THE FUND FOR MODERN COURTS, CHARACTERIS-
TICS OF ELECTED VERSUS MERIT-SELECTED NEW YORK CITY JUDGES, 1977-1992 (1992)
(on file with author); MARIE T. HOUGH (ED.), THE AMERICAN BENCH: JUDGES OF THE
NATION (1975-92 eds.); 10, 11 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY (1992); THE
FUND FOR MODERN COURTS, supra note 137; THE FUND FOR MODERN COURTS,
JUDICIAL ELECTIONS IN NEW YORK, VOTER PARTICIPATION AND CAMPAIGN FINANCING
OF STATE SUPREME COURT ELECTIONS 1978, 1979, AND 1980 (1982) (on file with author);
New York State Unified Court System, Court Operational Services, COSJ Master in Last
Name Sequence (1992) (on file with author); Search of NEXIS, Northeast Region libraries
(1993).
144. New York State Unified Court System, supra note 143.
145. Fourteen percent (n=1420) of New York State judges active in 1992 were women;
the judges' average age was 58.67 years (n=1143); see also JOHN PAUL RYAN ET AL.,
AMERICAN TRIAL JUDGES 128-29 (1980) (reporting average age for New York State trial
judges in 1977 as 58.3 and noting that American trial judges are "overwhelmingly" white
and male); NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON JUDICIAL DIVERSITY, REPORT 1-3 (1992)
(on file with author) (reporting that about 12% of state's supreme-i.e., general
trial-court justices are women and noting lack of racial and ethnic diversity among the
state's judiciary).
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Nor is it clear whether judicial characteristics typically play an
important role in determining case outcomes. Despite general
consensus that judges' decisions may be affected by their past
experience and personal values, litigation theorists do not agree on
the extent to which such influences can be detected and measured in
the outcomes of litigated cases."' The prevailing litigation models
derived by economists typically posit no correlation between judicial
characteristics and case outcomes, on the theory that litigants will take
judicial predilections into account during settlement negotiations.147
Litigation models developed by political scientists, by contrast, assume
that "the political values and orientations of the judges do affect the
way they resolve judicial issues, especially when precedents are
conflicting or when the court is being asked to tread in new and
uncharted realms,"'48 and thus posit that judges' life experience and
values 49 will have a measurable impact on judicial decision making.
Empirical researchers have reported results that support both viewpoints'
146. The following discussion draws on an excellent summary of the debate in Vicki
Schultz & Stephen Patterson, Race, Gender, Work, and Choice: An Empirical Study of the
Lack of Interest Defense in Title VII Cases Challenging Job Segregation, 59 U. CHI. L. REv.
1073, 1167-70 (1992).
147. See Selection of Disputes, supra note 31, at 35 ("The selection hypothesis ...
presumes that the parties ... anticipate the predilections of a judge, just as they would
anticipate the application of a legal rule or the collective attitudes of a jury. Thus, the rate
of success in contested civil bench trials similarly ought to tend toward equality among
judges."). The selection hypothesis has been criticized as inadequate in a number of
contexts, however. See, eg., Eisenberg, supra note 31, at 211-12; Donald Wittman, Dispute
Resolution, Bargaining, and the Selection of Cases for Trial: A Study of the Generation of
Biased and Unbiased Data, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 313 (1988).
148. ROBERT A. CARP & C.K. ROWLAND, POLICYMAKING AND POLMCS IN THE
FEDERAL DISTRICt COURTS 52 (1983).
149. Judicial values have typically been determined through political party affiliation.
See, e.g., Malcolm M. Feeley, Another Look at the "Party Variable" in Judicial Decision
Making: An Analysis of the Michigan Supreme Court, 4 POLITY 91, 93 (1971) (describing
party affiliation as "a crude, but ... effective, background indicator of judges' values
because it indicates a collection of like-minded persons .... is an important socializing
institution, and is an important reference group for people active in public affairs").
150. See, e.g., CARP & ROVLAND, supra note 148, at 32-36, 64-73 (identifying the
appointing president as an important predictor of federal judges' decisions, particularly in
civil rights and civil liberties cases); Sue Davis et al., Voting Behavior and Gender on the
U.S. Courts of Appeals, 77 JUDICATURE 129, 131-32 (1993) (revealing a significant
difference between decisions of male and female federal judges in employment
discrimination and search and seizure cases but not in obscenity cases); Eisenberg &
Johnson, supra note 123, at 1190-91 (suggesting that federal judges' age, race, sex, prior
prosecutorial experience, and prior judicial experience in state court were significantly
correlated with case outcome in race discrimination cases, but that political affiliation was
not); Sheldon Goldman, Voting Behavior on the United States Courts of Appeals Revisited,
9 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 491, 501-03 (1975) (finding that judge's age and political party were
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One reason for the difference in results may be an underlying
difference in the type of cases examined. The economists have
tended to focus on routine tort and commercial litigation, while the
political scientists have typically addressed more controversial issues
such as crime, civil rights, and civil liberties. Neither group has
examined divorce. Nor has either group focused on outcomes, like
those that characterize much of divorce litigation, where the result is
best described as a "how much" rather than a "who won." The
research reported here thus offers the opportunity to assess the
impact of judicial characteristics on litigation outcomes in a new, and
important, context.
D. The Litigation Pyramid: Characteristics of the Judicial Sample as
Compared to the General Divorce Population and the Settlement
Case Sample
While judges who decided sample cases are, in all probability,
fairly representative of their peers on the trial court bench, the
couples whose cases they heard are definitely not representative of
the larger divorce population. Nationally, half of divorcing couples
important background variables in civil liberties and criminal cases); Stuart S. Nagel,
Judicial Backgrounds and Criminal Cases, 53 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI.
333, 334, 337 (1962) (finding that political party and religion were important predictors of
state and federal supreme court judges' decisions in criminal court); Selection of Disputes,
supra note 31, at 35-36 (finding substantially similar success rates in contract and
negligence cases decided between 1960 and 1980 before five different federal district court
judges); Schultz & Patterson, supra note 146, at 1172, 1177 (finding that Democratic
judges, appointees, and courts were significantly more likely to rule in favor of sex
discrimination plaintiffs than their Republican counterparts, but not more likely to rule in
favor of race discrimination plaintiffs); see also Donald R. Songer & Sue Davis, The Impact
of Party and Region on Voting Decisions in the United States Courts of Appeal, 1955-1986,
43 W. POL. Q. 317, 322-23 (1990) (supporting the hypothesis that Democratic judges have
more liberal voting records than Republican judges); C. Neal Tate, Personal Attribute
Models of the Voting Behavior of U.S. Supreme Court Justices: Liberalism in Civil
Liberties and Economics Decisions, 1946-78, 75 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 355, 362-63 (1981)
(suggesting that the appointing president and party identifiers are predictors of justices'
voting records on civil liberty and economic issues); Timothy B. Tomasi & Jess A. Velona,
All the Presidents' Men? A Study of Ronald Reagan's Appointments to the U.S. Courts of
Appeals, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 766 (1987) (finding that Reagan judicial appointees' voting
patterns did not differ significantly from those of other Republican judges); S. Sidney
Ulmer, The Political Party Variable in the Michigan Supreme Court, 11 J. PUB. L. 352, 360-
62 (1962) (finding Democratic judges more favorably inclined to workmen's compensation
and unemployment compensation claims than their Republican counterparts); S. Sidney
Ulmer, Social Background as an Indicator to the Votes of Supreme Court Justices in
Criminal Cases: 1947-1956 Terms, 17 AM. J. POL. SCI. 622,625-27 (1973) (identifying age,
federal administrative experience, and religion as primary factors accounting for United
States Supreme Court Justices' voting records in criminal cases).
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have been married for less than seven years,' and four of ten have
not had children together.' Half of divorcing wives are younger
than thirty-three; half of divorcing husbands are younger than thirty-
six.'53 Although national statistics on employment levels, income,
education, and wealth at divorce do not exist, the available data
demonstrate that divorce is more likely when the husband is poorly
educateds 4 or unemployed;'55 the poverty rate among divorcing
couples is thus higher than that of married couples generally. 56
When compared to this general divorce population, the judicial
sample was disproportionately older, longer married, and more likely
to have children. The median marital duration for the sample was
151. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 92 tbl. 132 (1992) [hereinafter STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT] (stating that median marital duration at divorce is 7.0 years).
152. Thomas J. Oldham, Putting Asunder in the 1990s, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1091, 1100 n.4
(1992).
153. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 151, at 92 tbl. 132 (reporting median age
at divorce in 1988 of 35.1 years for husbands and 32.6 years for wives).
154. See DONALD J. HERNANDEZ, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, STUDIES IN HOUSEHOLD AND FAMILY FORMATION: WHEN HOUSEHOLDS
CONTINUE, DISCONTINUE, AND FORM 10-12 tbl. E (Current Population Reports, Series
P-23, No. 179) (1992) [hereinafter HOUSEHOLD CONTINUITY] (reporting that the rate of
divorce or separation within two years was 6% when husband had completed four or more
years of college, as compared to 13% when husband had completed eight or fewer years
of school). Divorced persons are also somewhat less likely to have completed four or
more years of college education than are married persons with a spouse present. See
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 151, at 144 tbl. 221 (reporting that 23% of married
persons with a spouse present have completed four or more years of college, as compared
to 17% of divorced persons).
155. See HOUSEHOLD CONTINUITY, supra note 154, at 12-15 tbls. F & G (reporting
divorce/separation rate among married couples of 6.9% over two-year period when
husband worked, as compared to 10.9% when only wife worked and 14.2% when neither
worked).
156. Recent Census data suggest that divorce is approximately twice as likely among
couples with incomes below the poverty line as it is among others. See HOUSEHOLD
CONTINUITY, supra note 154, at 2, 18-21 tbl. I. Census researchers have also reported that,
among families with children, 21% of those that experienced the loss of the father from
the household during a two-year survey period were already poor, a poverty rate double
that of married couple households generally. See SUZANNE M. BIANCHI, BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FAMILY DISRUPTION AND ECONOMIC HARDSHIP:
THE SHORT-RUN PICTURE FOR CHILDREN 2 (Current Population Reports, Series P-70,
No. 23) (1991). For complementary research reports, see Rand D. Conger et al., Linking
Economic Hardship to Marital Quality and Instability, 52 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 643 (1990);
J. Haskey, Social Class and Socio-Economic Differentials in Divorce in England and Wales,
1984 POPULATION STUD. 419; Jeffrey K. Liker & Glen H. Elder, Jr., Economic Hardship
and Marital Relations in the 1980s, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 343 (1983). For surveys of the
research data, see WILLIAM J. GOODE, WORLD CHANGES IN DIVORCE PATrERNS 152-57
(1993); Patricia Voydanoff, Economic Distress and Family Relations, 52 J. MARR. & FAM.
1099, 1105-09 (1990).
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more than double that reported by the Census Bureau for divorced
couples nationally; the median age of both husbands and wives was
about a decade older. In contrast to the below-average educational
attainments and incomes of the general divorce population, the
median educational level,'57 family income,'58 and net worth159
of the judicial sample were markedly higher than those of married
couples in the United States. (See Table 2.)
157. In 1991, 81.4% of married, non-separated persons in the U.S. had completed high
school; 23% had completed four or more years of college. STATISTICAL ABSTRACr, supra
note 151, at 144 tbl. 221.
158. In 1990, the median income of married couples' households was $39,895. BUREAU
OFTHE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MONEY INCOME OF HOUSEHOLDS, FAMILIES,
AND PERSONS IN THE UNITED STATES: 1991, at 40 tbl. 13 (Current Population Reports,
Series P-60, No. 180) (1992).
159. See T.J. ELLER, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
HOUSEHOLD WEALTH AND ASSET OWNERSHIP: 1991, at xv tbl. J (Current Population
Reports, Series P-70, No. 34) (1994) [hereinafter HOUSEHOLD WEALTH] (stating that in
1991, median net worth of U.S. married couples was $60,065).
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TABLE 2: SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF JUDICIAL
AND SETTLEMENT SAMPLES, AND U.S. DIVORCE POPULATION' 6°
Judicial Settle- U.S.
Case Characteristic* Sample ment Divorce
(n=383) Sample Pop.
(n=315)
Age (median years): husband 45.0 40.8 35.1
wife 43.0 38.1 32.6
Income (median $1000s):
family 63.3 49.5 n.a.
husband 47.6 35.5
wife 10.7 12.8
Marital duration (median years) 17.3 12.7 7.1
Net worth (median $1000s) 181.3 29.6 n.a.
Children of the marriage:
% with children 81.3 72.7 60.0
% with minor children 61.4 70.0 n.a.
mean # minor children 1.2 1.3 0.9
Education (% 4 or more years
of college): husbands 74.6 36.7 n.a.
wives 50.0 30.1
Employment (% working):
husbands 87.3 92.9 n.a.
wives 58.9 72.5
Occupational status (% in high
status job)": husbands 30.3 18.1 n.a.
wives 3.9 3.3
All monetary values are in 1990 dollars. 
162
160. All statistics for the U.S. divorce population are from STATISTICAL ABSTRACT,
supra note 151, at 92 tbl. 132.
161. The following occupations were classified as high status: architects, business
executives, dentists, engineers, government officials and managers, lawyers, commissioned
military officers, physicians, professors, and scientists.
162. The multiplier was obtained by dividing the consumer price index for the year in
which the trial court decided the case by the consumer price index for 1990. See
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 151, at 468 tNl. 737. Dollar values throughout this
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These differences were marked, and statistically significant, even
when the judicial group was compared to the subset of my New York
divorce sample in which the divorce was initially contested"'
(hereinafter the "settlement sample") and thus had the potential to
go to trial. Couples in the settlement sample were also older, longer
married, and higher income than the general divorce population.
They were also far more likely to have employed attorneys than are
divorcing spouses generally; while the majority of divorcing couples
today employ only one attorney or none at all,' 6' 97% of the
couples in the settlement group employed attorneys for both
spouses.' 65  The settlement sample thus appears to be fairly
representative of that segment of the divorce population for which
litigation is plausible."6 It represents the world of divorce as seen
by the divorce lawyer rather than the judge.
When compared to the settlement group, couples in the judicial
sample were still older, longer married, and higher income. But the
most striking difference was in asset values. Approximately one
quarter of the judicial sample had net assets exceeding half a million
dollars; the median value of their net assets was more than six times
Article represent 1990 dollars.
163. A case was considered contested if it was initiated on fault grounds, see N.Y. DOM.
REL. LAW §§ 170(1)-(4) (McKinney 1988), and the defendant spouse answered the
complaint. See Garrison, supra note 12, at 642-43. The settlement case sample
corresponds to the sample segment described as the "contested case sample" in my earlier
report on the impact of New York's Equitable Distribution Law. Id.
164. For descriptions of the data, see Jane C. Murphy, Access to Legal Remedies: The
Crisis in Family Law, 8 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 123 (1994); Jessica Pearson, Ten Myths About
Family Law, 27 FAM. L.Q. 280,281-82 (1993). The research reports include BAKER, supra
note 12, at 2-3 (both spouses represented in 21% of Alaska divorce sample); Bruce D.
Sales et al., Is Self-Representation a Reasonable Alternative to Attorney Representation in
Divorce Cases?, 37 ST. Louis L.J. 553, 594 (1993) (both spouses represented in 10% of
Arizona divorce sample, neither spouse represented in 52%).
165. By contrast, 11% of couples in the full, weighted divorce sample had two-party
representation in one research county; 47% had such representation in another. In the
third research county, the proportion could not be determined due to missing data. See
Garrison, supra note 12, at 646.
166. For most divorcing couples, the available evidence suggests that litigation is quite
implausible. Researchers report that most agree on the terms of the divorce and thus have
nothing to litigate. See, e.g., MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 14, at 159 (reporting that
three-quarters of divorcing couples studied "experienced little if any conflict over the terms
of the divorce decree"); Ralph C. Cavanagh & Deborah L. Rhode, Project, The
Unauthorized Practice of Law and Pro Se Divorce: An Empirical Analysis, 86 YALE L.J.
104, 138 (1976) (reporting that more than 60% of sampled divorcing couples had resolved
all property, support, custody, and visitation issues themselves); Jacob, supra note 32, at
579-81, 584-86 (reporting that many divorcing couples worked out an agreement before
approaching lawyer).
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that of the settlement sample. (See Appendix, Table Al.) Although
higher asset values for judicial sample are expectable given the
group's higher family incomes 67 and lengthier inarriages,' 1 the
magnitude of the difference is still notable.
Most of the group's assets were acquired during the marriage and
therefore subject to division. Couples in the judicial sample were less
likely to claim debts69 and no more likely to claim separate proper-
ty than were their counterparts in the settlement sample.70 Nor did
separate property comprise, on average, a larger fraction of their total
assets.17 1 The median value of net marital assets in the judicial
group was thus more than seven times greater than that of couples in
the settlement sample. (See Table 3.)
167. Family wealth is generally correlated with family income. See HOUSEHOLD
WEALTH, supra note 159, at 2 tbl. 1. On the relationship between family income and
wealth among divorcing couples, see, e.g., BAKER, supra note 12, at 7; WEITZMAN, supra
note 12, at 59-60. Asset values were positively and significantly correlated with family
income for both case groups. For the judicial sample, p<.001. For the settlement sample,
p<.001.
168. Marital duration was significantly and positively correlated with asset values for
both case samples. For the judicial sample, p=.018. For the settlement sample, p=.011.
Other divorce researchers have also noted a significant relationship between marital
duration and family wealth. See, e.g., WEITZMAN, supra note 12, at 58; Rowe & Morrow,
supra note 12, at 470. Married couples with an older householder are also likely to have
higher asset values than those with a younger householder. HOUSEHOLD WEALTH, supra
note 159, at xv tbl. J.
169. Debts were claimed by 49% (n=383) of couples in the judicial sample, as compared
to 82% (n=315) of those in the settlement group.
170. Thirty-three percent of couples in the judicial sample claimed separate property;
37% of the settlement group did so.
171. The value of separate property comprised an average of 11% of the value of total
assets in the judicial group and 10% in the contested sample. In both groups, the value
of separate property tended to comprise a larger proportion of the asset values of couples
in short marriages. See Appendix, Table A2.
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TABLE 3:
VALUE OF MARITAL ASSETS (1990 DOLLARS), BY CASE GROUP*
Judicial Sample Settlement Sample
Property
Value Gross Asset Net Asset Gross Asset Net Asset
Value Value Value Value
% cum.% % cum.% % cum.% % cum.%
(Negative
Value) (4) (4) (22) (22)
$0-
$9,999 14 14 12 16 29 29 17 39
$10,000-
$29,999 6 20 6 21 19 47 17 55
$30,000-
$49,999 7 27 7 29 11 59 7 63
$50,000-
$99,999 10 37 10 38 14 72 13 76
$100,000-
$199,999 19 56 19 57 11 84 10 85
$200,000-
$299,999 12 67 11 68 3 87 3 89
$300,000-
$499,999 9 77 9 77 4 91 4 93
$500,000-
$999,999 13 90 13 90 5 97 4 97
$1 mil. or
more 10 100 10 100 3 100 3 100
Median
Value $166,255 $159,632 $ 33,120 $ 22,916
Mean
Value $572,840 $523,910 $281,312 $251,669
Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.
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Couples in the judicial sample were also far more likely to own
their own home and to possess business assets, real estate, and a
pension than were couples in the settlement group (see Appendix,
Table A3) or married couples generally. Indeed, they were
wealthy enough that they often failed even to list personal possessions
or household goods among their assets. The composition of each case
group's average asset pool was thus quite different.
Most of the judicial sample's wealth was owned jointly or by the
husband. Property owned by the wife represented, on average, only
9% of family assets, while joint property represented 52% and
husband-owned property 39%.73
The wealth gap between husbands and wives in the judicial
sample was matched by a large disproportion in their average incomes
and occupational status. 74 In half of the cases, the husband's
income represented at least 85% of family income; 30% of husbands
were in high-status jobs, as compared to only 4% of wives. 75 On
each measure, the average difference between husbands and wives
was much larger in the judicial sample than in the settlement
group. 6 (See Table 2.)
Whether and how the disproportionate wealth and status of
judicial sample husbands might have affected the litigation process is
unclear. Judicial sample cases took, on average, much longer to
conclude than did those in the settlement sample,'77 but case
duration may have been enhanced by spiteful litigation tactics as well
as case complexity; in 22% of the judicial sample cases, for example,
some portion of the interim support payments ordered by the court
172. See HOUSEHOLD WEALTH, supra note 159, at 8-9 tbl. 1.
173. This gap was much smaller in the settlement sample, where the value of husband-
owned property represented, on average, 11% of total assets, and wife-owned property
represented 7%. In the judicial sample, the median value of joint property was $72,019,
of husband-owned property $35,923, and of wife-owned property $0. In the settlement
sample, the median value of husband-owned property was $3136, and of wife-owned
property it was $2133.
174. The value of husband- and wife-owned property was also significantly correlated
with individual income. For the relationship between the value of the husband's property
and his income, p<.001. For the relationship between the value of the wife's property and
her income, p<.001.
175. See supra Table 2.
176. See supra note 173. For further detail, see Garrison, supra note 12, at 656-57
tbl. 7.
177. The mean case duration in the judicial sample was 2.23 years (n=294), as compared
to 1.36 years in the settlement sample (n=310).
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were unpaid when the case went to trial.a8 Moreover, although
researchers have reported that social status influences the manner in
which judges exercise discretion, 79 researchers have not investigated
intrafamilial litigation. We do not know whether judges view family
members as having one uniform social status or, alternatively, view
them as separate individuals. Nor do we know if the results that
researchers have reported are equally applicable in the divorce
context.
It is clear, however, that in comparison to the general divorce
population-and even the settlement group where litigation was
threatened-the judicial sample was disproportionately composed of
cases involving very high stakes. In many cases, the income and
occupational status gap between husband and wife was sufficiently
great that divorce had the potential to cause a long-married,
economically dependent wife's standard of living to plummet from the
extremely comfortable to the nearly impoverished.
The overrepresentation of such cases is not surprising. Litigation
to trial appears to be most likely when the stakes are high." But
it serves as a reminder of the fact that the picture of divorce that
judges see in the courtroom, and that is thus reflected in published
opinions, is by no means representative of divorce generally; indeed,
it is not even an accurate reflection of what the divorce lawyer sees
in her office, a case set that likely resembles the settlement sample.
The judicial sample shows us only the tip of the litigation
pyramid. Although these cases can thus tell us little about divorce as
experienced by the typical American couple, we have every reason to
believe that they accurately represent what judges see in their
courtrooms. They can thus tell us a good deal about the reality of
judicial decision making at divorce.
178. Typically these arrears were not trivial. The median value of unpaid child support
and alimony arrears was $8,110; the mean was $13,227 (n=68).
179. For descriptions of the research, see DONALD BLACK, THE BEHAVIOR OF LAW
13-31 (1976) [hereinafter BLACK, BEHAVIOR]; DONALD BLACK, SOCIOLOGICAL JUSTICE
9-13 (1989); M.P. Baumgartner, The Myth of Discretion, in THE USES OF DISCRETION,
supra note 9, at 129, 142-48.
180. See, e.g., RICHARD J. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 21.4, at 522 (3d
ed. 1986); John P. Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 279 (1973);
Selections of Disputes, supra note 31, at 25-29; see also Patricia M. Danzon & Lee A.
Lillard, Settlement Out of Court: The Disposition of Medical Malpractice Claims, 12 J.
LEGAL STUD. 345,362-67 (1983) (discussing the factors involved in the decision to settle);
W. Kip Viscusi, The Determinants of the Disposition of Products Liability Claims and
Compensation for Bodily Injury, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 321,331-32 (1986) (discussing factors
involved in decision to drop a claim).
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III. JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING UNDER NEW YORK'S
EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION LAW: PROPERTY DIVISION, ALIMONY,
AND CHILD SUPPORT
A. Property Division
1. The Results of Judicial Decision Making vs. Settlement: The
Judicial and Settlement Samples Compared
a. Average Outcomes
Given the significant disparities between the judicial and
settlement samples in the ownership, composition, and value of
marital property, it would not be surprising if the ultimate
distributions of marital property were different as well. But the mean
division of marital property and debt in the two case sets was in fact
extremely similar: At the trial level, judges awarded wives an average
of 49% of marital property, 24% of marital debt, and 49% of net
marital property; in the settlement sample, wives received an average
of 51% of marital property, 31% of marital debt, and 55% of net
marital property. On average, then, the results of litigation do not
appear significantly different from those of settlement.' (See
Tables 6, 7, and 8).
The composition of the typical award to wives in. each group was
also quite similar. In both case groups, the wife's average property
award was heavily concentrated in home equity, and the value of
nonliquid property substantially outweighed liquid assets. (See Figure
1.)
181. The average division of marital property and net marital property did not differ
significantly. The average division of marital debt narrowly escaped significance (T=-1.94;p=.054).
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FIGURE 1: COMPOSITION OF AVERAGE PROPERTY AWARD TO
SAMPLE WIVES, BY ASSET TYPE AND CASE GROUP
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Although home equity constituted a larger percentage of the
average award to wives in the judicial sample than it did in the
settlement group, the difference appears to reflect the lower home
ownership rate of the latter case set more than an alternate
distributional pattern. Although wives in the judicial sample were
significantly more likely to obtain occupancy of the home than were
their counterparts in the settlement group (see Table 4),"8 they
were not more likely to obtain ownership. Sale of the home
(immediate or future), typically with a relatively equal division of the
net proceeds, 183 was also more common in the judicial sample. The
average percentage of marital home equity received by wives in the
two case groups was thus virtually identical.
182. The disposition of the marital home was strongly correlated with custodial status
(chi-square--40.49478 D.F.=6; p<.0001). When the wife was the sole custodian of the
couple's minor children, she received occupancy or ownership of the home in 68% of the
cases; husbands, too, were more likely to obtain occupancy of the home when serving as
the custodial parent, although the relationship was not as strong. But disposition of the
home was also strongly correlated with custody in the settlement group and, among wives
in that group with sole custody, a similar percentage (62%; n=95) obtained occupancy of
the marital home. Nor did sale of the home differ significantly by case group. See
Garrison, supra note 12, at 683 n.196; Appendix, Table A4.
The award of occupancy was also strongly correlated with marital duration (chi-
square=37.22217 D.F.=6; p<.0001). Judicial sample wives married for less than 10 years
obtained occupancy 45% of the time, as compared to 69% for wives married between 15
and 20 years. A judicial decision was, again, not associated with a significantly higher
likelihood of an occupancy award. See Garrison, supra note 12, at 682.
183. Home equity was divided relatively equally (45%-55%) in 60% (n=296) of the
judicial sample cases (cases in which the home was determined to be separate property
excluded). The wife obtained no share of home equity in 5% of the cases; between 15%
and 45% in 6% of the cases; between 56% and 99% in 9% of the cases; and 100% in 31%
of the cases. The tendency toward equal division was slightly greater (63%) after appeals
were taken into account.
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TABLE 4: DISPOSITION OF MARITAL HOME (WHEN OWNED),
BY CASE GROUP
Distribution of Marital Judicial Settlement Difference
Home Sample % Sample %
(n=303) (n=188)
Title to Wife with
Payment to Husband 5% 5% 0
Title to Wife without
Payment to Husband 29% 36% +7
Occupancy to Wife 22% 6% -16
Total Occupancy to
Wife 56% 47% -9
Title to Husband with
Payment to Wife 5% 11% + 6*
Title to Husband
without Payment to 5% 18% +13""
Wife
Occupancy to Husband 2% 3% + 1
Total Occupancy to
Husband 12% 32% +20""
Home Sold:
Immediate 33% 21% -12"
Future (after termin.
of occupancy order) 24% 9% -15
TOTAL SALES 57% 30% -27*
Home Equity Division:
Mean wife's % 64% 62% -2
Median wife's % 50% 63% +13
p<.05, *" p<.O1, "** p<.O01
The greater importance of business assets and pensions as
components of the wife's share also appears to reflect ownership rates
more than distributional differences. When the distribution of
individual assets is considered by type, judicial sample wives' average
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share of business assets and pensions was not markedly higher than
that of wives in the settlement sample; nor, indeed, did the average
distribution of any asset type differ significantly by case group.'
84
(See Table 5.)
TABLE 5: DISTRIBUTION OF INDIVIDUAL MARITAL ASSETS,
BY ASSET TYPE AND CASE GROUP
Judicial Sample Settlement Sample
Asset Type
Wife's Wife's
Mean % (n) Mean % (n)
Automobiles 48% (297) 42% (378)
Business Interests 23% (147) 19% (64)
Household Goods 76% (138) 58% (163)
Liquid Assets:
Bank Accounts 49% (288) 48% (601)
Other 40% (161) 40% (125)
Professional Licenses 18% (38) ,.185
Real Estate:
Marital Home 64% (296) 63% (188)
Other Real Estate 29% (174) 27% (95)
Retirement Assets:
Pensions 31% (216) 29% (64)
Other186  40% (135) 40% (91)
Other Assets 40% (244) 45% (339)
All Assets 45% (2130) 44% (2069)
All Debts 28% (249) 34% (1028)
184. Whether the wife was awarded a particular asset was highly correlated with the
ownership of that asset (p<.0001).
185. In the settlement groups, professional degrees and licenses were coded as business
assets due to the extreme infrequency with which they were listed as assets.
186. This category includes annuities, Keogh accounts, IRAs, and employee profit-
sharing plans.
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Although judicial decision thus was not associated with any
tangible advantage to wives in terms of the percentage or types of
marital assets awarded, judicial sample wives nonetheless emerged
from the divorce better off than their counterparts in the settlement
group. The reason is simply that, because couples in the judicial
sample generally had much more valuable assets, the wife's per-
centage share was worth more. Indeed, the median value of the
wife's net property award was approximately ten times higher in the
judicial sample than in the settlement group. 87
b. The Tendency Toward Equal Division
Although average outcomes in the judicial and settlement case
groups were not markedly different, the averages derive from
significantly different distributional patterns."' Settlement outcomes
were highly disparate and widely distributed along a zero to one
hundred percent scale.1" Judicial outcomes, by contrast, exhibited
a strong tendency toward equality. Although marital debts were
disproportionately distributed to husbands in both case groups (Table
6), judges divided marital assets (Table 7) and net marital wealth
(Table 8) relatively equally in almost half of the cases for which a
distribution could be determined."
187. The median value of the wife's net property award was $93,990 in the judicial
sample and $9,375 in the settlement group. The average value of the wife's net property
award was, in the judicial sample, $282,954, and, in the settlement sample, $105,672.
188. The distributional pattern for marital debt did not vary significantly by case group.
The differences in the distributional pattern for marital assets (chi-square=72.53542 D.F.=4;
p<.0001) and net marital assets (chi-square=73.29290 D.F.=4; p<.0001) were highly
significant.
189. See Garrison, supra note 12, at 685-87.
190. Although an exact percentage distribution of marital debts, property, or net
marital property could not be calculated in some cases because of missing or suspect
valuations, these problems were much less common in the judicial sample than in the
settlement group. Even when an exact percentage could not be calculated, judges typically
provided enough information to permit approximation of the distribution within a few
percentage points. Tables 6 through 8 are based on these approximations where relevant.
Marital property and net marital property results excluding cases where approximations
were made were also calculated; they did not differ significantly. See infra Appendix,
Tables A5 & A6. For a discussion of methodological issues in the calculation of
distributional percentages, see Garrison, supra note 12, at 668-70.
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TABLE 6: PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF NET UNSECURED
MARITAL DEBTS (COUPLES WITH MARITAL DEBTS),
BY CASE GROUP
Debt Distribution Judicial Sample Settlement Sample
% (n=80) % (n=158)
67% + to Husband 68% 60%
56%-66% to Husband 5% 4%
Relatively Equal* 14% 8%
56%-66% to Wife 0% 3%
67% + to Wife 14% 25%
Median % to Wife 1% 10%
Mean % to Wife 24% 34%
Relatively Equal = Between 45% and 55%
TABLE 7: PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL ASSETS
(COUPLES WITH MARITAL ASSETS), BY CASE GROUP
Asset Distribution Judicial Sample Settlement Sample
% (n=277) % (n=142)
67% + to Husband 16% 34%
56%-66% to Husband 18% 7%
Relatively Equal* 46% 12%
56%-66% to Wife 9% 8%
67% + to Wife 13% 39%
Median % to Wife 50% 51%
Mean % to Wife 49% 51%
Relatively Equal = Between 45% and 55%
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TABLE 8: PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL NET WORTH
(COUPLES WITH POSITIVE NET WORTH), BY CASE GROUP
Judicial Settlement
Net Marital Property Sample Sample
Distribution % (n=323) % (n=104)
67% or more to Husband 16% 33%
56%-66% to Husband 16% 5%
Relatively Equal* 48% 12%
56%-66% to Wife 7% 10%
67% or more to Wife 13% 41%
Median % to Wife 50% 54%
Mean % to Wife' 50% 55%
Relatively Equal = Between 45% and 55%
While this is not as large a percentage of equal distributions as that
reported by another researcher who reviewed a substantial number of
reported judicial decisions on property division at divorce, 92 it is
approximately four times the proportion of the settlement sample with
a relatively equal net asset distribution. (See Table 8.) Indeed, the
distributional patterns of the judicial and settlement groups are almost
mirror images, with judicial outcomes clustered at the center and
settlements toward the extremes.
The judicial tendency toward equal division'93 also increased
significantly after the first few years of experience with equitable
property distribution." Thirty-three percent of the cases decided
between 1980-83 resulted in a relatively even division of net worth, as
compared to 54% of those decided between 1984-86. The tendency
toward equal division appears to have levelled off at this point,
191. A trimmed mean (most extreme five percent of the cases eliminated) is reported
for the settlement sample. See Garrison, supra note 12, at 673 n.174.
192. Reynolds, supra note 41, at 854-55 (reporting that courts seldom deviated from an
equal division except in extraordinary circumstances).
193. The judicial preference for equal division was also apparent in the distribution of
specific assets and debts. Judges tended to divide equally, or not at all. Judges awarded
67% of listed marital assets and debts (n=2380) outright to one or another spouse and
divided 26% equally (i.e., exactly 50-50). Only 8% were divided disproportionately.
194. Chi-square=10.75732 D.F.=2; p=.00461.
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however, as the percentage of cases resulting in equal division did not
increase during the period from 1987 to 1990.195
The judicial sample differed from the settlement group in the
direction as well as the likelihood of a disproportionate outcome. In
the judicial sample, 61% of disproportionate outcomes favored the
husband and 39% the wife. In the settlement sample, these per-
centages were exactly reversed.'96
The tendency toward disproportion favoring the husband in the
judicial sample should be read in context, however. Because judges
were far more likely to divide net assets equally, judicial sample wives
were somewhat more likely to be awarded an equal or larger share of
net marital assets than were their counterparts in the settlement
group;"9 indeed, fewer than a third (32%) of husbands in the
judicial group were awarded a disproportionate share of net marital
assets. 9 ' The evidence thus fails to support the claim that judges
typically award wives less than half of the marital assets. 99 It
instead suggests the emergence of an equal division norm.
2. The Predictability of Equitable Property Distribution
a. Statutory Factors and Case Outcomes
Disproportionate outcomes were not only less common within the
judicial sample but also more predictable. Among couples in the
settlement group, property outcomes were not significantly correlated
with any of the litigant characteristics specified in the statute as
relevant to property distribution and for which case information was
available. Neither age, marital duration, employment, health, income,
occupational status, the award of custody, or the award of alimony
was significantly correlated with the percentage division of net marital
assets.
195. Relatively equal division occurred in 47% of the 1987-90 cases (n=98).
196. Cases with negative net worth are included. When cases with negative net worth
(where disproportion was particularly likely to benefit the wife and which were more
numerous in the settlement sample) were excluded, disproportionate outcomes favored the
wife in 54% of settlement sample cases, and 38% of judicial sample cases.
197. The wife received a relatively equal or larger share of net marital assets in 68%
of judicial sample cases and 63% in settlement group cases. See supra Table 8.
198. If cases involving professional degrees and licenses-assets that are not
characterized as divisible marital property except in New York, see supra notes 104-07 and
sources cited therein-are excluded, 70% of judicial sample wives were awarded a
relatively equal or larger share of marital net worth.
199. See supra note 111 and sources cited therein.
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Judicial outcomes, by contrast, were significantly correlated with
several of the statutory factors. Although marital duration, age, the
award of alimony, and the award of custody again evidenced no
significance as predictive variables,' a cluster of variables related
to the wife's relative need-her health, employment, income, oc-
cupational status, and the percentage of family income that she
earned-were all significantly correlated with the percentage division
of net marital assets at the .05 confidence level or better. 0 1
While a correlation between these variables and the property
division outcome is not surprising given the legislative requirement
that such factors be considered in marital property distribution,2°
it is intriguing that wives' income, employment, health, and oc-
cupational status were significantly related to case outcomes while
husbands' were not. Even more surprising is the direction of the
correlations. Indications that the wife was particularly needy-poor
health, unemployment, low income, low occupational status, and
income representing a small fraction of family income-were all
negatively correlated with the wife's percentage award.c 3 Wives in
poor health, for example, were significantly less likely to receive an
equal or larger share of marital assets than were wives in good
health.' 4 Similarly, women earning half or more of family income
were four times as likely to be awarded a disproportionate share of
the net marital property as were their counterparts earning less than
ten percent of family income.' ° (See Table 9.) These data strongly
support the claim by women's advocates that judges tend to give more
200. For correlation coefficients and p values, see infra Appendix, Table A7.
201. Among cases involving minor children, the percentage of the obligor's income
awarded in child support, and the value of combined alimony and child support, were also
significantly related to the division of net marital assets. See infra Appendix, Table A7.
202. See supra note 19 (listing statutory factors).
203. All of these variables except occupational status were significantly correlated with
the wife's percentage of net marital assets at the .05 confidence level or better: the wife's
health, p=.007; her unemployment, p=.028; her income, p=.022; her percentage of family
income, p=.005. The correlation between the wife's occupational status and her percentage
award of net marital assets barely escaped significance at the .05 level (p=.051).
204. p=.007. In almost two-thirds of the cases in which the wife was identified as
having poor health the husband was granted a disproportionate share of the net marital
assets; only 5% of wives in poor health received a disproportionate share themselves. This
finding contrasts with that of Professor Reynolds, who reported, based on a review of 138
published property division decisions from six states, that disproportion in favor of one
spouse was typically associated with that spouse's poor health. See Reynolds, supra note
41, at 854-55.
205. p=.005. For a similar finding, see Seltzer & Garfinkel, supra note 44, at 99-100 tbl.
4.5 (finding, based on analysis of Wisconsin sample composed of couples with children,
that divorced mother's income was significant positive predictor of her property award).
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weight to monetary contributions than to contributions as a spouse
and parent.2°6
TABLE 9: PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF NET MARITAL ASSETS
(JUDICIAL SAMPLE: COUPLES WITH POSITIVE NET WORTH),
BY PERCENTAGE OF FAMILY INCOME EARNED BY WIFE
Wife's Income/
Percentage Family Income
Distribution of Net 0%-9% 10%-29% 30%-49% 50% +
Marital Assets (n=93) (n=73) (n=49) (n=25)
Disproportionate
Share to Husband 41% 31% 25% 28%
Relatively Equal* 48% 53% 49% 28%
Disproportionate
Share to Wife 11% 16% 26% 44%
Relatively Equal = Between 45% and 55%
A cluster of property-related variables was also significantly
linked to the net distribution, and some of these relationships again
suggest a tendency to elevate monetary over other contributions. If,
for example, the husband owned a business or possessed a profes-
sional license-and husbands almost invariably held these assets when
they were present in the pool of marital property2w-he was sig-
nificantly more likely to obtain a disproportionate share of the marital
wealth."° (See Table 10.) Wives were awarded a relatively equal
or larger share of net assets in three-quarters of the cases in which the
husband did not own such an asset, as compared to roughly half of
the cases in which he did.2c
206. See supra note 110 and sources cited therein.
207. Excluding assets classified as separate property, husbands owned 86% of
businesses (n=147) and 86% of professional degrees and licenses (n=36).
208. Chi-square=19.21572 D.F.=4; p=.0007.
209. Wives were generally awarded very low percentages of business and professional
assets. The average share of a husband-owned business (n=127) awarded the wife was
16%; the median share was 0%. The average share of a husband-owned professional
degree or license (n=13) awarded the wife was 17%; the median was 13%.
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TABLE 10: PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF NET MARITAL
ASSETS (JUDICIAL SAMPLE: COUPLES WITH POSITIVE NET
WORTH), BY HUSBAND'S OWNERSHIP OF BUSINESS OR
PROFESSIONAL LICENSE
Husband Did Not Husband Owned
Percentage Own Business, Business, Profes-
Distribution of Professional sional Degree or
Marital Net Worth Degree or License License
(n=231) (n=91)
Disproportionate
Share to Husband 25% 48%
Relatively Equal* 52% 40%
Disproportionate
Share to Wife 23% 12%
Between 45% and 55%
Although husbands owning either a business or a professional degree
were disproportionately likely to obtain the lion's share of the marital
wealth, husbands with professional degrees did particularly well: Fully
54% of this group obtained a disproportionate share of net marital
assets.10 This result is perhaps foreseeable given the novelty of the
property interest at stake, the lack of consensus on whether it should
be treated as a divisible asset at all, and appellate case law finding
disproportionate division of professional assets equitable.1
But the correlation between title and the percentage division of
net assets is more surprising. Although an express aim of New York's
Equitable Distribution Law was to ensure that title did not determine
the distribution of assets acquired during the marriage, the percentage
of marital assets solely owned by the husband (but not the wife) was
a significant predictor of the divisional outcome. Husbands who
owned at least 60% of marital assets were more than twice as likely
to receive a disproportionate share as were their counterparts owning
less than 20%. (See Table 11.) Title, unlike the litigant characteris-
tics enumerated in the statute or the other property-related factors
210. n=26. Forty-four percent of husbands owning businesses (n=77) obtained a
disproportionate share of net marital assets.
211. See supra notes 104-09 and accompanying text.
212. p<001.
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considered, was also significantly correlated with the net property
division in the settlement group.
213
TABLE 11: PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF NET M:ARITAL ASSETS
(JUDICIAL SAMPLE: COUPLES WITH POSITIVE NET WORTH),
BY PROPORTION OF MARITAL ASSETS OWNED BY HUSBAND
Relatively Equal = Between 45% and 55%
The other property variables significantly related to the divisional
outcome do not suggest a uniform judicial preference for monetary
contribution as compared to need, however. The value of the
husband's (but not the wife's) separate property was positively, and
significantly, correlated with the wife's percentage award;2 4 com-
paratively needy wives whose husbands had substantial separate
property tended to receive a disproportionate share of marital
property. The distributional outcome was also significantly correlated
with the value of marital property; the smaller the value of net assets,
the greater the likelihood that the wife would receive a dispropor-
tionate share."' Thus in the handful of cases where debts exceeded
assets, 80% of husbands were required to assume disproportionate
213. p<.001. Among cases in the settlement sample, where wives tended to own a
larger percentage of marital property, see supra text accompanying note 173, the
percentage of marital assets owned solely by the wife was also significantly correlated with
the net property division (p<.001).
214. p=.032. The ratio of the husband's separate property to marital property was also
significantly correlated with the percentage distribution of net marital assets (=.037).
Neither the value of the wife's separate property, nor the ratio of her separate property
to marital property, were significantly correlated with the percentage distribution of net
assets. See Appendix, Table A7.
215. p=.013.
Percentage Husband's Property/
Distribution of All Marital Property
Net Marital 0%-19% 20%-59% 60%-100%
Assets (n=132) (n=89) (n=88)
Disproportionate
Share to Husband 20% 34% 48%
Relatively Equal* 53% 48% 39%
Disproportionate
Share to Wife 27% 18% 12%
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liability, and approximately 80% of wives received a relatively equal
or larger share of net marital assets when those assets were worth less
than $50,000.216 But when net assets were worth at least $400,000,
only 55% of wives were awarded a relatively equal or larger share.
(See Table 12.)
TABLE 12: PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF NET MARITAL
ASSETS (JUDICIAL SAMPLE), BY VALUE OF NET MARITAL ASSETS
Net Value
Percentage Marital Assets
Distribution of
Net Marital $ 0 - $50,000 $200,000 $400,000
Assets <$0 49,999 199,000 399,999 or more(n=5) (n=72) (n=98) (n=54) (n=94)
Greater Share
to Husband 80% 22% 26% 28% 46%
Relatively
Equal' 20% 49% 49% 54% 45%
Greater Share
to Wife 0% 29% 25% 19% 10%
Relatively Equal = Between 45% and 55%
To the extent that disproportionate distribution to one spouse
was predictable, it thus tended to reflect monetary contribution to the
marriage instead of need. The husband's ownership of a large
percentage of marital assets, of a business or professional license,
217
and a higher value for net marital assets were all associated with an
increased likelihood that the husband would receive a dispropor-
tionate percentage of marital net worth.218 The spouse who had
216. In the cases involving negative net worth, husband disproportion indicates a
greater share of net debts and thus represents a benefit to the wife. See infra note 225.
217. The presence of other types of assets in the pool of marital property had no
predictive value. For example, despite the fact that husbands owned 85% of all pensions
(n=236) and 94% of all pensions classified as marital property (n=220), pension ownership
was not significantly correlated with the net property distribution. The average share of
a husband-owned pension classified as marital property (n=180) awarded the wife was
20%; the median share was 0%. In the pension cases the wife was typically awarded
offsetting property; in the business and degree cases she was not.
218. The husband's ownership of a business or professional license was significantly and
positively correlated with his share of marital assets (p<.001) and marital net worth
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contributed more income to the marriage tended to receive more
property. But this apparent judicial emphasis on monetary
contribution was not uniform. In cases of relative poverty, the
wife-in all probability the needier party-tended to receive the lion's
share of the assets. The husband's ownership of a relatively large
amount of separate property was, again, associated with disproportion
in favor of the less-propertied wife.
b. The Predictability of Net Worth Distribution: More Detailed
Analysis
Property division outcomes were also analyzed taking into
account a variety of judicial characteristics and other case variables
unrelated to the legislative factors in order to determine whether
these extra-statutory considerations had any value in predicting
divisional outcomes. They did not: Neither the judge's sex, age,
religious affiliation, political party, judicial experience, nor educational
status score was significantly correlated with judicial sample net worth
distributions.219 Nor, in the judicial sample, did the case processing
time, case region, the gender of the spouse against whom the divorce
was granted, or the specific fault allegations upon which the divorce
was based demonstrate a significant relationship to the net worth
distribution.2"
For the settlement sample, variables that might suggest strategic
bargaining behavior were also assessed. No significant predictive
relationships were found. Although litigation theorists have often
posited that women confronted with the possibility of a custody battle
may make economic concessions to obtain custody.' an unrealized
custody threat by the husband was insignificantly related to the
distributional outcome.' Nor did case processing time, another
(p<.001). The value of net marital assets and the husband's percentage share of those
assets were also positively and significantly correlated (p<.001).
219. See infra Appendix, Table A7.
220. The gender of the plaintiff and the fault findings were significantly linked to the
divisional outcome at the .05 confidence level in the settlement sample but did not, when
regression analysis was employed, significantly contribute to the predictive capacity of the
regression model. For correlation coefficients and p values, see infra Appendix, Table A8.
221. See, e.g., MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 14, at 44-56; WEITZMAN, supra note
12, at 242-43; Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 14, at 963-66; Robert H. Mnookin,
Divorce Bargaining: The Limits of Private Ordering, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1015, 1032-
33 (1985).
222. A custody request by the husband is, of course, only a rough measure of the
degree of conflict over custody. Intense conflict may precede the filing of the divorce
papers; conversely, some lawyers may request custody for their client when the request
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potential conflict indicator,2' evidence a significant predictive
relationship.
Regression analysis 2  was then employed to determine the
relative impact of property and litigant-related variables on property
division, as well as the extent to which these variables could be used
to predict disproportionate outcomes. Table 14 shows the results of
that analysis for the judicial sample, excluding cases with negative net
worth.' The column headed "standardized regression coefficient"
shows the magnitude and direction of the effect of the independent
variable upon the distribution of net marital property. 6  The
column headed "t Stat." shows the t statistic, used to test the
significance of an individual coefficient, and the level of significance
attained. 7  The Table shows the results when all variables sig-
nificant at the .05 confidence level or better are used ("Full Model")
and, in the right column ("Parsimonious Model"), the results when
lacks credibility. My finding on the lack of a significant relationship is, however, consistent
with that of Professors Maccoby and Mnookin, who employed parents' own conflict ratings
and still found no significant relationship between conflict level and support outcomes.
See MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 14, at 154-57.
223. See id. at 138-39.
224. For discussions of multiple regression analysis, see MICHAEL 0. FINKELSTEIN &
BRUCE LEVIN, STATISTICS FOR LAWYERS 323-442 (1990); MICHAEL S. LEWIS-BECK,
APPLIED REGRESSION: AN INTRODUCTION 47-74 (1980).
225. In cases involving negative net worth the distributional percentage typically gives
a misleading impression of case outcome. Suppose that a couple owns $7000 in assets and
$10,000 in debts. If the wife is awarded $5000 in debts and $4000 in assets, while the
husband is awarded $5000 in debts and $3000 in assets, the wife gets 33% of net worth
(-$1000/-$3000) and the husband 67% (-$2000/-$3000). But the wife is better off than her
husband. In order to include negative net worth cases in the analysis, the distribution of
property and debt was also analyzed by adding debts to assets and calculating each
spouse's share of the pool on a 100-point scale. This approach, which I have termed
"distribution of the marital estate," was also employed in analysis of the settlement case
sample property/debt distribution data. See Garrison, supra note 12, at 670-71. Only five
judicial sample cases in which the division of net marital assets could be determined
involved negative net worth. Regression analysis of the distribution of the marital estate,
including these cases, did not vary substantially from the analysis displayed in Table 14.
The full and parsimonious regression models explicated 14% of the variability in outcomes;
the parsimonious model eliminated the same variables.
226. More precisely, the regression coefficient shows the effect that one standard
deviation difference in the independent variable would have on the standardized score.
For example, the regression coefficient for the wife's income is .148981, which means that
a difference of one standard deviation in this variable is predicted to cause a difference of
.148981 standard deviation in the percentage distribution of net marital property. Because
the coefficient is positive, a higher income is predicted to produce a higher percentage
share of net marital property for the wife. See FINKELSTEIN & LEVIN, supra note 224, at
332-36.
227. For a more detailed explanation of the t-statistic, see id. at 352-53.
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variables that fail to significantly improve the model's predictive
power are eliminated. After this elimination, only five variables-the
husband's ownership of a business or professional license, the wife's
income, the value of net marital property, the proportion of marital
property owned by the husband, and the value of the husband's
separate property-significantly contributed to the prediction of net
worth distribution. The predictive power of both the full and par-
simonious regression models is also quite modest; both explain less
than 15% of the variation in net property division outcomes.2"
Moreover, the results displayed in Table 13 derive from a reduction
of net property distribution percentages to five categories: When the
regression model was employed to predict actual percentages, 9 its
predictive capacity was, not surprisingly, even smaller.
228. Regression analysis of results for the smaller group of cases involving minor
children, where the percentage of the obligor's income awarded as child support was a
highly significant predictor of the net property division outcome, was somewhat more
successful in explicating the variation in outcomes. The full regression model, employing
the same variables listed in Table 14 and the child support percentage, explicated
approximately 24% of the variation in outcomes.
229. The full model (n=159), employing the same variables, accounted for 12% of the
variance.
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TABLE 13: REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF NET MARITAL PROPERTY
DISTRIBUTION JUDICIAL SAMPLE: TRIAL COURTS
(CASES WITH POSITIVE NET WORTH)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE = PERCENTAGE AWARD TO WIFE 0
Full Parsimonious
Independent (n=247) Model (n=247) Model
Variable Standard. t Stat. Standard. t Stat.
Regression (p=) Regression (p=)
Coefficient Coefficient
Husband Owns
Marital Business -.204901 - 3.179 -.203676 -3.254
or Degree (.0017) (.0013)
Wife's -.068899 - .895
Employment (.3717)
Wife's Income .148981 1.904 .154735 2.499
(.0581) (.0131)
Wife's Health -.039545 -.621
(.5353)
Wife's Income/ -.058650 -.697
Family Income (.4864)
Net Marital -.183989 -2.727 -.178067 2.499
Property Value (.0069) (.0062)
% of Marital
Property Owned -.131919 -2.044 -.132144 - 2.065
by Husband (0421) (.0400)
Husband's
Separate Property .175077 2.857 .175304 2.874
Value (.0049) (.0044)
Constant 10.235 24.984
(.0000) (.0000)
Proportion of variability explained by model:Y' 13.79% 14.24%
230. Coded as five ranks based on the wife's percentage award of net marital assets:
1 = less than 34%; 2 = 34%-44%; 3 = 45%-55%; 4 = 56%-66%; 5 = more than 66%.
231. The percentages refer to the "adjusted R Square." The multiple correlation
coefficient, R, is the correlation between the regression estimates and the observed values
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The data do support the claim that judges often fail to award an
equal share of business or professional assets to the nontitled spouse.
And in cases where the couple is relatively wealthy, the claim that
judges give greater weight to monetary contributions than to
contributions as a spouse, parent, and homemaker finds some support.
But these tendencies were by no means uniform and their value in
explaining outcome variation is modest. Some divisional outcomes
could also be explained by reference to relatively unusual case facts.
For example, when one spouse had committed a crime against a
family member, the other was almost invariably awarded the lion's
share of the assets."2  Dissipation or concealment of significant
marital assets often produced a skewed distribution as well.z3 Both
of these situations are relevant to the distribution decision under the
New York statute2' and judges clearly took them into account.235
of the dependent variable. The squared multiple correlation coefficient, R Square, can
thus be interpreted as the proportion of the total variability of the dependent variable that
is explained by the regression equation. R Square ranges between 0 (no association) and
1 (a perfect fit). Since the regression equation is optimally fitted to the data, R Square is
biased upward; to compensate, R Square is generally adjusted downward, and the revised
estimate is called the adjusted R Square. See FINKELSTEIN & LEVIN, supra note 224, at
345-46.
232. In four of the five sample cases in which the husband had committed criminal acts
involving a family member, the wife received a disproportionate share of the net marital
property. See Brancoveanu v. Brancoveanu, 535 N.Y.S.2d 86, 90 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988),
appeal dismissed, 538 N.E.2d 358 (N.Y. 1989), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 854 (1991); Thompson
v. Thompson, N.Y. L.J., 1/5/90, at 28, col. 3 (Sup. Ct.); Vasquez v. Vasquez, N.Y. L.J.,
4/4/86, at 13, col. 1 (Sup. Ct.); Wenzel v. Wenzel, 472 N.Y.S.2d 830, 835 (Sup. Ct. 1984).
In the one exception, Valenza v. Valenza, N.Y. LJ., 1/16/90, at 31, col. 4 (Sup. Ct.), the
wife as well as the husband was found guilty of criminal misconduct.
233. See, e.g., Farenga v. Farenga, N.Y. L.J., 3/14/83, at 16, col. 1 (Sup. Ct.); Lenczycki
v. Lenczycki, 543 N.Y.S.2d 724, 726-27 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989); Mahon v. Mahon, 514
N.Y.S.2d 446,447 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987); Whelan v. Whelan, N.Y. L.J., 9/24/81, at 12, col.
5 (Sup. Ct.).
234. Dissipation of assets is specifically listed as a factor in property division. N.Y.
DOM. REL. LAW § 236B(5)(d) (McKinney 1986). Marital fault is not listed as a factor but,
interpreting the last clause of the statute authorizing the judge to consider "any other
factor which the court shall expressly find to be just and proper," appellate courts have
ruled marital fault relevant if egregious. See, e.g., Blickstein v. Blickstein, 472 N.Y.S.2d
110, 113-14 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984). In interpreting this test, courts have found criminal
violence, including assault, rape, kidnapping, a long history of physical abuse, and
attempted murder to constitute egregious fault, but have found that lesser offenses fail to
qualify. For a useful summary of the cases, see McCann v. McCann, 593 N.Y.S.2d 917,
920-22 (Sup. Ct. 1993).
235. Neither evidenced a significant predictive relationship, however. One reason why
asset dissipation evidenced no significant relationship with case outcome is the varying
methodologies employed by judges confronting a case by dissipation. In some instances
judges included the value of the unavailable property in the pool of marital assets subject
to distribution and assigned it to the guilty spouse. Trial court judges typically distributed
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But, overall, the explanatory value of the legislative factors is quite
slight. More often than not, judicial deviation from the new equal
division norm is simply inexplicable from the data at hand.
Property distribution outcomes were, ironically, more predictable
in the settlement sample, at least if cases involving negative net worth
are excluded from the analysis. Using regression analysis, slightly
more than 30% of the variation in outcomes could be predicted. But
the predictive variables were the percentages of marital property to
which each spouse held title. 6 Moreover, the inclusion of cases
where debts exceeded assets-a far more numerous group in the
settlement than in the judicial sample and one where wives tended to
do comparatively well-eroded the value of title as a predictive
variable substantially; 7 for this larger case set, only 6% of case
variation was explicable.
Thus, in neither the judicial nor the settlement sample is it
possible to explain much of the variation in results on the basis of the
available case information. The lingering impact of title is apparent
in both case sets. Some of the statutory factors were significantly
correlated with case outcomes. But judicial consensus on when and
how to deviate from the new equal division norm is not apparent, and
the relative rarity of equal division in the settled cases, a result that
cannot be explained on the basis of strategic bargaining, is striking.
What is perhaps most notable about the property division data is
simply that they explain so little.
this enhanced pool relatively equally. See, e.g., Vogel v. Vogel, 549 N.Y.S.2d 438, 440
(N.Y. App. Div. 1989); Contino v. Contino, 529 N.Y.S.2d 14, 14-15 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988);
Gottlieb v. Gottlieb, N.Y. L.J. 6/29/82, at 15 col. 1 (Sup. Ct.); see also Harrell v. Harrell,
502 N.Y.S.2d 57, 58-59 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (remitting case to trial court where that
court had failed to include value of dissipated assets in pool distributed and awarded
husband who had dissipated assets an equal share of those remaining). In other cases
(particularly when the value of the missing assets could not be determined), the court
simply awarded the lion's share of the remaining assets to the blameless spouse. See, e.g.,
Lenczycki v. Lenczycki, 543 N.Y.S.2d 724, 727 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989); Mahon v. Mahon,
514 N.Y.S.2d 446 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987); Farenga v. Farenga, N.Y. L.J., 3/14/83, at 16, col.
1 (Sup. Ct.); Whelan v. Whelan, N.Y. L.J., 9/24/81, at 12 col. 5 (Sup. Ct.).
236. No other variables contributed significantly to the model's predictive capacity.
237. Twenty-two percent of couples in the settlement sample had debts exceeding their
assets, as compared to 4% in the judicial sample. See supra Table 3.
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B. Alimony and Child Support
1. The Award of Alimony
a. The Judicial and Settlement Samples Compared
Although litigation to trial appeared to confer no remarkable
advantage on judicial sample wives with respect to property division,
it was associated with a higher alimony rate. At the trial court level,
62% of wives in the judicial sample were awarded alimony,"8 an
award rate more than four times that of divorced women in both New
York state 9 and the nation,' and approximately double the
alimony award rate of wives in the settlement sample.
The best predictors of alimony in both the judicial and settlement
groups were spousal income24' and marital duration;24 the high
alimony rate for the judicial cases thus reflects, in part, the greater
proportion of lengthy marriages, low-income wives, and high-income
husbands in this group. For example, the alimony rate for employed
women married less than ten years varied insignificantly by case
group. But there were approximately twice as many women with
these characteristics in the settlement group as in the judicial sample.
(See Table 14.)
238. Three husbands (.8%) were awarded alimony as well.
239. See Garrison, supra note 12, at 697 (alimony award rate in three New York
counties was 12% in 1984).
240. See GORDON H. LESTER, JR., BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY 1989 1 (Current Population Reports, Series
P-60, No. 173) (1991) (reporting that 15% of women who had ever divorced or separated
as of 1990 had been awarded alimony).
241. For correlation coefficients and p values, see infra Appendix, Table A14.
242. Similar relationships between alimony and income, and alimony and marital
duration, have been noted by other researchers. See, e.g., STERIN & DAVIS, supra note
12, at 140-41; WErrzMAN, supra note 12, at 169, 179; Rosalyn B. Bell, Alimony and the
Financially Dependent Spouse in Montgomery County, Maryland, 22 FAM. L.Q. 225, 294
(1988); McLindon, supra note 12, at 363-64; Rowe & Morrow, supra note 12, at 476-77;
Wishik, supra note 12, at 88.
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TABLE 14: PERCENTAGES OF SAMPLE WIVES AWARDED ALIMONY, BY
MARITAL DURATION, WIFE'S EMPLOYMENT STATUS, AND CASE GROUP
Marital Duration & Judicial Settlement Difference
Wife's Employment Status Sample Sample
% (n) % (n)
Unemployed wives 83% (116) 49% (47) -34".
married > 10 years
Unemployed wives 74% (31) 50% (32) -24"
married < 10 years
All Unemployed Wives 82% (151) 52% (79) -30."
Employed wives married 53% (170) 27% (132) -34."
>_ 10 years
Employed wives married 23% (39) 21% (73) -2
<10 years
All Employed Wives 48% (214) 26% (208) -22."
p<..uJ, p<.uu.
The higher alimony award rate in the judicial group does not
appear to result simply from sample composition, however. Long-
married and low-income wives, who had the highest alimony award
rates in both case sets, had significantly higher award rates when the
case was judicially decided. Among women married twenty or more
years, for example, 69% of the judicial group were awarded alimony
compared to 39% in the settlement sample. (See Table 15.)
TABLE 15: PERCENTAGES OF SAMPLE WIVES AWARDED
MARITAL DURATION AND CASE GROUP
ALIMONY, BY
Judicial Settlement
Marital Duration Sample Sample Difference
% (n) % (n)
0 - 4 years 50% (14) 27% (44) -23
5 - 9 years 46% (59) 28% (71) -18"
10 - 14 years 58% (77) 29% (68) -29."
15 - 19 years 64% (73) 22% (51) -42"'.
20 or more years 69% (144) 39% (79) -30...
All Sample Cases 62% (377) 31% (313) -31."
p<.05, **' p<.001
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Similarly, 89% of wives who earned less than 10% of family income
were awarded alimony by the judges, as compared to an alimony
award rate of 58% for this group in the settlement sample.243
(See Table 16.)
TABLE 16: PERCENTAGES OF SAMPLE WivEs AWARDED
ALIMONY, BY WIFE'S INCOME PERCENTAGE (WIFE'S
INCOME/FAMILY INCOME) AND CASE GROUP
Wife's Income/ Judicial Settlement
Family Income Sample Sample Difference
% (n) % (n)
0%- 9% 89% (113) 58% (76) -31**
10- 29% 76% (86) 31% (49) -45* *
30- 49% 39% (56) 12% (57) -27**
50% or more 4% (28) 4% (23) -0
p<.01, "'* p<.001
Litigation to trial was thus associated with a higher alimony award
rate both because the judicial sample contained more long-married
and low-income wives-the group with the best alimony
prospects-and because wives with these characteristics received
alimony awards more frequently from judges than through the
settlement process.
b. Changes in Judicial Alimony Decision Making Over Time
The advantages of litigation were not consistent over the ten year
period reviewed. The judicial alimony award rate for the period 1980-
83 was fourteen percentage points higher than for the period 1987-90;
a later decision year was, in fact, a significant negative predictor of an
alimony award.2' Nor was the lower alimony rate for the later
period confined to women in short marriages. Women married for
twenty or more years experienced a decline in their alimony prospects
identical to that experienced by women married for less than ten
years. (See Table 17).
243. Similar differences are observable in many segments of the sample population.
For a comparison of alimony award rates by wife's income, husband's income, and custody
status, see infra Appendix, Tables AS-A10.
244. p=.018.
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TABLE 17: JUDICIAL SAMPLE ALIMONY AWARDS,
DURATION AND TIME PERIOD
BY MARITAL
Time Period
Marital Duration 1980-83 1984-86 1987-90
% (n) % (n) % (n)
0 - 9 years 65% (20) 32% (25) 46% (28)
10 - 19 years 68% (37) 58% (72) 61% (41)
20 or more years 75% (44) 73% (59) 56% (41)
All Sample Cases 71% (102)1 60% (161) 57% (114)
The alimony prospects of women who earned an extremely small
percentage of family income were unaffected by the lower award rate
in later research years, however. Wives earning less than 10% of
family income were not significantly less likely to be awarded alimony
in the last triennial period than they were in the first. (See Table 18.)
Women earning at least 30% of family income, on the other hand,
saw their alimony prospects decline by almost half over the research
period. The declining alimony award rate over the ten year period
reviewed thus appears to reflect increased judicial emphasis on need
as compared to other factors.
TABLE 18: JUDICIAL SAMPLE ALIMONY AWARDS, BY WIFE'S
INCOME PERCENTAGE AND TIME PERIOD
Wife's Income Time Period
Percentage
(Wife's Income/ 1980-83 1984-86 1987-90
Family Income) % (n) % (n) % (n)
0%- 9% 91% (32) 87% (53) 89% (28)
10-29% 78% (23) 74% (35) 75% (28)
30% or more 40% (25) 23% (35) 21% (24)
All Sample Cases 71% (102) 1 60% (161) [ 57% (114)
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2. The Duration of Alimony
a. The Judicial and Settlement Samples Compared
In contrast to the markedly higher judicial alimony rate, litigation
to trial -was not associated with significantly enhanced prospects of a
permanent alimony award. Only 35% of judicial alimony awards
were permanent, as compared to 31% in the settlement group.245
Nor were long-married and older women more likely to be
awarded permanent alimony by judges than through the settlement
process. Although marital duration was a highly significant predictor
of a permanent award for both case groups,246 permanent awards to
long-married wives were no more frequent in the judicial sample than
in the settlement group. (See Table 19.)
TABLE 19: PERCENTAGES OF SAMPLE ALIMONY AWARDS THAT
WERE PERMANENT, BY CASE GROUP AND MARITAL DURATION
Judicial Settlement Difference
Marital Duration Sample Sample
% (n) % (n)
0 - 9 years 24% (33) 28% (32) + 4
10 - 19 years 28% (93) 20% (30) - 8
20 or more years 46% (98) 45% (31) - 1
All Sample Cases 35% (230)1 31% (93) -4
Age, too, was a significant predictor of a permanent award for both
case sets,247 but the likelihood of a permanent alimony award for
women over fifty was actually somewhat lower in the judicial sample
than in the settlement group.2'
Nor, when time-limited alimony was awarded, were judicial
awards likely to extend over a significantly longer period. The
245. The difference was not significant.
246. For the judicial sample, p<.001. For the settlement sample, p=.024. The difference
in permanency rates by case group was not significant for any marital duration category.
247. For the judicial sample, p=.003. For the settlement sample, the husband's rather
than the wife's age was statistically significant (p=.050). The difference in permanency
rates by case group was not significant in any age category.
248. For a more detailed presentation, see infra Appendix, Table A13.
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average length of a time-limited award was 5.0 years in the judicial
sample249 and 4.6 years in the settlement group.2
b. The Impact of Statutory Change Upon Judicial Awards
Although the 1986 amendments to the Equitable Distribution
Law 1 were intended to reverse the trend toward durational
alimony, these amendments had no apparent impact. The proportion
of alimony awards that were permanent was lowest in 1987-90, after
the amendments went into effect. (See Table 20.) Indeed, a later
decision year was a significant negative predictor of a permanent
award.22 The passage of the amendments was, however, associated
with stabilization of the permanent alimony rate among long-married
wives; although the permanent alimony rate for this group did not
increase after 1986, wives married twenty or more years did not see
a further decline in their prospects of a permanent alimony award.
Wives married for shorter periods, on the other hand, saw the
likelihood of permanent alimony continue to fall.
TABLE 20: PERCENTAGES OF JUDICIAL SAMPLE ALIMONY
AWARDS THAT WERE PERMANENT, BY MARITAL DURATION
AND TIME PERIOD
Time Period
Marital Duration 1980-83 1984-86 1987-90
% (n) % (n) % (n)
0 - 9 years 31% (13) 38% (8) 8% (12)
10 - 19 years 46% (24) 26% (43) 15% (26)
20 or more years 50% (32) 44% (43) 44% (23)
All Sample Cases1 44% (70)] 35% (97) 25% (63)
249. The median was 4.1 years; judicial awards ranged from 0.9 to 26.0 years (n=148).
250. The median was 3.5 years; settlement awards ranged from 1.0 to 13.0 years (n=62).
251. For a description of the amendments, see supra notes 113-14 and accompanying
text.
252. p=.022.
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3. The Value of Alimony and Child Support
a. The Judicial and Settlement Samples Compared
In contrast to the similarity of judicial and settlement permanence
outcomes, the average value of both alimony 3 and child sup-
port' varied substantially by case group. The average value of
combined alimony and child support in the judicial group 15 was,
indeed, almost double its value in the settlement sample. 6 (See
Table 21.)
TABLE 21: MEAN ALIMONY AND CHILD SUPPORT AWARDS
(1990 DOLLARS), BY CASE GROUP
Judicial Settlement
Mean Award Sample Sample Difference
(1990 Dollars) $ per month $ per month
(n) (n)
Alimony:
when awarded $1084 (233) $ 978 (98) - 106
all cases $ 677 (373) $ 307 (312) - 370-
Child Support:
per family $ 778 (225) $ 481 (196) - 297-
per minor child $ 430 (225) $ 301 (196) - 129"
Total Alimony &
Child support:
minor children $1474 (225) $ 709 (208) - 765""
no minor children $ 675 (143) $ 429 (97) - 246
all cases $1163 (368) $ 620 (305) - 543-
p<.01, "'" p<.O01
253. The median monthly alimony award was $685 in the judicial sample (n=233) and
$405 in the settlement group (n=98).
254. The median monthly child support award was $683 in the judicial sample (n=196)
and $378 in the settlement group (n=196).
255. Judicial awards were not more likely to include enhancements of the basic alimony
and child support package than were awards based on settlement, however. For a
comparison of enhancements to child support by case group, see infra Appendix, Table
A15. Provision for the payment of college expenses was, indeed, more common in the
settlement group than in the judicial sample. See infra Appendix, Table A15.
256. The median monthly combined award was $815 for the judicial sample (n=368) and
$324 for the settlement sample (n=305).
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While the higher dollar values of judicial alimony and child
support awards reflect, to some extent, the higher incomes of couples
in the judicial sample, judicial awards also constituted a larger
percentage of obligor income. For judicial cases involving minor
children, the average percentage of obligor income awarded in
combined alimony and child support was 31%, as compared to 23%
in the settlement sample.17 Although the difference between the
settlement and judicial groups was not significant at all income levels
(see Table 22), it was consistent over the ten-year period
reviewed.' 8
TABLE 22: MEAN PERCENTAGE OF OBLIGOR'S GROSS INCOME
(1990 DOLLARS) AWARDED AS ALIMONY AND CHILD SUPPORT,
BY OBLIGOR'S INCOME AND CASE GROUP
Mean % of Income Mean % of Income
Obligor's Awarded as Child Awarded as Child
Gross Income Support Support & Alimony
(1990 Dollars) J Group S Group J Group S Group
(n) (n) (n) (n)
$0-$34,999 29% 21%* 38% 24%"
(38) (76) (38) (76)
$35,000-$69,999 18% 17% 31% 22%*"
(77) (47) (77) (47)
$70,000 + 13% 9% 25% 19%
(59) (14) (59) (14)
All Sample 19% 18% 31% 23%...
Cases (174) (137) (174) (137)
J Group= Judicial Group; S Group=Settlement Group
Difference between group means: * p<.05, "' p<.01, *" p<.001
257. For cases not involving minor children, the average percentage of obligor income
awarded as alimony in the judicial sample was 15%, if $0 awards are included in the
calculation, or 22%, if $0 awards are excluded; in the settlement sample, the average
percentage was 8% ($0 awards included) or 21% ($0 awards excluded).
258. In the judicial sample, the average percentage of obligor income awarded as child
support was 18% (n=49) in 1980-83; 18% (n=71) in 1984-86; and 22% (n=51) in 1987-90.
The average percentage of obligor income awarded in combined alimony and child support
(for cases involving minor children) was 31% (n=49) in 1980-83; 30% (n=73) in 1984-86;
and 32% (n=52) in 1987-90.
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Alimony and child support payments also constituted a larger
fraction of the recipient's post-divorce income in the judicial sample.
(See Table 23). For women with minor children, for example, the
value of alimony and child support represented an average of 62% of
post-divorce income, as compared to 44% in the settlement group.
TABLE 23: MEAN PERCENTAGE OF RECIPIENT'S TOTAL INCOME
(INCLUDING ALIMONY AND CHILD SUPPORT) REPRESENTED BY
ALIMONY AND CHILD SUPPORT, BY RECIPIENT'S INCOME
(EXCLUDING ALIMONY AND CHILD SUPPORT) AND CASE GROUP
Child Support Child Support &
Award/Recipient's Alimony Award/
Recipient's Total Income: Recipient's Total
Gross Income Mean % Income: Mean %
(1990 Dollars)
J Group S Group J Group S Group
(n) (n) (n) (n)
$0-$4,999 51% 68%** 97% 94%
(66) (47) (66) (47)
$5,000-$19,999 32% 26%* 51% 32%-
(53) (70) (53) (70)
$20,000 + 19% 12% 27% 14%'**
1 (48) (48) (48) (48)
All Sample 36% 34% 62% 44%***
Cases (167) (165) (167) (165)
J Group= Judicial Sample; S Group=Settlement Group
Difference between group means: * p<.05, "" p<.01, * p<.001
b. Payment of Legal Expenses
The more valuable child support and alimony awards achieved by
judicial decision did not, of course, come free. The average value of
judicial sample wives' legal fees was $30,795;'9 in half of the cases
259. n=115. The median value of wives' fees was $16,024.
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for which a comparison could be made, the wife's fees were equal to
more than a year of combined alimony and child support
payments.26° Although judicial sample husbands were also more
likely to shoulder some or all of their wives' legal fees than were their
counterparts in the settlement case group,261 this difference stemmed
largely from a higher proportion of cases requiring joint payment of
the wife's fees. In these joint payment cases, judges generally failed
to specify either the wife's total fees or the percentage that the
husband was required to pay; information on the value of legal fees
was also rarely available in the settlement sample files. The data
thus do not permit comparison of wives' legal expense obligations by
case group, but it is entirely possible that the higher child support and
alimony awards to women in the judicial sample were more than
offset by higher expenses associated with obtaining a litigated divorce
judgment. (See Table 24.)
260. n=89. The median ratio of a wife's fees to her combined annual alimony and child
support award was 1.28; the mean ratio was 3.17.
261. In the settlement sample, payment of the wife's legal fees by the husband was
significantly and positively correlated with the wife's award of alimony (p<.001), the
husband's income (p=.047 ), the value of combined alimony and child support (p=.025), and
the percentage of the husband's income awarded in combined alimony and child support
(p<.001). Payment of the wife's legal fees by the husband was significantly and negatively
correlated with the wife's income (p=.004). The wife's employment status, the custody of
minor children, the percentage of family income she earned, and marital duration were not
significantly related to the payment of her counsel fees.
In the judicial sample, the husband's payment of the wife's counsel fees was
significantly and positively correlated with the wife's award of alimony (p<.001), the
husband's income (p=.010), the value of combined alimony and child support (p<.001), the
wife's employment status (p=.003), and the percentage of the husband's income awarded
in alimony and child support (p<.001). The husband's payment of the wife's counsel fees
was also significantly - and negatively - correlated with the percentage of family income
earned by the wife (p<001) and the wife's income (p<.001). Marital duration and custody
status were not significantly related to the the husband's payment of the wife's counsel
fees.
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TABLE 24: PAYMENT OF SAMPLE WIVES' LEGAL FEES. BY CASE GROUP
Cases with joint or split custody excluded.
4. Post-Divorce Income and Standard of Living
Even if the impact of their legal expenses is ignored, child
support and alimony awards to women in the judicial sample were
typically inadequate to prevent a marked drop in their post-divorce
standard of living. Although women in this group suffered a slightly
smaller average decline in per capita income and standard of living
than did women in the settlement sample, the difference was
insignificant.262 In both case sets, the average woman's standard of
living" fell markedly, while that of her husband improved. (See
262. A comparison of median per capita income changes produced comparable results.
In the judicial sample, the median ratio of the husband's post to pre-divorce per capita
income was 163%; the wife's was 61%. In the settlement sample, the median ratio of the
husband's post to pre-divorce per capita income was 172%; the wife's was 63%.
263. Per capita income fails to accurately measure standard of living because it ignores
economies of scale. A variety of equivalence scales have been developed to take account
of economies of scale and thus produce a more realistic measure of living standards.
These equivalence scales typically adjust family income by family size raised to a power
ranging between 0.2 to 1 (the size elasticity), with 1 representing per capita income and
0.2 representing an adjustment that assumes very large economies of scale. For discussions
of equivalence scales, see, e.g., B. Buhmann et al., Equivalence Scales, Well-being,
Inequality and Poverty: Sensitivity Estimated across Ten Countries using the Luxembourg
Income Study (LIS) Database, REV. INCOME & WEALTH 115 (June 1988); Sorensen, supra
note 43, at 273-74. Change in post-divorce standard of living is extremely sensitive to the
equivalence scale utilized. See Sorenson, supra note 43, at 280 tbl. 15.5 (comparing post-
divorce change in living standards using four different measurements). Post-divorce
Wife Category Judicial Sample Settlement Sample
Fees Paid by: % (n) % (n)
Alimony Recipients Fees (205) (83)
paid by: Husband 34% 39%
Joint 38% 18%
Wife 28% 42%
Custodial Parents* (176) (142)
Fees paid by: Husband 26% 25%
Joint 43% 18%
Wife 31% 56%
All Wives (324) (266)
Fees paid by: Husband 25% 22%
Joint 34% 16%
Wife 41% 61%
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Table 25.) Because judicial sample wives were more likely to receive
some portion of the husband's post-divorce support obligation in the
form of alimony, it is indeed possible, given the prevalence of short-
term alimony awards, that they would be worse off than their
settlement group counterparts within a few years after the divorce.
TABLE 25: CHANGES IN HUSBANDS' AND WIVES' PER CAPITA INCOME
AND LIVING STANDARDS POST-DIVORCE, BY CASE GROUP
Judicial Sample Settlement Sample
Median Per Median Per
Capita Income Capita Income
(1990 Dollars) (1990 Dollars)
Mean % (n) Mean % (n)
Pre-Divorce Family $20,544 (287) $14,781 (205)
Husband's household after
divorce: $35,177 (296) $27,028 (221)
Ratio of post to pre-divorce per
capita income: 172% (266) 182% (196)
Ratio of post to pre-divorce
living standard:* 126% 135%
Wife's household after divorce: $12,515 (292) $9,710 (262)
Ratio of post to pre-divorce
per capita income: 71% (266) 68% (196)
Ratio of post to pre-divorce
living standard:* 61% 57%
Measured as ratio of post to pre-divorce per capita income, adjusted by family
size(073).
In both case sets there was also significant variation in the ratio
of the wife's to husband's post-divorce standard of living. In both
change in living standard was measured here using a size elasticity of 0.73, which
approximates the size elasticity underlying the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
standard budgets for urban families. See Buhmann et al., supra, at tbl. 2; Sorensen, supra
note 43, at 273. Professor Weitzman also relied on the BLS equivalence scale in assessing
post-divorce change in living standards, but measured the change in income over the BLS
Lower Standard Budget for a family of comparable size. WEITZMAN, supra note 12, at
338-39, 481-82 n. 19. The average living standard changes (+42% for husbands; -73% for
wives) Weitzman reports, id. at 338-39, have been criticized by some demographers as
unlikely results given her underlying data on per capita income changes. See Hoffman &
Duncan, supra note 43, at 643-44.
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groups, wives in the highest income category married to husbands in
the lowest actually enjoyed a higher post-divorce living standard, on
average, than did their husbands, while wives in the lowest income
category married to husbands in the highest experienced the largest
relative decline. (See Table 26 and Appendix, Table All.)
TABLE 26: MEAN RATIO OF WIFE'S POST-DIVORCE STANDARD OF
LIVING*YHUSBAND'S POST-DIVORCE STANDARD OF LIVING* (JUDICIAL
SAMPLE), BY HUSBAND AND WIFE PRE-DIVORCE INCOME
Husband's Income
Wife's Income $0 - $34,999 $35,000- $60,000 +
$59,999
mean mean mean
ratio (n) ratio (n) ratio (n)
$ 0 - $4,999 .48 (21) .26 (32) .23 (42)
$5,000- $19,999 .42 (40) .45 (31) .33 (24)
$20,000 + 1.83 (19) .88 (29) .44 (29)
All Sample
Wives .77 (80) .52 (92) .32 (95)
Measured by post-divorce family income adjusted by size (0.73).
This pattern suggests that the prime determinant of post-divorce
living standards is the pre-divorce income of each spouse, rather than
income transfers in the form of alimony and child support. The ratio
of the wife's and husband's post-divorce living standards was
significantly and positively correlated with the percentage of family
income earned by the wife' and the value of her income 65 The
award of alimony to the wife' and the value of combined alimony
and child support,2 67 on the other hand, were (at least for cases in
the judicial sample) significant negative predictors of the ratio.
264. In both the judicial and settlement samples, p<.001.
265. In both the judicial and settlement samples, p<.001. In the judicial sample, the
ratio was not significantly correlated with the value of the husband's income (p=.244); in
the settlement sample it was significantly correlated (p=.003).
266. In the judicial sample, p=.008; in the settlement sample, p=.217.
267. In the judicial sample, p=.020; in the settlement sample, p=.26 1.
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While a judicial decision was thus associated with the award of
more valuable alimony and child support, in amounts representing a
higher proportion of obligor and recipient income, these transfers
were, in the vast majority of cases, inadequate to ensure wives and
children a post-divorce living standard equal to that enjoyed by the
husband."r Nor was the average gap between the post-divorce
living standards of wives and husbands significantly smaller in the
judicial sample than the settlement group.
It is important to note, however, that the post-divorce gap in the
living standards of husbands and wives produced by discretionary
decision making was not demonstrably greater than that which would
be produced under New York's new, determinate child support
guidelines. Although these guidelines curtailed judicial discretion in
order to reduce post-divorce income disparities,2 69 the average
percentage of obligor income awarded as child support in both the
judicial and settlement samples was fairly equivalent to what one
would predict under the support guidelines. Although direct
comparisons are not possible,27 the results of discretionary decision
making do not appear to be markedly different from those mandated
under these new bright-line rules.
5. The Predictability of Alimony and Child Support
Decision Making
a. The Award of Alimony
In contrast to property division, where only a few of the factors
enumerated in the statute had explanatory value, the award of
alimony was significantly correlated with a long list of litigant
268. Only 16% of wives in the judicial sample had post-divorce adjusted incomes equal
to or greater than their husbands' post-divorce adjusted incomes (n=267).
269. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (discussing such disparities).
270. New York's child support guidelines describe the presumed child support amount
as a percentage of the obligor's gross income. For one child the percentage is 17%; for
two, 25%. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240.1-b(b)(3) (McKinney Supp. 1995). As the average
number of children in the judicial sample was 1.2, one would expect the rate to be about
19%. But the guidelines include alimony in the child support calculation only if the
agreement or court order establishing the alimony award requires an adjustment in child
support upon the termination of the alimony obligation, id. § 240.1-b(b)(5)(vii)(C), and
mandates pro rata apportionment of reasonable child care expenses related to employment
or job training in addition to the percentage award, id. § 240.1(c)(4). The presumed
percentages also apply only to combined parental income less than $80,000. Id. § 240.1-
b(c)(2).
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characteristics deemed relevant by the legislature."' In both the
judicial and settlement groups, the variables most strongly correlated
with the award of alimony were the wife's income, employment, and
the percentage of family income that she earned. In the judicial
sample, the wife's education, occupational status, health, marital
duration, whether the marriage produced children, the percentage of
the husband's income paid in child support, and the husband's oc-
cupational status were also significant at the .05 confidence level, as
were the value of the wife's assets, net marital assets, and her net
property award.2n
Although a number of statutory variables that demonstrated
significance within the judicial sample failed to do so within the
settlement group, the strength and direction of the variable cor-
relations in the two case sets were often quite similar.273 Only one
variable, the husband's income, was significantly related to the
alimony decision in the settlement case group and failed to
demonstrate significance in the judicial sample.
The relationship between various nonstatutory factors and
alimony awards was also assessed. In the judicial sample, the
likelihood of an alimony award varied significantly by case region; a
later decision year was also significantly and negatively correlated
with the alimony outcome.274 The only judicial characteristic that
demonstrated significance at the .05 confidence level was the judge's
age,275 although the judge's sex narrowly escaped significance at the
.05 confidence level.276 Neither the judge's political party, length of
judicial experience, educational background, or religion was sig-
nificantly correlated with the alimony outcome. In the settlement
sample, variables suggesting strategic bargaining---case processing time
and an unrealized claim of custody by the husband-again failed to
271. For the statutory factors, see supra note 19.
272. For correlation coefficients and p values of these variables (except value of wife's
assests), see infra Appendix, Table A12.
273. Variables that were significantly correlated with the alimony decision in the judicial
but not the settlement sample included: whether the marriage had produced children, the
award of custody, the percentage of the husband's income paid in child support, the wife's
education, the wife's health, marital duration, the value of the couple's net marital assets,
the value of the wife's property, and the value of her net property award. For a
comparison of correlation coefficients, see infra Appendix, Table A12.
274. AL
275. Younger judges were less likely to award alimony than older judges (p=.039).
276. Female judges were less likely to award alimony than male judges (p=.051).
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evidence a significant predictive relationship with the alimony
decision; the case's fault ranking did, however.2n
Logistic regression analysis278 was employed to determine the
relative impact of statutory, judicial, and other case-related variables
on alimony outcomes and the extent to which these variables could
be used to predict alimony awards. Table 27 shows the results of that
analysis for the judicial sample. The Table shows each variable's
"odds multiplier,"279 a statistic that measures the variable's average
impact upon the odds of obtaining alimony, and "R" value,' 0 a
statistic that measures the extent to which, among all cases, the
alimony outcome is predicted by this variable. The left column
displays results for the full logistic regression model, taking into
account all independent variables significant at the .05 confidence
level or better."8 The right column displays results for the most
parsimonious model that fits the data, in which variables that do not
significantly enhance the predictability of alimony outcomes are
deleted.
277. The gender of the plaintiff also narrowly escaped significance at the .05 confidence
level (p=.059).
278. Logistic regression is ordinarily employed instead of least-squares (multiple)
regression when the dependent variable (in this case alimony) is dichotomous. See
FINKELSTEIN & LEVIN, supra note 224, at 447-52; DAVID W. HOSMER & STANLEY
LEMESHOW, APPLIED LOGISTIC REGRESSION (1989). For examples of logistic regression
analysis applied to litigation outcomes, see DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE
AND THE DEATH PENALTY (1990) (capital punishment); Eisenberg & Johnson, supra note
123, at 1178-97 (federal civil rights actions); Schultz & Patterson, supra note 146, at 1095-
1149 (Title VII litigation).
279. The odds multiplier is obtained by taking the antilog of the regression coefficient.
See HOSMER & LEMESHOW, supra note 278, at 58. On the distinction between an odds
multiplier and a probability multiplier, see BALDUS ET AL., supra note 278, at 383-84.
280. See BALDUS ET AL., supra note 278, at 71 n.34.
281. One variable significant at the .05 confidence level, the wife's education, is
excluded from the analysis. The addition of this variable did not enhance the predictability
of the model when included and would have necessitated, given the large number of cases
with missing data for this variable, the reduction of the sample size by almost half.
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TABLE 27: LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF ALIMONY
AWARDS (JUDICIAL SAMPLE: TRIAL COURTS)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE = AWARD OF ALIMONY TO WIFE
Full Model Parsimonious Model
Independent (n=235) (n=235)
Variable
Odds Odds
Multiplier R Multiplier R
(p= ) Value (P= ) Value
Wife's Income/ .0104 (.0196) -.1041 .0334 (.0503) -.0781
Family Income
Wife's Income .9999 (.0005) -.1861 .9999 (.0004) -.1887
Wife's 1.3026 (.4630) .0000
Employment
Marital Duration 1.0412 (.0784) .0654 1.0429 (.0341) .0911
Marriage Pro- .7300 (.2899) .0000
duced Children
Decision Year 1.0522 (.5663) .0000
Net Marital 1.0000 (.1628) .0000 1.0000 (.0023) -.1557
Property Value
Wife's Net
Property Award 1.0000 (.4699) .0000
Value
Wife's Job Status .7368 (.3295) .0000
Husband's Job .6205 (.0129) -.1196 .6115 (.0051) -.1394
Status
Wife's Health 2.6286 (.0379) .0864
Judge's Age 1.0456 (.0700) .0592
Constant (.6709) (.0000)
% of Cases Accurately
Predicted by Model: 85.11%
1996]
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Both models produced accurate predictions of alimony outcomes
in more than 80% of the cases, although the parsimonious model,
which fit the data equally well, achieved predictive results almost as
good as the full model far more economically. With information on
the percentage of family income earned by the wife, the value of her
income, marital duration, the value of net marital property, and the
husband's job status, the model accurately predicted alimony
outcomes for 83% of the cases, a rate considerably better than that
achievable by random assignment.' Although the model achieved
highly disparate results depending on whether alimony was awarded
or not, the improvement over random assignment was substantial for
each category.' Application of the parsimonious model to the
larger set of cases in which values for the five predictive variables
were available produced equivalent predictive results.'
Given the potential use of alimony as a tax reduction device in
cases where child support is payable,' the sample was also sub-
divided into two segments-one including all cases in which the wife
was awarded child custody and thus was eligible for child support
("the child support segment"), the other including all cases in which
the husband had no potential child support liability-in order to
detect any differences in decision making based on tax considerations.
Although the subdivision of the sample did not substantially alter the
overall predictability of the alimony award,s6 the variables that
282. Random assignment of 62% of the cases to the alimony group should produce an
overall 53% accuracy rate.
283. The full model accurately predicted 92% of the cases in which alimony was
awarded and 71% of those in which it was not; the parsimonious model accurately
predicted 90% of the cases in which alimony was awarded and 70% of those in which it
was not. See supra Table A17. Random assignment of 62% (the alimony rate) of the
cases to the alimony group should produce a 62% accuracy rate for the alimony cases and
38% accuracy rate for the nonalimony cases.
284. The model correctly predicted 83.5% of the cases (n=261). Within this larger case
set, replacing the net value of marital property in the regression model with the value of
the wife's net property award increased the accuracy rate from 83.5% to 84.2% (n=260).
The substitution changed the prediction rate in the no alimony category to 68.2% and in
the alimony category to 92.4%.
285. For more detailed information on the taxability of alimony and child support
payments, see JUDITH AREEN, FAMILY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 837-42 (3d ed.
1992); IRA M. ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS 757-94 (2d ed.
1991).
286. In the child-support segment of the sample, the parsimonious model achieved an
accuracy rate of 65% for the no alimony cases and 91% for alimony cases. In the other
segment, the parsimonious model achieved a prediction rate of 67.5% for no alimony cases
and 84.5% of alimony cases. In each case, the regression model's accuracy rate constituted
an improvement over random assignment to the alimony and no-alimony groups.
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were the most powerful predictors did differ. Among the child
support segment, the percentage of family income earned by the wife,
marital duration, and the value of the wife's net property award were
the most useful alimony predictors; the percentage of obligor income
awarded as child support did not significantly contribute to the
predictive power of the model. In the other segment of the sample,
the absolute value of the wife's income, her health, and the husband's
job status were the most powerful predictive variables. These results
suggest the possibility that cases in which alimony is an alternative to
child support may be subject to somewhat different decision-making
norms than are those in which alimony represents the only possible
means of income transfer.
Regression analysis was also applied to alimony outcomes in the
settlement sample. The relative importance of the predictive variables
within the regression model for this group was fairly consistent with
the results obtained for the judicial sample (the most important were
the percentage of family income earned by the wife and the husband's
job status) although the accuracy rate achieved was several percentage
points lower. This accuracy rate still constituted a substantial
improvement over random assignment overallf and within the
alimony category; the improvement over random assignment within
the no-alimony category was modest, however.2
8
While regression analysis thus suggests that much of the variation
in alimony outcomes can be explained by reference to the statutory
factors, the number of inexplicable outcomes was still substantial,
particularly in the settlement case group.29 Forty-five percent of
settlement sample wives earning less than 20% of family income were
not awarded alimony, and the case data fail to reveal why.2' The
importance of the husband's job status as a predictive variable is also
notable. The husband's status was, in both case sets, a more powerful
predictive variable than his income, suggesting that socioeconomic
class may play a role in alimony determination, independent of its
287. The full regression model accurately predicted 72.8% of the cases; the par-
simonious model predicted 75.7%. Random assignment should produce an overall
accuracy rate of 58%.
288. The full regression model accurately predicted 80.2% of no-alimony cases and
60.0% of alimony cases; the parsimonious model accurately predicted 81.4% of the no-
alimony cases and 66.0% of alimony cases. Random assignment, by contrast, should
successfully predict 70% of no-alimony cases and 30% of alimony cases.
289. See Garrison, supra note 12, at 706-11.
290. See id. at 707-08 tbl. 46.
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correlation with income, that comparatively disadvantages women in
low-status families.
But the analysis also suggests that the legislative scheme did play
a significant role at trial and in settlement negotiations. A substantial
majority of alimony outcomes could, for both case groups, be
explained on the basis of the statutory factors alone. The analysis
also reveals that, among all variables for which case information was
available, the spouses' relative need was the dominant factor in
alimony determination. Indeed, with information on the percentage
of family income earned by the wife alone, it was possible to
accurately predict 80% of alimony outcomes in the judicial sample29'
and 72% of those in the settlement group.292 This result, coupled
with the failure of any fault-related variables to contribute sig-
nificantly to the predictability of alimony results, suggests that the
"rehabilitative" alimony concept adopted by the New York legis-
lature, which posits alimony as a remedy for need rather than a
reward for marital virtue, now reigns as the governing principle in
alimony determination.
b. The Duration of Alimony
In contrast to the wealth of litigant characteristics recited in the
alimony statute that were significantly correlated with judges' alimony
award decisions, only three variables-the wife's age, her health, and
marital duration-were significantly correlated with the decision to
award alimony for an unlimited time period.293 A similar pattern
was evident in the settlement sample, where the wife's health, marital
duration, and (curiously) the husband's age were the only variables to
demonstrate significance at the .05 confidence level or better.294
In the judicial sample, several nonstatutory factors were also sig-
nificantly correlated with the permanence of alimony. The decision
year was again a significant negative predictor of a permanent
award. 95 Democratic judges were significantly less likely to award
291. Using the wife's percentage of family income alone, it was possible to accurately
predict 58.95% of the no-alimony cases, 90.96% of the alimony cases, and 80% overall
(n=283).
292. Using the wife's percentage of family income alone, it was possible to accurately
predict 77.54% of the no-alimony cases, 61.2% of the alimony cases, and 72.2% overall
(n=205).
293. For correlation coefficients and p values, see infra Appendix, Table A14.
294. See infra Appendix, Table A14.
295. p=.022.
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permanent alimony than were Republican judges.296 (See Table 28.)
And the judge's educational background was significantly correlated
with alimony permanence as well. Judges with high educational status
scores297 and those who had attended both college and law school
outside the region298 in which they served were significantly more
likely to award permanent alimony than judges educated locally and
those with low status scores.
TABLE 28: PERCENTAGE OF JUDICIAL ALIMONY AWARDS TO
WIVES THAT WERE PERMANENT, BY JUDGE'S POLITICAL PARTY
Duration of Alimony Republican Democratic
Award Judges (n=101) Judges (n=83)
Permanent Alimony
Awarded 40% 25%
Durational Alimony
Awarded 60% 75%
In order to assess the relative importance of litigant and case
characteristics in determining the permanence of judicial alimony
awards, logistic regression analysis was again employed, using all
variables that demonstrated significance at the .05 confidence level.
Table 29 displays the results of that analysis.
296. Chi-square=4.76917 D.F.-1; p=.02897.
297. p=.013. Educational status and the regionality of the judge's education were
themselves strongly correlated (p<.001). The judge's political party was not significantly
linked with either the regionality of the judge's education (p=.099) or the judge's
educational status score (p=.133).
298. Chi-square=18.18364 D.F.=2; p=.00011.
1996] 487
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
TABLE 29: LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF ALIMONY
PERMANENCE (JUDICIAL SAMPLE: TRIAL COURTS)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE = PERMANENT ALIMONY TO WIFE
Full Model Parsimonious Model
(n=137) (n=137)
Variable
Odds Odds
Multiplier R Value Multiplier R Value
(p=) (p=)
Wife's Age 1.0258 .0000
(.4681)
Wife's Health .6537 .0000
(.1981)
Marital .9338 .1073 .9462 .1708
Duration (.0443) (.0074)
Decision Year 1.2227 .0000
(.2131)
Judge's 1.6568 .1402 1.5892 .1369
Political Party (.0191) (.0210)
Judge's .9127 .0000
Education (.4232)
Constant (.3205) (.0001)
% of Cases Accurately
Predicted by Model: 70.07% 67.15%
Both the parsimonious and full regression models attained an
accuracy rate around 70%,299 considerably lower than that achieved
with the decision whether to award alimony, and slightly lower than
that produced by regression analysis of permanence outcomes in the
299. Application of the parsimonious regression model to the larger set of cases for
which data on marital duration and the judge's political party were available (n=178)
produced a similar overall prediction rate (67.4%), but with more extreme variation by
category. The model accurately predicted 90.7% of permanent awards, but only 21.7%
of those that were nonpermanent.
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settlement sample.3°° For both the judicial and settlement groups,
the model's accuracy rate nonetheless constituted an improvement
over random assignment overall0 t and for cases in which nonper-
manent alimony was awarded;3°2 for permanent awards, however,
the model failed to improve over random selection in either case
group.3 The limited success of the regression model in predicting
alimony permanence was also, for the judicial sample, dependent on
the judge's political party variable. Indeed, the judge's political party
was a more important predictor of alimony permanence than every
other variable except marital duration.
The length of the alimony period for nonpermanent awards was
even less predictable than alimony permanence. In the judicial
sample, not a single litigant characteristic enumerated in the alimony
statute as relevant to the decision was significantly correlated with the
length of a durational alimony award. Several nonstatutory fac-
tors-the case region, the appellate department, the judge's age, and
the judge's political party-were correlated, at the .05 confidence level
or better, with the length of the alimony period, but their explanatory
value was slight.3" Several litigant characteristics were significantly
related to the length of the alimony period in the settlement
sample, 5 but regression analysis, employing these variables,
explained less than 1% of the variation in durational outcomes. The
alimony duration decision thus presents a fairly marked contrast to
the more basic decision on whether alimony should be awarded.
While the alimony award decision appears to be fairly predictable,
300. The prediction rate for both the full and parsimonious models was 74.7%.
301. In the judicial sample, random assignment should produce an overall accuracy rate
of 55%; in the settlement sample, random assignment should produce an overall accuracy
rate of 57%.
302. In the judicial sample, random assignment should produce an accuracy rate of 65%
for nonpermanent award cases, while the regression model accurately predicted 86.5% (full
model) or 84.3% (parsimonious model) of nonpermanent awards. In the settlement
sample, random assignment should produce an accuracy rate of 69% for nonpermanent
awards, while the regression model accurately predicted 91.67% (full model) or 96.67%
(parsimonious model).
303. In the judicial sample, random assignment should produce a 35% accuracy rate for
permanent awards, while the regression model correctly predicted 30.6% (full model) or
35.4% (parsimonious model) of permanent awards. In the settlement sample, random
assignment should produce a 31% accuracy rate for permanent awards, while the
regression model accurately predicted 37.0% (full model) or 25.9% (parsimonious model)
of permanent awards.
304. The proportion of variability explained by these variables was 5.8%.
305. The length of the marriage, as well as the husband's income, age, and education
were all significantly linked to the alimony period at the .05 confidence level or better.
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highly correlated with the specific factors and principles contained in
the alimony statute, and largely uninfluenced by personal judicial
values, the alimony duration decision does not.
c. The Value of Alimony and Child Support
i. Cases Involving Minor Children
Although a range of income and status-related variables were
significantly correlated with the value of both child support and child
support combined with alimony,"6  the obligor's income
demonstrated the strongest correlation with each."° In the judicial
sample, two nonstatutory case variables, the decision year and
appellate department, were significantly correlated with the value of
child support, whether or not alimony was included.0 In the
settlement sample, the obligor's income was again the most important
predictive variable, although the recipient's income demonstrated a
much stronger relationship with the child support outcome than it did
in the judicial sample.30 9
Regression analysis was performed in order to determine the
relative strength of the predictive variables and their utility in
predicting the value of the award. Table 30 shows the results of that
analysis for cases in the judicial sample. 10
306. See infra Appendix, Table A16.
307. For the value of child support and combined child support and alimony, p<.0001.
308. Several other variables, including the case duration and region, demonstrated a
significant relationship with the value of child support depending on whether alimony was
counted as part of its value. See infra Appendix, Tables A16 & A17. None of these
variables ultimately contributed to the predictability of child support when regression
analysis was utilized.
309. Variables suggesting strategic bargaining (the case duration, and an unrealized
custody threat by the husband) were also significantly linked to case outcomes. But the
relationships were the opposite of what bargaining theory would suggest: a longer case
duration and an unrealized custody threat were both positively correlated with the value
of child support (although an unrealized husband's custody threat was not significantly
correlated with the value of child support plus alimony). See Appendix, Tables A30 &
A33. Use of a custody contest threat as a bargaining chip would, of course, suggest a
negative correlation. Although the custody contest threat did not contribute significantly
to the regression model, the case duration variable did (at least when the value of alimony
was excluded).
310. Two variables significant at the .05 confidence level, the recipient's education and
the obligor's education, are excluded from the analysis. The addition of these variables
did not enhance the predictability of the model when included and, given the large number
of cases with missing data for these variables, would have necessitated a large reduction
in sample size.
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TABLE 30: REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF CHILD SUPPORT AWARDS
(ALIMONY EXCLUDED) (JUDICIAL SAMPLE: TRIAL COURTS)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE = VALUE OF CHILD SUPPORT
(1990 DOLLARS)
Full Parsi- Model
(n=134) Model monious
Independent (n=134)
Variable
Standard. t Stat. Standard. t Stat.
Regression (p=) Regression (p=)
Coefficient Coefficient
Obligor's Income .606522 7.843 (.0000) .594826 9.897
(.0000)
Obligor's Job Status -.058442 -.814 (.4171)
Recipient's .066505 1.644 (.1027)
Income/Family Income
Decision Year .161647 2.438 (.0162) .210526 3.499
(.0006)
# of Minor Children .271017 4.455 (.0000) .262227 4.427
(.0000)
Judge's Sex .102856 1.644 (.1027)
Judge's Experience -.032889 -.535 (.5938)
Sole Custody to Mother .126776 2.077 (.0399) .142092 2.409
(.0174)
Appellate Department:
1st -.030937 -.450 (.6538)
3rd .014028 .228 (.8201)
4th -.049351 -.808 (.4207)
Constant -2.811 (.0058) -4.028
(.0001)
Proportion of Variability Explained by Model.?" 53.74% 54.29%
311. The percentages refer to the adjusted R Square. See supra note 231 (defining the
adjusted R Square).
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Both the full and parsimonious regression models explicated
slightly more than half of the variation in child support awards. The
obligor's income was by far the most powerful predictive variable, a
result quite consistent with those reported by other researchers who
have employed regression analysis to determine the predictability of
child support under both discretionary standards 12 and presumptive
child support guidelines. 313 Interestingly, regression analysis did not
eliminate the decision year as a predictive variable, thus suggesting a
trend toward higher child support awards over the research period.
Adding the alimony award to the value of child support did not
improve, but instead slightly diminished, the predictability of case out-
comes?14 Although the obligor's income remained the most impor-
tant predictive variable, the recipient's percentage of family income
also contributed significantly to the model when alimony was taken
into account. The regression models thus suggest that judges made
child support decisions with little regard to the characteristics and
income of the parent-recipient, using alimony as means of adjustment.
They also suggest that extrastatutory factors (or at least those factors
on which information was available) did not play an important role
in child support determination.
Regression analysis of child support values in the settlement
group revealed slightly different predictive relationships and explained
a somewhat lower proportion of outcome variability."5  The
obligor's income was, again, by far the most powerful predictive
variable, but the recipient's relative need, as measured by her
percentage of family income, here demonstrated a significant
predictive relationship to the child support award, whether or not
alimony was included in its value.
312. See Melli et al., supra note 32, at 1164 (finding that the number of children, income
of supporting parent, and couple's estimated net worth accounted for almost 50% of
variation in child support values).
313. See MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 14, at 122 tbl. 6.1,156 tbl. 7.7 (finding 54%
of variation in child support awards explicable, with the father's earnings and the number
of children the most important predictive variables).
314. The adjusted R Square was .49520 for the full regression model and .50599 for the
parsimonious model.
315. When the value of alimony was excluded, the adjusted R Square was A6553 for
the full and .44118 for the parsimonious regressionjmodel. When the value of alimony was
included, the adjusted R Square was .39572 for the full and .39436 for the parsimonious
regression model.
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ii. Cases Without Minor Children
Although several income and status-related variables were sig-
nificantly correlated with the value of alimony in judicial sample cases
without minor children,316 regression analysis revealed the obligor's
income to have little predictive weight as compared to the value of
the obligor's property and the appellate department in which the case
was decided. (See Table 31.317) Although the small sample size
prevents conclusive interpretation of the results, these two variables
explicated approximately two-thirds of the variation in alimony values.
The small number of settlement sample cases without minor children
in which alimony was awarded1 . precluded regression analysis of
these outcomes.
316. In the judicial sample, the husband's income, wife's income, percentage of family
income earned by the wife, the husband's job status, the value of husband-owned property,
the value of the wife's net property award, the fault ranking, the judge's political party,
and the appellate division were significantly linked to the value of the alimony award at
the .05 confidence level or better. For correlation coefficients and p values, see infra
Appendix, Table A18.
317. Two variables significant at the .05 confidence level, the husband's job status and
the judge's political party, are excluded from the analysis. The addition of these variables
did not contribute significantly to the predictability of the model and would have reduced
the sample size by a fairly large margin.
318. n=28.
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TABLE 31: REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF ALIMONY VALUE (JUDICIAL
SAMPLE: TRIAL COURTS-CASES WITHOUT MINOR CHILDREN)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE = VALUE OF ALIMONY AWARD TO WIFE
(1990 DOLLARS)
Full Model Parsimonious Model
(n= 41) (n= 41)
Independent Standard. t Stat. Standard. t Stat.
Variable
Regression (p=) Regression (p=)
Coefficient Coefficient
Fault Ranking .017450 .174 (.8628)
Husband's .079866 .712 (.4818)
Income
Wife's Income .094304 .607 (.5481)
Wife's Income/ -.224294 -1.371 (.1802)
Family Income
Wife's Net -.317090 -2.240 (.0324)
Property Award
Value
Husband- .740757 5.066 (.0000) .509548 5.165
Owned Property (.0000)
Value
Appellate
Division:
1st .366469 3.431 (.0017) .476615 4.831
3rd -.034322 - .368 (.7157) (.0000)
4th -.076928 -. 771 (.4463)
Constant 2.244 (.0321) 5.333
(.0000)
Proportion of Variability
Explained by Model:319 71.70% 68.88%
319. The adjusted R Square.
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6. Alimony and Child Support Decision Making: A Summary
A review of the data on the predictability of alimony and child
support reveals a striking fact: Virtually every possible claim
regarding discretionary decision making finds support somewhere.
On the issue of consistency, there is evidence of regional
variation (the value of alimony in cases without minor children), class
bias (the award of alimony), the intrusion of private values into the
decision-making process (alimony permanence), different decision-
making patterns from one year to the next (alimony, alimony
permanence, child support values), utter unpredictability (the duration
of nonpermanent alimony awards), and of highly predictable decision
making quite consistent with the statutory mandate (the award of
alimony, child support values).
On the issue of gender bias, there is evidence that judicial
decisions produced post-divorce income disparities, comparable to
those reported in settled cases,321 that seriously disadvantage women
and children. But the average percentage of obligor income judges
awarded under discretionary standards does not appear to be smaller
than the average percentage judges would presumptively award under
the determinate child support guidelines now in effect in New York.
Judges were less prone to award alimony, and particularly permanent
alimony, over the research period. But the decline in alimony was
offset, for women with minor children, by higher child support
awards, a shift that, given the taxability of alimony and its loss upon
remarriage, may have provided a net advantage to women with minor
children.
On the issue of how discretionary decision making affects the
settlement process, the picture is also mixed. No strategic bargaining
effects were evident? 2' Depending on which decision we consider,
settlements were either highly consistent with judicial decision-making
patterns (alimony, child support) or quite inconsistent (alimony
duration).
320. See supra note 42 and sources cited therein.
321. One possible explanation for this result is suggested by Seltzer and Garfinkel, who
found evidence of property for support trade-offs when husband and wife had relatively
equal incomes, but "[i]n most cases the parent who receive[d] a favorable property
settlement also receive[d] a favorable support award." Seltzer & Garfinkel, supra note 44,
at 105, 107. Based on this finding, they suggest that in the typical divorce negotiation
characterized by inequality, the more powerful spouse does not need to engage in
strategic bargaining.
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What we do not see in the alimony and child support data is
overall consistency. Depending on where we look, there is evidence
that suggests both discretion's success and its failure.
C The Impact of Appellate Courts
1. The Likelihood of Affirmance
Because many judicial sample cases were obtained from appellate
records, the sample's overall appeal rate is very high; some aspect of
the trial decision was appealed in 77% of the cases. In contrast to the
propensity of state appellate courts to affirm trial decisions reported
outside the divorce context,"m in the majority of sample appeals the
trial court order was modified, the case remanded for reconsideration,
or both. Only 30% of trial decisions appealed were fully af-
firmed.3  (See Table 32.) Although the likelihood of affirmance
did not vary substantially over the research period, appellate courts
were significantly less likely to remand the case to the trial court in
later years than in earlier ones;324 37% of appeals resulted in
remand during the first triennial period as compared to 17% during
the last.
322. See, e.g., Thomas Y. Davies, Affirmed. A Study of Criminal Appeals and Decision-
Making Norms in a California Court of Appeal, 1982 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 543, 574;
James W. Meeker, Criminal Appeals over the Last 100 Years, 22 CRIMINOLOGY 551, 553
(1984); Stanton Wheeler et al., Do the "Haves" Come Out Ahead? Winning and Losing
in State Supreme Courts, 1870-1970, 21 LAW & SOc'Y REv. 403, 406-07 (1987); Note,
Courting Reversak The Supervisory Role of State Supreme Courts, 87 YALE L.J. 1191,
1209-10 (1978).
323. This rate is fairly consistent with that reported by another researcher who
evaluated appellate activity in family law appeals. See Crippen, Abundance, supra note
26, at 94 tbl. 1 (finding that in 39% of published 1990 family law opinions by the
Minnesota Court of Appeals the decision below was wholly affirmed, as compared to 52%
of published opinions on all topics).
324. Chi-square=16.50258 D.F.=6; p=.0113.
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TABLE 32: APPELLATE AcrIONS, BY TIME PERIOD
Time Period
Appellate Action 1980-83 1984-86 1987-90
% (n=80) % (n=144) % (n=74)
Affirmed 30% 32% 28%
Modified or Reversed 34% 39% 56%
Remanded
For lack of reasons 10% 6% 3%
For reconsideration
of specific issues 14% 13% 7%
Modified and
remanded 13% 11% 7%
The likelihood of affirmance was significantly correlated with the
gender of the appellant. Although litigation theorists have tended to
assume that the party with the greater resources has the best chances
of winning,'25 that conjecture was not borne out here. Husbands,
who as a group had much higher incomes and more valuable assets
than wives,326 had significantly smaller chances of obtaining a
remand or modification of a trial court order.3" Although husbands
were almost twice as likely to appeal as were wives (see Table 33),
the trial court's order was fully affirmed twice as often when the
husband appealed as when the wife did. The fact that husbands were
so much more likely to appeal may, indeed, be the reason for their
lower chances of success; one team of researchers has reported (not
surprisingly) the highest appellant success rates among litigants who
are highly selective in electing to appeal.32
325. See, eg., BLACK, BEHAVIOR, supra note 179, at 21-23; Galanter, supra note 14, at
124-25 ; Marc Galanter, Afterward. Explaining Litigation, 9 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 347, 357
(1975); Wheeler et al., supra note 322, at 438-43.
326. See supra text at notes 173-75.
327. Chi-square=11.22773 D.F.=4; p=.0241.
328. Wheeler et al., supra note 322, at 441.
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TABLE 33: AcTIONS BY APPELLATE COURTS
Appeal By:
Appellate Action* Husband Wife Both Total
(n=146) (n=78) (n=73) (n=297)
Affirmed 38% 18% 27% 30%
Modified or reversed 40% 46% 41% 42%
Remanded
Without modification 14% 24% 18% 18%
With modification 8% 12% 14% 10%
All Remands 22% 36% 32% 28%
Final actions as of September 1992.329
The rates of affirmance, modification, and remand also varied
significantly among appellate courts 30 Of the state's four appellate
departments, the rate of affirmance ranged from 17% to 43%, and the
rate of modification or reversal from 28% to 72%.331
2. Property Division
Appellate activity focused primarily on property distribution. In
almost two-thirds of the cases appealed, the distribution of marital net
worth was modified or remanded for reconsideration by the trial
court. (See Table 34.) The most common appellate action was
modification of the percentage distribution of a particular asset, debt,
or the overall net worth distribution; the remainder involved remand
or modification of a valuation or lump sum distribution. Appellate
courts were also far more active with respect to assets than debts.
The trial court's debt distribution was modified in only 3% of appeals;
329. In 10 sample cases, there was a second appeal from the trial court's recon-
sideration after remand; six were modified, three affirmed, and one remanded to the trial
court again. Since the sample results were calculated as of September 1992, it is possible
that the final count of cases involving more than one appeal might be higher, as some of
the later cases could not have reached an appellate court a second time by that date.
330. Chi-square=15.49927 D.F.=6; p=.0167 (based on final actions).
331. The rate of affirmance was highest in the Third Department (43%), and lowest in
the First Department (17%); the Second Department affirmance rate was 28%; the Fourth
Department rate was 24%. The rate of reversal or modification was highest in the First
Department (72%) and lowest in the Third Department (28%). The Second Department
modification/reversal rate was 42%; the Fourth Department rate was 56%.
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overwhelmingly these modifications were in the wife's favor.332
Overall, however, appellate modification of asset and debt distribution
did not favor either party. Wives benefitted in 52% of the cases in
which the net worth distribution was modified, husbands in 48%.333
TABLE 34: APPELLATE MODIFICATION OF TRIAL COURT
PROPERTY AND DEBT DISPOSITION
Appellate Action* (n297)
Modified
Valuation of debt or asset 12%
Amount of lump sum payment 3%
Percentage division of asset or debt 27%
Remanded
For reconsideration based on lack of
reasons for distribution 6%
For reconsideration of valuation or
asset/debt distribution 17%
Total Property Remands and Modifications 65%
Percentages do not add to 100 due to multiple appellate actions per case.
Although neither husbands nor wives consistently benefitted from
appellate modification of trial court property distribution orders,
modification was significantly less likely when the trial court had
divided a couple's net worth relatively equally.3 (See Table 35.)
Only 31% of trial court distribution orders were modified when the
division of net worth was relatively equal, while more than twice that
number were modified when the husband received the lion's share of
net assets. Appellate modifications also tended to benefit the party
to whom the trial court had awarded the smaller asset share.
332. In eight of nine cases in which the appellate court modified the debt distribution,
the wife benefitted.
333. This pattern did not vary significantly over the 10 year period reviewed, nor was
the direction of the altered distributional outcome significantly correlated with the income
of either spouse, the value of their total assets, the value of their marital assets, or case
location.
334. Chi-square=47.64651 D.F.=8; p<0001.
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In general, then, appellate activity enhanced the likelihood of
equal division rather than the fortunes of husbands or wives as a
group. The median and average percentage share of net property
awarded to sample wives remained constant after appeals were taken
into account, but the proportion of cases in which relatively equal
division was ordered rose from 48% to 58% of the total 3
TABLE 35: APPELLATE MODIFICATION OF TRIAL COURT ORDERS
DIVIDING MARITAL ASSETS AND DEBTS, BY PERCENTAGE
DISTRIBUTION OF TRIAL COURT
Trial Court's % No Modification Modification
Distribution of Modification Benefiting Benefiting
Marital Net Worth (n=162) Husband Wife
(n=53) (n=57)
67% + to Husband 33% 13% 54%
56%- 66% to 50% 7% 43%
Husband
Relatively Equal* 69% 17% 14%
56% - 66% to 54% 39% 8%Wife _____ __________
67%+ to Wife 45% 42% 21%
Relatively Equal = Between 45% and 55%
335. Cases involving negative net worth are excluded (n=323). Post-appeal, 24% of the
cases resulted in disproportion favoring the husband and 15% in disproportion favoring
the wife. If cases involving businesses or professional degrees are excluded, the proportion
of cases resulting in relatively equal division rises to 62% (n=240). Among this smaller
group, disproportion favoring the husband occurred in 18% of the cases and disproportion
favoring the wife in 20%.
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3. Alimony and Child Support
Appellate action regarding alimony or child support was much
less common336 and more difficult to categorize. Trial courts'
alimony decisions were almost never reversed. In only five cases did
an appellate court reverse a trial court decision not to award alimony;
in only three was a decision to award alimony overruled. The
alimony rate after appeal (63%) was thus almost identical to the trial
court rate (62%).
Appellate modification of the value of alimony or child support
was also relatively uncommon. The appellate court modified the
value of alimony in only 12% of appeals where the trial court had
awarded alimony,"' and in only 9% of the child support cases
where an appeal was taken.33 Some of the modifications simply
reallocated payments between alimony and child support. Thus, in
only nineteen cases was the total value of child support and alimony
altered.339 Nine of these modifications were increases and ten were
decreases; they evidenced no particular pattern. Remands for
reconsideration of alimony or child support were even more rare.
Such orders were made in only nine cases, all involving the value of
the alimony or child support award.
Appellate courts were somewhat more likely to alter the duration
of an alimony award; in 17% of appeals from a trial court alimony
award,' 4° the appellate court changed the duration of the award.
Half of these modifications altered the permanence of the award; the
other half altered the time period over which durational alimony was
payable. The modifications did not show that appellate courts were
more willing to award permanent alimony than trial courts, however.
Among the seventeen cases in which the trial court was reversed on
alimony permanence, approximately two-thirds (11 of 17) imposed
time-limited instead of permanent alimony. Overall, 33% of alimony
awards were thus permanent after appeal, as compared to 35% pre-
336. This finding is consistent with that of another divorce researcher. See Crippen,
Abundance, supra note 26, at 91 n.28 (finding that Minnesota appellate courts have
specifically imposed or reduced a maintenance award on only three occasions during two
decades). It is also consistent with the finding of a low reversal rate by state appellate
courts generally. See supra note 322 and sources cited therein.
337. n=191.
338. n=186.
339. Cases in which the trial court's alimony order was reversed are excluded.
340. n=191. The two cases in which the trial court's alimony award was reversed are
excluded here and in other portions of the analysis of appellate activity.
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appeal. Although the difference was not significant, the appellate
process did enhance the likelihood of permanent alimony for long-
married, older women and reduce it for others. 41 Age and marital
duration may thus have been given somewhat greater emphasis by
appellate than by trial court judges.
Appellate modifications of the time period over which durational
alimony was payable evidenced no particular pattern, however. In the
seventeen cases where appellate courts so modified the award, a
longer payment period was imposed in 59%, and a shorter term in
41% of the cases. The alterations did not appear to benefit any
particular group, nor was the typical modification substantial. On
average, the term of the award, when modified, was altered by only
2.5 years.
4. The Impact of Appellate Courts on Outcome Predictability
Although the actions of appellate courts did alter the predic-
tability of alimony and property distribution outcomes slightly, their
impact was not substantial. With respect to net worth distribution,
the values of correlation coefficients and levels of significance often
shifted, but only one variable (the wife's employment) that had
demonstrated significance at the .05 confidence level at the trial level,
failed to do so post-appeal 42 And only two variables (the ratio of
the wife's separate property to marital property and the appellate
department) that had failed to demonstrate significance at the trial
level did so after appeal. Regression analysis explained a somewhat
larger proportion of variability in appellate than trial outcomes,343
341. The following table illustrates this point:
PERCENTAGE OF ALIMONY AWARDS THAT WERE PERMANENT
Wife's Marital Status and Age Trial Court Appellate Court
% (n) % (n)
Wives Married At Least 15 Years 54% (63) 59% (63)
and At Least 45 Years Old
Other Wives 28% (120) 23% (120)
Cases with missing data on wife's age or marital duration are excluded. The correlation
coefficients for marital duration and the wife's age both increased in value at the appellate
level, as did the level of significance for each of these variables. See infra Appendix, Table
A14.
342. For correlation coefficients and p values, see infra Appendix, Table A7.
343. The regression model explained 20.0% of variability post-appeal, as compared to
13.8% pre-appeal.
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but the enhanced success of the regression model was partially
dependent on regional variation in case outcomes, with a decision
from the first appellate department a significant negative predictor of
the wife's percentage share. The ratio of the wife's separate property
to marital property also contributed significantly to the regression
model; counterintuitively, a higher ratio was positively correlated with
the wife's percentage award.
For alimony awards, appellate action altered the strength and
significance of the variable correlations only in trivial respects."
No litigant characteristic that had, at the trial level, demonstrated
significance at the .05 confidence level failed to exhibit at least that
level of significance after appeal. No litigant characteristic
demonstrated significance after appeal that had failed to do so
previously. Logistic regression analysis of post-appeal alimony
outcomes yielded a model that varied insubstantially from the model
applicable to trial courts, and yielded a prediction rate less than three
percentage points different.345
Although appellate courts were more active with respect to the
permanence and duration of alimony, their activity again failed to
substantially alter the predictability of these decisions." Marital
duration remained the most important predictive variable (indeed, its
predictive value increased). Regression analysis of alimony per-
manence did achieve a somewhat improved prediction rate,
however.347 The judge's political party failed to contribute sig-
nificantly to the regression model post-appeal, while the decision year
did for the first time. The duration of a nonpermanent award
remained, post-appeal, altogether unpredictable.348
Perhaps most important, the appellate opinions do not evidence
clear, consistent guidance to trial courts. Trial judges had no apparent
methodology for computing the length of a durational alimony award,
for example. But in modifying the duration of alimony, appellate
courts typically offered little methodological help. The factors most
frequently mentioned by appellate courts as bases for changing the
344. For correlation coefficients and p values, see infra Appendix, Table A12.
345. The full regression model accurately predicted 82.7% of the cases post-appeal,
compared to 85.1% pre-appeal.
346. For correlation coefficients and p values, see infra Appendix, Table A14.
347. The full regression model accurately predicted 76.4% of cases post-appeal, the par-
simonious model 72.9%. The full regression model predicted 70.1% of cases pre-appeal,
the parsimonious model 67.15%.
348. Only one litigant characteristic, the award of sole custody to the wife, achieved
new significance post-appeal (p=.015).
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alimony time period were the amount of time the wife would need to
become self-sufficient and the age of the children. But it was rare for
an appellate court to link self-sufficiency to any specific events,
349
and no consensus on how the children's age should affect the alimony
decision was evident. Sometimes, indeed, the court offered no
reasoning for altering the duration of alimony at all.35'
Appellate activity thus tended to enhance the predictability of
trial court outcomes, but only by modest margins. One reason for this
result is that the norms established by appellate courts were followed
quite faithfully by trial judges; consistently, the same variables
demonstrated significant relationships at the trial and appellate levels.
This pattern suggests that, where trial court judges exhibit confusion,
appellate courts could produce more predictable results. That
appellate courts have failed to do so seems to reflect a lack of consen-
349. See, e.g., Wood v. Wood, 526 N.Y.S.2d 608, 610 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (extending
alimony award from two to five years for homemaker married 3.5 years "to give her
adequate time to prepare to reenter the job market"); Morton v. Morton, 515 N.Y.S.2d
499, 500-01 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (extending alimony award from one to five years for
wife married for 17 years and a homemaker for 16 years; "A period of five years ...
should be sufficient to provide the defendant with the necessary financial support for
retraining and readjustment." (citations omitted)); Durso v. Durso, 483 N.Y.S.2d 101, 102
(N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (extending alimony award from three to six years for wife who was
married for 20 years and a homemaker for 18 years; "Until such time as she can earn a
substantially higher income, the defendant's sustained efforts to educate herself so that she
can become fully self supporting should not be a reason to limit the duration of the
maintenance award."); Patti v. Patti, 472 N.Y.S.2d 20,21 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (extending
alimony award from two to four years for wife married 16 years and a homemaker for 14
years; "four years requested by the plaintiff is a more appropriate period which would
permit her, after 14 years out of the work force, to refresh her skills and better prepare
herself to become self supporting").
350. Among cases involving minor children, the children's age did not demonstrate a
significant predictive relationship to the duration of alimony before or after appeal; the
level of correlation was slightly lower post-appeal. See infra Appendix, Table A14. For
cases discussing the children's age, see, e.g., Schoenfeld v. Schoenfeld, 563 N.Y.S.2d 500,
502 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (reducing permanent alimony award to five years; "Such a
limitation will allow the wife to remain at home until her children are thirteen and almost
eleven years of age, respectively."); Stempler v. Stempler, 532 N.Y.S.2d 550, 552 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1988) (extending alimony award from five to seven years "because of the age
[six] of youngest child" [child's age is unspecified in opinion but available from record on
appeal]); Patti v. Patti, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 21 (extending alimony award from two years to
four for homemaker of 14 years married 16 years; "likely that the son [14 years old] will
live with the plaintiff for at least four more years" (citations omitted)).
351. See, e.g., Weinstein v. Weinstein, 508 N.Y.S.2d 950, 951 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986)
(extending alimony award from five to seven years; "Under all of the facts and
circumstances of this case, it is our view that maintenance in the amount of $200 per week
should have been granted to the plaintiff wife for a period of seven years... rather than
five years .... ").
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sus at both levels of the litigation process on how to employ the
discretion granted by the legislature.
IV. JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING IN RETROSPECT: DIRECTIONS
FOR DIVORCE REFORM
A. Interpreting the Data
1. Discretion's Diversity
If any single thing is apparent from this inquiry into judicial
decision making at divorce, it is that the results of discretionary
decision making are by no means uniform. Each discretionary
decision judges made-property division, the award of alimony, the
duration of alimony, the value of alimony and/or child sup-
port-presents its own unique features. Depending on which
economic decision we take as an example, evidence can be found to
support the claims of either discretion's critics or its champions.
Discretion's champions might use the alimony award data, which
suggest a fair degree of consensus among judges on the litigant
characteristics that determine an alimony claim and on their relative
weight. That consensus not only reflects the factors specified in the
legislative scheme but, as the results of settlement track those of
judicial decision making tolerably well, appears to have been quite
faithfully transmitted to the practicing bar. The data on alimony and
child support values similarly suggest a fair degree of consensus
among judges on a decision making model, a consensus that both
comports with the statute and is reflected (albeit imperfectly) in the
results of settled cases.
Discretion's critics, on the other hand, might point to the alimony
duration data, which suggest the intrusion of private values as
decision-making criteria and the lack of developed consensus within
the judiciary on the relevance and weight to be accorded particular
litigant characteristics. The apparent link between trial court
permanence decisions and political party, for example, suggests just
the sort of arbitrariness that critics have complained about; so do the
apparent class bias in alimony awards, the regional variation in
alimony values, and the complete unpredictability of alimony duration
decisions. The property division data also lend weight to the critics'
claims. Judges seem to agree on relatively equal division as a
prototypical outcome, but do not appear to have reached sufficient
consensus on the factors that justify departure from equal division, to
1996]
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permit reliable outcome predictions. The infrequency of equal
division in the settled cases also suggests that judges were not able, at
least during the Equitable Distribution Law's first few years, to
transmit the new norm to the divorce bar. Moreover, the judicial
tendency to award the ill and relatively needy wife less than half of
the net assets certainly runs counter to the equal partnership principle
that underlies the statute.
Discretion thus sometimes produced outcomes that appear to rely
more on private values than on public standards. Outcomes were
sometimes unpredictable, and sometimes failed to reflect the factors
that the legislature had specified as relevant. Judicial consensus was
not necessarily reflected in the outcomes of settled cases. But
discretionary decision making was at times highly predictable and
highly correlated with the legislative scheme. The results of set-
tlement sometimes mirrored, albeit imperfectly, those achieved
through litigation, and no evidence of distortions in settlement
outcomes due to strategic bargaining could be found.
2. Explaining Discretion's Diversity
How can we explain these disparities?
a. Discretionary Standards Differ
One relevant factor may be differences in the discretionary
standards themselves. 5 2 Some discretionary standards subtly curtail
the exercise of discretion, while others do not. Professor Mnookin,
for example, reports the "rather surprising" finding that every
pregnant minor who sought judicial authorization for an abortion
under a statute permitting waiver of parental consent based on a
judicial finding that the minor is mature or that "an abortion would
be in her best interests" ultimately obtained it.353 His explanation
for this finding was that judges, many of whom personally opposed
abortion, believed it impossible to justify finding both that a minor
was insufficiently mature to choose an abortion, and that it was also
in her best interests to bear a child: "The law puts judges in the
352. See Lempert, supra note 17, at 214-15 (describing the importance of "the mandate
and clarity of the law as understood by the decision-maker" in determining how discretion
is exercised).
353. Robert H. Mnookin, Bellotti v. Baird: A Hard Case, in IN THE INTEREST OF
CHILDREN: ADVOCACY, LAW REFORM, AND PUBLIC POLICY 149, 239-40 (Robert H.
Mnookin ed., 1985).
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ridiculous position of being rubber stamps," one judge complained.
"There is no way you could substantiate such a decision.''a4
While no provisions of the Equitable Distribution Law
constrained judicial discretion this tightly, there were differences in
the level of restraint imposed by specific statutory provisions. Some
were premised on coherent themes or principles that tended to rein
in discretion; others were not. Viewed from this perspective, the
unpredictability of durational alimony awards may derive, in part,
from the "rehabilitation" concept that underlies the alimony
provisions of the law.355 Judges, in an apparent attempt to conform
their decisions to the rehabilitation principle, tended to focus on when
the alimony recipient would become self-supporting. But while it is
easy to predict this time period when the alimony recipient plans to
obtain further job training, neither the statute nor the rehabilitation
concept outlines any logical method for making such a prediction in
the far more typical case in which the recipient does not. The
economic circumstances of an older alimony recipient with little
education and a job history confined to low wage, dead-end
employment cannot be expected to improve. The predictive question,
in these cases, verges on incoherence and thus may have enhanced the
unpredictability of judicial response.
By contrast, the "partnership of coequals," '356 concept that
underlies the property distribution rules offers a clear decision-making
principle applicable to each and every case: Equal partnership implies
equal treatment. Given this underlying statutory principle, it is not
hard to see why judges gravitated to an equal division norm. The
statute itself invites, indeed drives, judges in this direction. Nor is it
surprising that appellate courts have enhanced the tendency toward
equality. With a statute premised on equal partnership, this is the
most logical result and the one easiest to justify.
Given the equality norm underlying the property division
provisions of the statute, the extent of judicial consensus on equality
is perhaps less surprising than the number of departures from that
norm. Even after appeals are taken into account, slightly more than
40% of the cases resulted in unequal division. A partial explanation
lies, again, in the nature of the constraints imposed by the statute: It
is an underlying principle that suggests equality, rather than a literal
statutory command. Moreover, the statute, by requiring a mul-
354. Id. at 240.
355. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
356. See supra note 101 and sources cited therein.
1996]
508 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74
tifaceted consideration of case circumstance, implies that departure is
appropriate in a variety of circumstances. 5 7
b. "Familiarity Breeds Precedent"
A second explanation for the diversity of results derives, I
believe, from the relative novelty of some statutory commands as
compared to others: The extent of judicial experience under a
discretionary standard will, like the discretionary standard itself, affect
the manner in which judges exercise their discretion. The reasons for
this phenomenon are uncomplicated. Decision-makers gravitate
toward routine decision-making norms when repetitively confronted
with cases of a similar type. 8  Judges, moreover, are expected to
strive for like results in like cases and thus rely heavily on ac-
cumulated precedents.35 9  Routinized norms also serve a time
allocation function, permitting the decision-maker to give adequate
consideration to the atypical."6 Judges thus gravitate toward factual
and legal stereotypes in order to achieve consistent and efficient
results.
As a result of this tendency toward consistency, the predictability
of both judicial decisions and lawyer-negotiated settlements may vary
substantially based on a decision-making standard's age and case
357. Appellate courts have also endorsed departures from equality. See supra note 109.
358. See DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION, supra note 80, at 150-51; Lempert, supra note 17,
at 216-17; Schneider, supra note 8, at 2282-83. For contextual research describing the
tendency toward routinized decision making, see ROBERT M. EMERSON, JUDGING
DELINQUENTS (1969) (juvenile court judges); H. LAURENCE Ross, SETTLED OUT OF
COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE CLAIMS ADJUSTMENTS 233-43 (1970)
(insurance claims adjusters); Lempert, supra note 17, 216-26 (public housing eviction
board); Douglas W. Maynard, The Structure of Discourse in Misdemeanor Plea Bargaining,
18 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 75 (1984) (prosecutors); Jerome H. Skolnick, Social Control in the
Adversary System, 11 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 52 (1967) (public defenders and private defense
counsel); David Sudnow, Normal Crimes: Sociological Features of the Penal Code in a
Public Defender Office, 12 SOC. PROBS. 255 (1965) (public defenders). For discussion of
the psychological factors that contribute to routinized decision making, see, e.g., DANIEL
KAHNEMAN ET AL., JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (1982);
RICHARD NISBETr & LEE RoSS, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS
OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT (1980); Vladimir J. Konecni & Ebbe B. Ebbesen, The Mythology
of Legal Decisionmaking, 7 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 5, 6-7, 15-16 (1984).
359. For a classic account of this process, see BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE
OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 28-36 (1921) [hereinafter CARDOZO, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS].
360. LEMPERT & SANDERS, supra note 86, at 83-88. Routinized decision-making norms
thus offer many of the benefits of formal rules. As Professor Schauer has put it, "[W]e
are able to do what we can precisely because rules free us from having to do anything
else." SCHAUER, supra note 9, at 230.
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volume261  The intrusion of disparate private values into the
decision-making process, as indicated by the correlation of case
outcomes with judicial characteristics, appears most likely when the
decision-making standard is young and when the case volume is light.
Clear decision-making norms that rely on a few key facts are,
conversely, more likely to be encountered as the standard ages and as
case volume increases.
The research results conform quite closely to this "natural
history" of discretionary decision making. Standards for determining
child support did not change at all as a result of the 1980 Equitable
Distribution Law.362 Judges could thus rely on an established
consensus developed over decades, and judicial decisions on the value
of child support were accordingly quite predictable. By contrast,
durational alimony, where judicial decisions were quite unpredictable,
was newly established as a norm by the 1980 law. Judges and lawyers
had only the statute to guide the decision-making process. So, too,
with property division. Given the fact that New York had no marital
property distribution scheme prior to the Equitable Distribution Law,
judges and lawyers confronted a blank slate.
c. Consensus Does Not Hold
Yet another explanatory factor for the diverse results achieved
by the Equitable Distribution Law is the dynamic nature of judicial
consensus. The flexibility inherent in a discretionary standard permits
dramatic shifts in judicial perceptions and decision-making pat-
terns.363  Rules thus codify the consensus of a given moment;
discretion embraces the consensus of yesterday, today, and tomor-
row.3 4
The shifting nature of judicial consensus is evident in the fact that
the year of decision was a significant predictor of the award of
alimony, the likelihood of a permanent alimony award, and the value
361. For a detailed discussion of the time factor in precedent promulgation and its
relation to the choice between rules and discretionary standards, see Kaplow, supra note
9, at 612-14; Gillian K. Hadfield, Bias in the Evolution of Legal Rules, 80 GEO. L.J. 583
(1992); Ronald A. Heiner, Imperfect Decisions and the Law: On the Evolution of Legal
Precedent and Rules, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 227 (1986).
362. Nor did the new alimony statute's specification of factors necessitate any major
departure from traditional decision-making patterns for the alimony component of the
total transfer payment.
363. For a fascinating example, see Lempert, supra note 17, at 204-13.
364. See SCHAUER, supra note 9, at 160 (describing tendency of rules to enhance the
status quo and give power to the past).
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of child support (as well as child support and alimony combined).
The flexibility inherent in a discretionary standard permitted child
support awards to drift upward. It permitted the percentage of cases
in which alimony and permanent alimony were awarded to drift
downward as well.
These shifts tracked social and public opinion trends. Over the
ten-year research period, increasingly large numbers of married
women with young children were in the paid labor-force,365 a shift
that decreased not only the need for both short- and long-term
alimony, but public support for such transfers as well. The period
also saw a genuine sea change in public sentiment regarding child
support. Over the decade the low value of child support awards came
under intense public and political scrutiny;366 during the later years
of the research period, child support guidelines, which would
eventually supplant discretionary decision making altogether, were
being actively debated in the state legislature. 67 By contrast, judges
were not required to respond to a new public opinion climate or to
the threat of major statutory change in the area of property division,
and these outcomes were not significantly related to the decision year."
365. In 1980, 45.1% of married women with children under the age of six were in the
paid labor force, as compared to 59.9% in 1991. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 151,
at 388 tbl. 620.
366. Professors Belier and Graham report that the New York Times Index listed "child
support" as a separate category for the first time in 1980; by 1986 the listings under that
heading had grown to two full columns. BELLER & GRAHAM, supra note 69, at 5.
367. Child support guidelines legislation was first introduced in the New York
legislature in 1985. In part due to the vigorous and effective opposition of the New York
State Bar Association, the legislature did not enact a bill until 1989. See, e.g., Paul
Browne, State Bar Weight Felt Against Measure on Child Support, N.Y. L.J., August 12,
1988, at 1; E.R. Shipp, Support Formula Stymied in Albany, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1988, at
36. The continuing debate over the legislation helped to focus media attention on child
support issues, both in the popular press, see, e.g., Editorial, Divorce Lawyers Thrilled at
Bill's Demise, DAILY NEWS, Sept. 9,1988, at 12; Editorial, Cheapskates and Child Support,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1988, at A22, and in the legal press, see, e.g., Henry H. Foster & Grier
H. Raggio, An Analysis of Proposed Law for 'Equitable' Child Support, N.Y. L.J., May 14,
1987, at 1; Martin Fox & Gary Spencer, New Drive for Child Support Guidelines, N.Y. L.J.,
Dec. 13, 1988, at 1.
368. See infra Appendix, Table A19. Social consensus regarding the equal partnership
conception of marriage perhaps expanded during the research period, but did not change
direction. For example, the Uniform Probate Code provisions relating to the spousal right
of election were substantially revised in order "to bring elective-share law into line with
the contemporary view of marriage as an economic partnership." UNIF. PROBATE CODE
art. 2, pt. 2, general cmt. (1990). Revisions to New York's estates law, introduced in the
legislature toward the end of the research period, enlarged the intestate share of a
surviving spouse from one-third to one-half of the probate estate and enhanced the spousal
right of election through the expansion of testamentary substitutes and abolition of the so-
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While it would be impossible to establish clear links between the
decision-making climate and judicial decisions themselves, "[t]he great
tides and currents which engulf the rest of men, do not turn aside in
their course, and pass the judges by."369 The tides of social change
do not, of course, break with equal force upon all decision-makers, a
fact perhaps evidenced by the tendency of older judges to award
alimony more frequently than younger ones, and of Republican judges
to award permanent alimony more frequently than Democratic judges.
The variable rate and manner in which individual judges respond
to changing social and legal conditions, coupled with the resulting
tendency of judicial consensus to shift over time, thus ensure that the
results of discretionary decision making can never be perfectly
predictable. Indeed, given the rapid pace of change in public opinion
and in gender and marital roles during the research period, it is
perhaps surprising that the judicial decisions reviewed exhibited as
much predictability as they did.
3. Evaluating Discretion's Results
a. Consistency, Gender Bias, and Settlement Patterns
The research findings, which at first glance appear chaotic and
contradictory, thus reveal, in the end, some consistent themes. They
show us judges struggling conscientiously to give form and content to
their discretionary mandate, a process guided by legislative directives
(or lack thereof), shaped by experience, and set in a shifting historical
context. They show us the impact of individual values and social
climate. And they also show us the channelling effect of institutional
norms, appellate precedent, and legislative principle, which tend over
time to produce more uniform and predictable case outcomes.
On the issue of consistency, the research findings thus suggest
that if trial judges are given clear legislative and appellate guidance,
discretionary divorce decision making may, over time, produce highly
predictable results. Discretionary decision making will, of course,
remain subject to shifting trends,370 but the tendency of discretion
called "right of election trust." See Act of July 24, 1992, ch. 595, 1992 N.Y. Laws 595 §§
8, 25 (codified at N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.1, 5-1.1A (McKinney Supp.
1995)).
369. CARDOZO, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 359, at 168.
370. For example, the alimony decisions of younger and Democratic judges (who were
less prone to award alimony and permanent alimony) appear to reflect an underlying
preference for formal gender equality. But this model of equality has, at least since the
middle of the research period, been subjected to repeated criticism from feminist critics.
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to evolve toward routinized norms should ultimately produce patterns
that are more reliant on institutional values than on individual judicial
predilection.
That judges have failed to achieve predictable and consistent
outcomes in many areas of divorce decision making appears to derive
from the novelty of the statutory provisions, coupled with the
conflicting, and at times incoherent, principles upon which judges have
been directed to base the decision-making process. Novelty will pass.
But how fast and how well courts will evolve clear decision-making
principles where legislative guidance is sparse remains to be seen.
The research findings thus suggest that discretion could produce fairly
consistent results, but do not reveal whether it will.
On the issue of gender bias, the research findings suggest equally
ambiguous conclusions. Judicial decisions often reflected traditional
gender stereotypes. For example, judges who awarded the wife a
small share of business or professional assets sometimes justified that
decision by noting that the wife had been awarded substantial
alimony, a choice that reflects, and reinforces, a tradition of wifely
dependence upon an economically dominant husband who controls
the family purse strings.37 t The tendency of judges to award hus-
bands the lion's share of marital debts, and to require little or no
child support from women who did not obtain custody, also suggest
reliance on this stereotype of wifely dependence.
But as these varied examples make plain, judicial adherence to
traditional gender stereotypes did not uniformly advantage either
husbands or wives. The conscious and unconscious influence of
gender stereotype should not be confused with consistent bias. Of the
former, there is plentiful evidence. Of the latter, there is little.
See, e.g., FINEMAN, supra note 75; OKIN, supra note 78; Christine Littleton, Reconstructing
Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1279 (1987); Joan C. Williams, Dissolving the
Sameness/Difference Debate: A Post-Modern Path Beyond Essentialism in Feminist and
Critical Race Theory, 1991 DUtKE L.J. 296. As these criticisms of formal equality gain a
broader audience, it is altogether possible that the preferences-and the decisions-of
these judges will shift direction.
371. See, e.g., Arvantides v. Arvantides, 478 N.E.2d 199, 200 (N.Y. 1985) (upholding
reduction of wife's share of husband's dental practice: "When it is considered that [the
wife] has also received an award of maintenance, medical expenses, insurance benefits and
the more valuable of the two homes owned by the parties, the distribution cannot be said
to be inequitable as a matter of law."). More typically, the pattern described is not
explicitly recognized by the court. See, e.g., Behrens v. Behrens, 532 N.Y.S.2d 893 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1988); Wood v. Wood, 526 N.Y.S.2d 608 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988); Morton v.
Morton, 515 N.Y.S.2d 499 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987); Pulitzer v. Pulitzer, N.Y. L.J., 10/22/85,
at 11, col. 2B, modified, 523 N.Y.S.2d 508 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988); Ginter v. Ginter, N.Y.
St. B. Ass'n Fam. L. Rev., Sept. 1990, at 23, 25.
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It is true that the results of the discretionary decision-making
process ultimately produced considerable inequality in post-divorce
living standards. On average, women and children suffered a sharp
decline in their standard of living, while men obtained an
improvement. But we cannot attribute this result simply to judicial
bias. The New York legislature, which reduced judicial discretion in
awarding child support in order to improve children's post-divorce
living standards, adopted guidelines that would presumptively transfer
no more income to women and children than did judges acting under
discretionary standards.3  For the typical family, where husband
earns substantially more than wife, this "improvement" over
discretionary decision making produces outcomes fairly comparable
to those produced by judges.373 We are all, as Professor Regan
reminds us, "both cause and effect of the gender system, which means
that we may unwittingly reproduce it even as we seek its demise."'374
As for the impact of discretionary decision making on the
settlement process, the research shows that settlements can track the
results of judicial decision making tolerably well. No adverse effects
due to strategic bargaining behavior could be found; custody-for-
money trade-offs, thought to be common under discretionary
standards, were not evident. But strategic behavior may take
different forms than theorists have supposed.375 More importantly,
372. See supra notes 262-69 and accompanying text.
373. See David M. Betson et al., Trade-Offs Implicit in Child-Support Guidelines, 11 J.
POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 1, 12 tbl. 3 (1992) (assuming custodial parent earns $10,000
and noncustodial $20,000, under a child support model similar to the New York statutory
guidelines, the ratio of post-divorce to pre-divorce scaled surplus income was 1.24 for
noncustodial household and 0.41 for custodial household with one child). The New York
statute does provide for pro rata apportionment of child care expenses when custodial
parent is working or in school, however, N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240.1-b(c)(4) (McKinney
Supp. 1995), which would tend to improve these ratios somewhat.
374. Milton C. Regan, Jr., Divorce Reform and the Legacy of Gender, 90 MICH. L. REV.
1453, 1494 (1992).
375. The high rate of noncompliance with temporary support orders among cases in the
judicial sample may evidence strategic behavior, for example. It is also possible, of course,
that strategic behavior is much less common than theorists have supposed. Researchers
have noted, in varied contexts, that the existence of an ongoing relationship tends to
reduce the likelihood of adversarial behavior. See; e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER
WITHOUT LAW 270-75 (1991) (neighboring and concurrent landowners); MILTON
HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS, JUDGES, AND
DEFENSE ATTORNEYS (1977) (prosecutors and defense counsel); Stewart Macaulay, Non-
contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55,58-61, 63-64
(1963) (parties to commercial contracts); Robert E. Scott, Conflict and Cooperation in
Long-Term Contracts, 75 CAL. L. REV. 2005, 2040-42 (1987) (buyer-seller contractual
relationships).
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the tendency of settlements to predictably track judicial decision
patterns, and the lack of strategic bargaining effects, may be due to
the high rate of legal representation in the settlement sample and thus
unrepresentative of results in the general divorce population. 76
Overall, the research results suggest that discretionary decision
making at divorce is not clearly inferior to rule-based decision
making. It is capable of producing consistent, predictable results. It
is no more prone to gender bias than recent legislative rules. At least
if the settlement process is guided by lawyer intermediaries, adverse
effects resulting from discretionary standards are not demonstrable.
b. Discretion and Rule: The Tendency Toward Convergence
It is also probable that, in some instances, discretion and rule will
produce relatively equivalent results. The reasons for this
phenomenon derive from the contrary effects of rule and discretion
on the decision-making process. As noted above, discretionary
standards will typically, through the development of informal rules of
thumb and formal precedents, become more rule-like. An historical
example of this channelling tendency of discretion can be found in
child custody law. Courts, ostensibly deciding custody based on a
broad examination of a child's best interests, over time adopted what
might be best described as a set of presumptions: in favor of the
mother for a child of "tender years;" in favor of the parent preferred
by a mature child; against the parent whose conduct exposes the child
to immorality.
3 77
In contrast to the channelling tendency of discretion, rules tend
to produce exceptions 78 Indeed, the narrower the rule that
constrains the decision-making process, the greater the likelihood and
the number of exceptions that will occur. These exceptions may
376. Professors Maccoby and Mnookin, who also failed to find evidence of money-for-
custody trade-offs in their research on divorce outcomes in California, hypothesized that
the explanation lay in California's bright-line "child support schedules and community
property rules [which] substantially constrain such trade-offs" and in the difficulty of
"fathers to engage in strategic behavior [regarding custody] that appears credible to their
spouses." MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 14, at 160. Lawyers, like bright-line rules,
may significantly reduce the credibility of custody threats.
377. For a description of the rules and case law, see, e.g., CLARK, FIRST EDITION, supra
note 59, at 584-87.
378. See, e.g., Rose, supra note 54, at 578-90 (giving detailed examples of how "the
straightforward common law crystalline rules [of property law] have been muddied
repeatedly by exceptions and equitable second-guessing").
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result from judicial interpretation of the rule itself,379 rejection of
the rule in favor of a competing rule or higher principle,.. or even
from legislative reaction to judicial rule enforcement that results in
perceived injustice. 8'
As a result of these divergent tendencies, the results of
discretionary and rule-based decision making, if shaped by similar
principles within the same historical context, may ultimately converge.
Marital property distribution is a potential example of this
phenomenon. With only a few years' experience with equitable
property distribution, it appears that New York courts already view
equal division as a prototypical outcome, or perhaps as an analytical
starting point. Professor Reynolds, reviewing a collection of reported
equitable property distribution decisions from six states with older
equitable division regimes, reports that judges almost never divided
marital property unequally? 2 By contrast, in a state like California
that has an established equal division rule, it has been necessary to
carve out exceptions to the equality requirement to meet equitable
concerns: for cases of negative net worth,3"' for cases in which the
custodial parent needs the home,3" and for cases of asset dis-
sipation.385 Judicial decisions made under a mature equitable
property distribution standard and a mature equal division rule thus
may not, in the end, differ greatly.
379. The law of wills offers some good examples. See, e.g., Engle v. Siegel, 377 A.2d
892 (N.J. 1977) (excluding application of anti-lapse statute based on determination that
testator probably intended an inconsistent result); Johnson v. Johnson, 279 P.2d 928 (Okla.
1954) (admitting to probate a typewritten, unsigned, and unexecuted will on theory that
handwritten addition republished will by codicil); see also BURTON, supra note 9, at 191-99
(describing competing claims regarding judicial interpretation of the law).
380. The classic example is the case of Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889), in
which the New York Court of Appeals denied the beneficiary of a will who had murdered
the testator his legacy: "[A]ll laws ... may be controlled in their operation and effect by
general, fundamental maxims of the common law. No one shall be permitted to profit by
his own fraud ... or to acquire property by his own crime." Id. at 190. Riggs has
attracted the attention of many students of judicial discretion. See, e.g., BURTON, supra
note 9, at 51-62; CARDOZO, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 359, at 40-43; DWORKIN,
supra note 9, at 23-39.
381. For example, legislatures have enacted elective share statutes that expand the
range of includible assets in order to ensure that the elective share entitlement cannot be
circumvented through will substitutes. See, e.g., LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER ET AL.,
FAMILY PROPERTY LAW 488 (1991).
382. Reynolds, supra note 41, at 854-55.
383. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2622(b) (West 1994).
384. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 3801-3802 (West Supp. 1994).
385. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2602 (West 1994).
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B. Directions for Divorce Reform
1. Discretion and Rule: Their Costs and Constraints
The choice between discretion and rule is not, however,
immaterial. Like Professor Coase's well-known theorem positing the
irrelevance of liability rules,386 a claim of immateriality might have
merit in a timeless world of perfect information and insignificant
transaction costs. But this is not the world of divorce litigation. Real-
world constraints on time, information, and money not only render
the theorem invalid, but offer a framework for determining the
appropriate balance between discretion and rule. While the research
suggests that discretionary and rule-based decision making at divorce
can, and ultimately may, produce similar results, the costs of
discretionary and rule-based decision making, and the actors on whom
they are imposed, are quite different. The choice between discretion
and rule should take these differences into account.
One important difference is the greater cost of obtaining
information about a law's content when it is embodied in a
discretionary standard. A rule provides its own notice of the
applicable legal standard. A discretionary standard does not. Lawyer
intermediaries may, of course, offer litigants as much certainty as
would a rule-the findings from this research project confirms that
they often do-but lawyer assistance is neither cheap nor certain.
Based on an informal telephone survey of law offices that advertise
divorce as a specialty, an uncontested, uncomplicated divorce now
costs, in New York City, almost $1,000."8 For the "typical" divorce
litigant, who has been married for perhaps seven years and has
divisible marital assets consisting of a used car, household goods,
386. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
387. Ten law firms, all randomly selected from those listing divorce as a specialty in the
Brooklyn, Manhattan, or Queens, N.Y. telephone directory Yellow Pages, were
telephoned. A representative of each firm was asked the "likely cost" of representation
in an uncontested divorce. The firm representative was told that the prospective divorcing
couple had been married for five years, had no children, and no property except for a joint
bank account, a car, furniture, and a jointly owned condominium apartment (which they
planned to sell and equally divide the proceeds). Estimates ranged from $469 to $1770;
the mean was $931. There is no national data on lawyer fees for simple, uncontested
divorces, but wide regional variation is probable. See Grace G. Blumberg, Who Should
Do the Work of Family Law?, 27 FAM. L.Q. 213,218 (1993) (reporting anecdotal evidence
of regional variation in rate of pro se representation and cost of legal representation in
divorce cases).
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limited home equity, and a small bank account,3"' the price of legal
representation may well exceed any loss in post-divorce entitlements
that legal representation could have averted.8 9 Without large-scale
public funding of legal services, it is thus unlikely that the current,
relatively low rate of legal representation at divorce will increase.3"
Indeed, quite to the contrary, researchers have reported a trend
toward increased self-representation in divorce actions.39'
Although we have little systematic data on the extent of the
litigation disadvantage that accompanies lack of legal representation
in divorce, it seems unlikely that the judicial norms on which lawyers
rely in negotiating adversarial settlements carry over as well to the
vast numbers of divorce actions where couples employ one lawyer to
serve primarily as a scrivener, or no lawyer at all.3" These infor-
388. See Garrison, supra note 12, at 743 app. tbl. 5 (comparing asset ownership patterns
for state divorce samples).
389. See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 9, at 571 ("Individuals acting in their self-interest will
acquire such [legal] advice only if its perceived value exceeds its perceived cost.");
Comment, On Letting the Laity Litigate: The Petition Clause and Unauthorized Practice
Rules, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1515, 1532 n.74 (1984) (stating that self-representation "simply
constitutes a conscious and efficient allocation of human resources, from which there is no
reason to 'protect' the consumer"). Researchers have reported that self-representation at
divorce is significantly correlated with income, age, education, occupation, whether the
marriage produced children, property ownership, and marital duration. Sales et al., supra
note 164, at 561-66; see also Cavanagh & Rhode, supra note 166, at 162 (finding that
divorce litigants with no children and short marriages were more likely to represent
themselves).
390. According to a New York state survey, "[r]elatively few legal services programs
across the state will accept matrimonials," and approximately 80% of pro bono legal
assistance programs indicated that "divorce is an area where demand consistently exceeds
the supply of attorneys." COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID, NEW YORK STATE BAR ASS'N,
THE NEW YORK LEGAL NEEDS STUDY 70-71 (1993). New York is by no means unique.
Surveys uniformly report that only about 15%-20% of the legal needs of the poor and
60% of the needs of moderate income Americans are currently met. See, e.g, AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION CONSORTIUM ON LEGAL SERVICES ANID THE PUBLIC, TWO
NATIONWIDE SURVEYS: 1989 PILOT ASSESSMENTS OF THE UNMET LEGAL NEEDS OF THE
POOR AND OF THE PUBLIC GENERALLY 37 (1989); James Podgers, Legal Profession Faces
Rising Tide of Nonlawyer Practice, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1993, at 51,53 (estimating that 40% of
legal needs of moderate-income persons go unmet).
391. See Garrison, supra note 12, at 646 tbl. 2 (reporting decreased percentage of
divorce cases with two-party representation between 1978 and 1984 in two New York
counties); Sales et al., supra note 164, at 594 (reporting that the percentage of divorce
cases in Maricopa County, Arizona involving at least one unrepresented party rose from
24% in 1980 to 90% in 1990).
392. Among cases in my full research sample (excluding judicial decisions), the award
of alimony was highly correlated with the presence of counsel. Where both parties were
represented by lawyers, 30% of wives received an alimony award; where neither spouse
was represented by counsel, no wives obtained alimony awards. See Garrison, supra note
12, at 710-11. To be sure, self-selection plays a role here. A wife with poor alimony
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mational costs of discretion are magnified by the sheer volume of
divorce litigation today.393 While divorce may not yet be as certain
as either death or taxes, some experts estimate that two-thirds of
couples married during the 1990s will ultimately divorce or
separate 94 Even today, more than a million divorces are processed
annually in the United States. 95  The price of our current
discretionary regime-in lawyers' fees necessitated by the imprecision
of current standards and in inappropriate outcomes that may result
from the failure to obtain legal advice-thus is likely substantial, and
argues in favor of more rule-like standards.
Rules do not come without their own corollary set of disad-
vantages, of course. The search for the right rule imposes heavy "up-
front" costs on the rulemaking authority. If unsuccessful, rulemaking
imposes additional costs on litigants, who may bear the burden of
being inappropriately categorized, and on courts that must attempt to
fashion remedies.396
These are not insignificant difficulties. The most recent wave of
divorce law reform, the introduction of numerical child support
guidelines, offers a good example of the problems. The federal
mandate in favor of child support presumptions was designed to
increase award levels and decrease their variability.39 But research
on the impact of the new rules suggests that the failure of New York's
prospects-childless, earning an income close to that of her husband, married a short
time-is less likely to obtain (and pay) for legal representation than is the unemployed
homemaker married for a long time to a high-income professional. It was impossible to
ascertain the magnitude of the legal representation effect for the full research sample,
however, because income information was available only for the settlement group (where
two-party representation was almost invariable).
393. Experts agree that case volume is a key factor in choosing between rule and
discretion. See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 30, at 6 ("When more than a handful of parties are
affected, creation of a new law through either statutory enactment or administrative
rulemaking is much more desirable than creation of new law through judicial decision.");
Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 9, at 274 ("The benefits of detailing a rule will be greater the
larger the amount of activity governed by it.. . ."); Kaplow, supra note 9, at 621 ("The
central factor influencing the desirability of rules and standards is the frequency with which
a law will govern conduct.").
394. William J. Goode, World Changes in Divorce Patterns, in INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 43, at 24; see also Teresa Martin & Larry Bumpass, Recent
Trends in Marital Disruption, 26 DEMOGRAPHY 37, 40 (1989) (predicting that two-thirds
of recent first-marriages will experience "marital disruption").
395. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 151, at 90 tbl. 127.
396. See Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 9, at 267-70; Kaplow, supra note 9, at 579-80,
599-601.
397. See BELLER & GRAHAM, supra note 69, at 164-65; Garfinkel & Melli, supra note
72, at 160-62.
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support guidelines to improve upon the results of discretionary
standards is by no means unique. Researchers report that, in most
states, the introduction of guidelines was associated with relatively
small increases in award levels39 and insubstantial improvements in
award variability.399  Although women's advocates vigorously
supported the adoption of guidelines on the theory that they would
significantly lessen the gap between husbands and wives post-divorce,
there is no evidence that this has occurred.' Overall, it appears
that the guidelines have had only a modest impact in achieving their
aims.4°t
The reasons why child support guidelines have not had a more
dramatic effect are varied. First, no state adopted guidelines that
explicitly aim at ensuring children a post-divorce standard of living
equal to that of the noncustodial parent.' Perhaps motivated by
fears that this model would produce undesirable work disincentives
for the custodial parent and payment disincentives for the obligor,'
states instead adopted guidelines that aim to transfer to the custodial
parent that portion of the obligor's income that would have been
398. The largest, and best-designed, research to date is reported in Nancy Thoennes et
al., The Impact of Child Support Guidelines on Award Adequacy, Award Variability, and
Case Processing Efficiency, 24 FAM. L.Q. 325,343 (1991) (reporting that in only one (the
one with the lowest pre-guideline award level) of three research states did all income
groups experience significant increases in the level of child support attributable to
mandatory guidelines; in one state no income group did). For a listing and brief
description of other research reports, see Marsha Garrison, Child Support and Children's
Poverty, 28 FAM. L.Q. 475, 489-90 n.80 (1994) (reviewing ANDREA H. BELLER & JOHN
W. GRAHAM, SMALL CHANGE: THE ECONOMICS OF CHILD SUPPORT (1993); DONALD
J. HERNANDEZ, AMERICA'S CHILDREN: RESOURCES FROM FAMILY, GOVERNMENT AND
THE ECONOMY (1993)).
399. See Garrison, supra note 398, at 489 n.79 (describing and summarizing research
reports).
400. See MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 14, at 260-61 (under California's child
support guidelines sample mothers experienced decline in standard of living post-divorce
while fathers experienced improvement). Maccoby & Mnookin's findings do not compare
post-divorce standard of living before and after guidelines, but the small increases in
support associated with the adoption of guidelines are clearly inadequate to significantly
affect the gap in husbands' and wives' post-divorce living standards.
401. See Thoennes et al., supra note 398, at 345 (describing results of research in three
states and concluding that "the changes brought by passage of the guidelines have been
modest"); see also BELLER & GRAHAM, supra note 69, at 248-50 (describing negative and
positive effects associated with the introduction of advisory guidelines).
402. See IRWIN GARFINKEL, ASSURING CHILD SUPPORT 88 (1992).
403. For discussion of the work incentive effects of various guideline models, see
Betson et al., supra note 373, at 15-18.
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expended on children in the intact family.404 But for the typical
family in which the noncustodial parent earns the larger income, this
approach appears to ensure, as we have seen, a post-divorce living
standard gap of the same magnitude as that produced through
discretionary decision making. 4° Moreover, researchers have found
that single parents typically spend a considerably larger fraction of
their incomes on their children than do two-parent households.
46
As this recent history demonstrates, even with consensus on the
basic goals to be achieved, imperfect information and conflicting
subsidiary goals may produce a highly flawed rule. These problems
are magnified in the divorce context by lack of public consensus on
which values should take precedence in the formulation of more rule-
like standards. The rationale for continued reliance on discretion is
thus the heterogeneity of values and fact patterns that must be accom-
modated in divorce decision making.'
2. Curtailing Judicial Discretion: Some Modest Proposals
Given the competing advantages and disadvantages of rule and
discretion, what, if any, type of limitations on discretion do the
research results suggest as appropriate?
404. See GARFINKEL, supra note 402, at 88. The most widely used guideline model (the
"income shares" model) sets child support as a percentage of family income, utilizing
percentages derived from research on the proportion of income spent on children in intact
families. Thirty-two states have adopted some form of the income shares model. Id. at
87. The "percentage of income" model, which also derives from this research, has been
adopted in another nine states; eight other states use a modified version. Id.
405. See Betson et al., supra note 373, at 11-12 tbl. 3 (reporting that when noncustodial
parent earns $20,000 and custodial parent earns $10,000, under income shares model the
custodial parent's ratio of post to pre-divorce scaled surplus income is 0.41, while
noncustodial parent's ratio is 1.24).
406. See DAVID M. BETSON, ALTERNATIVE ESTIMATES OF THE COST OF CHILDREN
FROM THE 1980-86 CONSUMER EXPENDITURE SURVEY (1990) (concluding that, based on
1980-86 Consumer Price Survey (CPS) data, child-related percentage of total family
expenditure in a two-child family was 35% in a two-parent and 53% in a single-parent
household); EDWARD P. LAZEAR & ROBERT T. MICHAEL, ALLOCATION OF INCOME
WITHIN THE HOUSEHOLD 90, 98 (1988) (concluding that, based on 1972-73 CPS data, the
proportion of family income expended on children in a two-child family was 27% in a two-
parent and 53% in a single-parent household). But see FAMILY ECONOMICS RESEARCH
GROUP, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, EXPENDITURES ON A CHILD BY FAMILIES, 1992,
10 (1992) (concluding that "expenses on a child in single-parent households are [only]
slightly higher than those in two-parent households").
407. See, ag., ATIYAH, PRINCIPLES TO PRAGMATISM, supra note 74, at 11 ("[Divorce]
law.., is now largely based on the assumption that the infinite variety of circumstances
is such that the attempt to lay down general rules is bound to lead to injustice. Justice can
only be done by the individualized, ad hoc approach .. ").
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First, the research results do not, in my view, support the claim
that divorce is too factually varied to permit more rule-like stan-
dards."° For some divorce decisions, judges appear to rely heavily
on a few key facts. These key facts are objective variables, such as
marital duration and income, that do not hinge on a complex,
individualized appraisal of relative spousal merit. It is indeed notable
that, even in a state where marital fault retains its vitality as a ground
for divorce, fault-related variables-the gender of the defendant
against whom the divorce was granted, the specific fault findings-did
not significantly contribute to the predictability of any economic
decisions made by judges.'°9
That is not to say that the current discretionary regime is ripe for
replacement with rules as precise as those applicable to marital
dissolution at death. Judges do not appear to rely exclusively on a
few key facts and they appear willing to take highly unusual case
circumstances, including extreme fault, into account. On some issues,
the research results reveal no judicial consensus whatsoever. What
appears warranted are modest limitations on judicial discretion that
clarify the results for typical case categories, while preserving judicial
discretion to fashion appropriate remedies for the atypical.
Limitations on discretion in awarding alimony and in distributing
marital property appear to be particularly desirable and achievable.
Alimony decision making is a good reform target because key
facts can be identified that explain a substantial majority of alimony
decisions and that suggest presumptions altogether compatible with
the principles underlying the current discretionary standard. To state
legislatively a presumption in favor of alimony for the long-married
spouse whose earnings (and earning capacity) constitute a relatively
small fraction of family income, and against alimony when spousal
earning capacity is relatively equal or when the marriage is short and
childless, would simply describe current judicial outcomes. 410 Such
408. Recent research on self-representation in divorce actions reveals that many
litigants do not experience divorce as necessitating complex and highly individualized
decision making. Those who do not hire an attorney-the new majority- tend to describe
their divorces as simple and uncomplicated. See Sales et al., supra note 164, at 562, 598.
409. In the settlement sample, some or all of the fault-related variables were
significantly correlated with the net marital property distribution, see infra Appendix,
Table A7, the award of alimony, see infra Appendix, Table A12, and the value of child
support, see infra Appendix, Table A16, but in no instance did a fault-related variable
significantly contribute to the predictability of case outcomes when regression analysis was
utilized.
410. Eighty-eight percent of wives married 10 or more years who earned less than 30%
of family income were awarded alimony.
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presumptions comport with-and would clarify-the principles that
underlie the existing discretionary statute, in addition to enhancing
the predictability of case outcomes.
Property division is another obvious reform target due to the
strength of the equal division norm and the conformity of this norm
with the statutory principles. Under a standard premised on the view
of marriage as a partnership of equals, and with more than half of all
cases ultimately resulting in a relatively equal division of net assets,
there is no obvious justification for failing to specify that relatively
equal division is the most typical outcome, or an anaiytical starting
point.
These limitations on judicial discretion appear to be not only
warranted but politically feasible. They rest upon values that the
legislature has already adopted and thus require no more than a
willingness to codify current decision-making patterns: Such modest
amendments would merely clarify what judges now do. The extent of
judicial consensus on these issues also suggests that broad public
support for these limited reforms would be available.
While these are modest limitations on judicial discretion, they
would nonetheless provide considerable information to divorce
litigants who determine their own divorce entitlements without
adversarial legal representation. They would also offer more guidance
to divorce lawyers and judges than does current law. By enabling
judges to focus on the appropriate circumstances for deviation from
the norms, the development of precedents would be enhanced, as
would the likelihood of consistent outcomes in which like persons are
accorded like treatment. Finally, these modest measures would
enhance what legal scholars have variously described as the hortatory
or expressive function of the law.4" By expressing the normative
principles that underlie divorce entitlements in more concrete,
accessible form, the power of those principles to shape goals and
conduct is expanded. These modest measures may thus accomplish
much.
The data also point to a variety of procedural issues where
modest reforms would be useful. The extent of noncompliance with
temporary child support and alimony orders, for example, suggests the
411. See, e.g., ATIYAH, PRINCIPLES TO PRAGMATISM, supra note 74, at 11; Katharine
T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293 (1988); REGAN, supra note 67,
at 176-84; Carl E. Schneider, The Channelling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 495 (1992); Carol Weisbrod, On the Expressive Functions of Family Law, 22 U.C.
DAvIs L. REv. 991 (1989).
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need for stiffer sanctions.41 2  The overrepresentation of cases
involving businesses and professional practices413 suggests the need
for-clearer legislative guidance on valuation and separate/marital
property apportionment.414 The conflicting methods judges utilized
when resolving a case of asset dissipation suggest the need for a
standardized approach.15
The reforms I have outlined will not, of course, accomplish all
that is desirable. They would not, for example, improve current
results on the duration of alimony at all. Here the research data offer
no simple solutions. On alimony permanence, the data demonstrate
a strong correlation between permanence and marital duration, but
they also suggest that consensus on marital duration as the basis for
permanence has declined. On the duration of a nonpermanent award,
they show the lack of any meaningful predictive relationships. These
results demonstrate the desirability of constraints on judicial
discretion. They demonstrate the need for new decision-making
models. But they offer no guidance for cutting through the thicket of
competing values that the derivation of such standards will neces-
sitate.
With respect to property division, the modest revisions of current
law I have outlined also represent a first step, rather than a complete
reform program. A description of the typical property division
outcome, for example, would ideally be stated as a presumption and
coupled with a concise list of circumstances, or common fact patterns,
that justify deviation from the presumptive norm. But with more than
40% of cases overall-and a majority in some case
categories-ultimately resulting in unequal division, it is not al-
together clear that a presumption, placing the burden of persuasion
on the litigant who urges a contrary result, is warranted.
The problem lies in the apparent lack of judicial consensus on the
bases for deviation from equal division and the extent to which
discernible trends will almost certainly prove controversial. The
significant relationship between separate and marital property-a link
explicitly authorized by the current statute-is unlikely to arouse
412. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
413. A business, professional practice, or degree figured in 38% of the cases decided
by judges.
414. Many were small, closely-held family businesses that neither would be sold nor had
an obvious market value; apportionment issues were common as well. For a discussion of
how valuation and apportionment issues contribute to litigation, see Robert J. Levy, An
Introduction to Divorce-Property Issues, 23 FAM. L.Q. 147, 151-59 (1989).
415. See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
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controversy. But the apparent links between distributional outcomes
and title, business ownership, and asset values are likely to produce
debate over the extent to which such factors should influence
outcomes. These tendencies did not explain much of the variation in
results, and it is far from clear that they represent any genuine judicial
or public consensus on what is "equitable" when distributing marital
property.
Nor is it obvious whether (and how) these factors should
influence case outcomes. Consider, for example, the link between
asset values and property distribution. Judicial departures from
equality benefitted the needier spouse at the bottom of the
socioeconomic ladder and the spouse who had made greater monetary
contributions at the top. The tendency for the wife's percentage
award to vary based on wealth thus benefitted poor women and
harmed those who were wealthy. A presumption of equality that
applied regardless of asset values would, conversely, advance the
interests of wealthy women at the expense of their poorer-and far
more numerous--counterparts. This one example thus raises basic
questions about the relative roles of need, monetary contribution, and
formal equality as bases for property division.416 Is it appropriate
to prefer the needier spouse at the bottom of the socioeconomic
ladder; is it appropriate to prefer the asset producing spouse at the
top? Is wealth an appropriate basis for departure from equality at
all? If it is, to what extent and how?4"
The relationship between the husband's ownership of a business
or his possession of a professional degree/license and property
distribution outcomes also raises fundamental issues of equity and
consistency.4 18  Judges seemed loath to distribute these assets
416. For a more detailed discussion of the incompatibility of need and contribution as
factors in property distribution, see Martha L. Fineman, Societal Factors Affecting the
Creation of Legal Rules for Distribution of Property at Divorce, 23 FAM. L.Q. 279,289-95
(1989).
417. The possibilities are numerous. One might follow probate law and exempt certain
assets from distribution. For example, household goods, the car, the family home, might
be exempted based on the needs of minor children or on a more general need-based
standard. One might apply different rules to debts than to assets, or to cases where debts
exceed assets.
418. The tendency to award the title-holding spouse a disproportionate share of
business and professional assets remains evident in recent New York cases that post-date
the research period. See, e.g., Patricia B. v. Steven B., 588 N.Y.S.2d 874, 876 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1992) (awarding wife one-third of husband's periodontal practice and holding that
"there is no basis in law for beginning an analysis concerning a business or a professional
practice with a presumption that the parties must divide such an asset on an equal basis").
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equally, at least in part due to the sense that they represent future in-
come-the source of future alimony and child support
payments-rather than tangible material wealth.419 With respect to
professional degrees, the weight of critical commentary, as well as
statutory and appellate case law outside New York, concurs with
judicial sentiment."a  Some commentators have suggested the
capitalization and distribution of future income in all cases.421 But
no commentator has endorsed the approach peculiar to New York,
which treats as divisible the future income stream of the doctor (if she
obtained her degree while married) while ignoring that of the
ambulance driver, billing clerk, and hospital president.4' Thus,
even though wives tended to obtain a small share of professional
degree assets, they were still better off than their counterparts in the
other forty-nine states. They were also better off than their New
York counterparts whose spouses obtained degrees before marriage
or whose future income was not dependent on the possession of such
a license. (This may be yet another reason for judicial reluctance to
divide such assets equally.)
The judicial tendency to treat business assets like professional
degrees is also intriguing and warrants further research. The primary
component of the value of a professional practice is often non-
marketable goodwill;423 this may explain why judges tended to lump
these assets in with degrees. But husbands who owned more
traditional businesses-a machine shop,424 soda distributorship,4"
419. The novelty of the property interest involved in some of these cases, on the other
hand, does not appear to have troubled the judges. They were entirely willing to treat
intangible assets like pensions-the status of which was quite controversial at the beginning
of the research period-much as they did the bank account and family car.
420. See Weitzman, supra note 107, at 132 tbl. 5.3 (summarizing state rules). Some
states have adopted rules that provide for monetary reimbursement to a spouse who has
significantly contributed to the other's acquisition of education during the marriage. See
id.
421. See, e.g., WEITZMAN, supra note 12, at 110-11 (urging division of "career assets"
such as education, job experience, seniority, networks of professional contacts, or a track
record or reputation that commands a good salary); Deborah A. Batts, Remedy Refocus:
In Search of Equity in "Enhanced Spouse/Other Spouse" Divorces, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 751,
788 (1988) (arguing that the "source of the enhanced earning capacity.., is irrelevant");
Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker, 60 U. Cl. L. REV. 67, 131-38
(1993) (urging division of spouses' enhanced earning capacity at divorce).
422. See, e.g., OLDHAM, supra note 23, § 9.02[1], at 9-11 ("It would be Alice-in-
Wonderlandish to say that education is property only sometimes.").
423. For detailed discussion of issues related to goodwill evaluation in professional
practices, see OLDHAM, supra note 23, § 10.03[3].
424. Stein v. Stein, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 19, 1982, at 12 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.).
425. Romano v. Romano, 519 N.Y.S.2d 850 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987).
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advertising agency,42 type-setting firm,427 glass and tile installation
company,4' wholesale jewelry business429 -were also highly likely
to retain most of its value. Some of these outcomes could be
explained as a result of the highly personal nature of the business's
goodwill4 0 or as a result of the statutory mandate that the ap-
preciated value of premarital property remains separate unless due to
the efforts of the nontitled spouse.43' Interpreting the latter re-
quirement, New York courts have held that homemaking
contributions suffice to create divisible marital property,43 2 but the
statutory language may nonetheless produce a tendency to consider
such assets as presumptively separate. The judges' decisions in these
cases also suggest, however, a larger tendency to view an asset
representing the source of the title-holder's livelihood as a hybrid
standing somewhere between salaried employment and a traditional
property interest. These cases thus squarely raise the large, and
contentious, question of how marital assets should be defined.
The correlations between property division outcomes and both
asset values and business/degree ownership thus expose fundamental
issues of principle. The former correlation raises questions about the
model of equality upon which our divorce law should rest; the latter,
the scope of the estate to which that model should apply. The modest
reform of the property division statute that I have suggested cannot
resolve these larger issues. Nor would its adoption make their
resolution less important.
CONCLUSION
The research results offer legislatures information on which to
base some modest, but nonetheless useful, limitations upon judicial
discretion. They also offer legislatures-and the public-better
information to enrich the continuing debate over divorce standards.
They underscore the importance of that debate by revealing the
extent to which current standards have thus far failed to achieve
consistent, predictable outcomes for many aspects of divorce decision
making.
426. McCormack v. McCormack, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 29, 1982, at 7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.).
427. Beckerman v. Beckerman, 511 N.Y.S.2d 33 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987).
428. Ginter v. Ginter, N.Y. St. B. Ass'n Fam. L. Rev., Sept. 1990, at 21, 23.
429. More v. More, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 10, 1990, at 22 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 9, 1990).
430. See OLDHAM, supra note 23, § 10.03[2].
431. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 2360B)(5)(d)(6) (McKinney 1986).
432. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
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The research data also offer a glimpse of divorce decision making
in transition. It is all here: the clash of values that pervades the
national debate on issues of family and gender, the chaos that
accompanies change, and tentative trends that may mark the
emergence of new normative and legal standards. The data provide
evidence of the shift in divorce law's central paradigm, from remedial,
fault-based justice to a regime focused on formal equality and
dependency prevention. They show us the traces of judicial per-
sonality and those thousand limitations that constrain judicial choice.
They show us the legacy of the past, the uncertainty of the present,
and tantalizing hints of the future of judicial decision making at
divorce.
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TABLE Al
DISTRIBUTION OF COUPLES' TOTAL ASSET VALUES (1990
DOLLARS), BY CASE GROUP
Property Value Judicial Sample Settlement Sample
Gross Asset Value Net Asset Value Gross Asset Value Net Asset Value
% cur.% % cum.% % eum.% % cur.%
(Negative Value) (3) (3) (18) (18)
$ 0-$ 9,999 10 10 9 12 25 25 18 35
$10,000 - $29,000 6 16 6 18 17 42 16 51
$30,000 - $49,000 5 21 6 24 11 53 8 59
$50,000 - $99,999 12 33 11 34 15 69 14 73
$100,000 - $199,000 19 52 19 53 14 83 11 84
$200,000 - $299,000 13 65 12 65 4 86 4 87
$300,000 - $499,000 9 73 9 74 4 90 4 91
$500,000-$1,000,000 15 89 15 89 6 96 5 97
$1,000,000 or more 11 100 11 100 4 100 4 100
Median Value $189,326 $181,286 $ 41,045 $ 29,596
Mean Value $637,277 $587,359 $300,148 $268,815
TABLE A2
AVERAGE RATIO OF SEPARATE PROPERTY TO TOTAL PROPERTY,
BY MARITAL DURATION AND CASE GROUP
Marital Duration Judicial Sample Settlement Sample
% (n) % (n)
0 - 4 years 41% (12) 21% (44)
5 - 9 years 20% (54) 10% (71)
10 - 14 years 10% (73) 10% (68)
15 - 19 years 7% (71) 7% (51)
20 or more years 8% (140) 8% (78)
ALL SAMPLE CASES 11% (350) 10% (312)
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TABLE A3
OWNERSHIP RATE AND MEDIAN VALUE (1990 DOLLARS) OF
REPORTED ASSETS, BY CASE GROUP
Asset Type Judicial Sample Settlement Sample
Median Median
% Owning Net Value % Owning Net Value
Automobiles 47% $ 5,960 79% $ 4,077
Business Assets (all) 38% $186,080 18% $ 37,324
Professional degrees or
licenses 12% $325,809 ** **
Other business assets 33% $129,737 ** **
Household goods & furniture 54% $ 10,692 83% $ 5,018
Liquid Assets
Bank accounts 55% $ 17,688 82% $ 1,616
Other 35% $ 13,549 37% $ 6,799
Nonliquid Assets
Pensions 49% $ 40,100 20% $ 17,315
Other 28% $ 22,229 30% $ 6,383
Marital Home 82% $111,299 60% $ 48,929
Other Real Estate 34% $102,675 25% $ 45,683
Other Assets 33% $ 12,590 $ 2,950
Debts 47% $ 14,864 82% $ 8,368
TABLE A4
DISPOSITION OF THE MARITAL HOME, BY CUSTODY STATUS AND
CASE GROUP
Disposition of
Marital Home Custody Status & Case Group
Husband JtJSplit No Minor
Wife Custody Custody Custody Children
JS SS JS SS JS SS iS SS
n=160 n=95 n=13 n=12 n=8 n=11 n=121 n=70
% % % % % % % %
Occupancy to Wife 68% 61% 8% 25% 50% 27% 46% 36%
Occupancy to Husband 7% 16% 54% 58% 13% 73% 12% 41%
Home sold 26% 23% 39% 17% 38% 0% 41% 23%
JS=Judicial Sample; SS--Settlement Sample
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TABLE A5
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL ASSETS (COUPLES WITH
MARITAL ASSETS AND COMPLETE ASSET INFORMATION),
BY CASE GROUP
Asset Distribution Judicial Sample Settlement Sample
(n=162) (n=130)
67% + to Husband 16% 34%
56%-66% to Husband 18% 7%
Relatively Equal* 45% 12%
56%-66% to Wife 8% 8%
67% + to Wife 13% 39%
Median % to Wife 50% 51%
Mean % to Wife 50% 51%
* Relatively equal=Between 45% and 55%
TABLE A6
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL NET WORTH (COUPLES
wmTH POSrrIvE NET WORTH AND COMPLETE ASSET & DEBT
INFORMATION), BY CASE GROUP
Net Marital Property Distribution Judicial Sample Settlement Sample
(n=159) (n=104)
67% or more to Husband 17% 34%
56%-66% to Husband 19% 5%
Relatively Equal* 39% 14%
56%-66% to Wife 6% 8%
67% or more to Wife 19% 40%
Median % to Wife 50% 54%
Mean % to Wife 51% 55%
* Relatively Equal=Between 45% and 55%
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TABLE A7
NET PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION VARIABLE CORRELATIONS, BY CASE
GROUP (CASES wITH PosmvE NET WORTH) DEPENDENT
VARIABLE=WIFE'S NET MARITAL PROPERTY PERCENTAGE'
Independent Variable Case Group
JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT
Trial Appellate
Pearson's R Pearson's R Pearson's R2
(n) (n) (n)
p= p= p=
CASE CHARACTERISTICS
Fault Judgment3  -. 028 -. 0197 -. 2014
(299) (299) (104)
p=.961 p=.734 p=.040
Fault Ranking4  -. 0385 .0018 -. 2600
(273) (273) (104)
p=.527 p=.977 p=.008
Gender of Plantiff* *** -. 1933
(104)
p=.049
Length of Proceeding -. 0587 -.0486 .0850
(232) (233) (100)
p=.373 p=A60 p=AO1
Region* 9.0(8) 9.1(8) 9.1(8)
(323) (323) (104)
p=.342 p=. 335 p=.336
Appellate Department* 20.7(12) 21.4(12)
(323) (323)
p=.055 p=.045
Year of Decision -. 0167 -. 0433
(323) (323)
p=.765 p=.38
JUDICIAL CHARACTERISTICS
Age .0200 ***
(305)
p=.72 8
Educational Status Score6  -.0466
(288)
p=.431
Judicial Experience (years) .0376
(311)
p=.509
Political Party7  .0461
(270)
p=.450
Regionality of Education -.0734
(293)
p=.2 10
Religion* 14.8(8)
(172)
p=.063
Sex9  -.0056 *
(323)
p=.920
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LITIGANT CHARACTERISTICS
AGE
Husband
Wife
CHILDREN OF THE MARRIAGE
Marriage Produced Children
Sole Custody to Wife
% of Obligor Income
Paid in Child Support
% of Obligor Income
Paid in Alimony & CS
Value of Combined
Alimony/Child Support
Husband's Unrealized
Custody Request
EDUCATION (YEARS)
Husband
Wife
HEALTH"0
Husband
Wife
INCOME AND EMPLOYMENT
Husband's Job Status
Husband's Income
Wife's Employmenti1
Wife's Job Status
12
Wife's Income
Wife's Income/Family Income
.0704
(251)
p=.234
.0073
(254)
p=.908
.0430
(323)
p=.446
.0156
(323)
p=.819
.2367
(151)
p=.003
.2262
(151)
p=.005
-.0212
(309)
p=.7 10
-. 1039
(145)
p=.214
-. 0178
(171)
p=.817
.0389
(323)
p=.486
-. 1518
(323)
p=.0016
.0773
(302)
p=.180
-. 0428
(268)
p=.485
-. 1274
(309)
p=.025
-. 1137
(295)
p=.051
.1411
(263)
p=.022
.1727
(261)
p=.0 05
.0260
(250)
p=.682
.0345
(252)
p=.585
.0465
(323)
p=.410
.0128
(323)
p=.520
.2480
(150)
p=.002
.2273
(150)
p=.005
-. 0744
(308)
p=.193
-. 1280
(147)
p=.122
-. 0120
(175)
p=.875
.0468
(323)
p=.402
-.1266
(323)
p=.0213
.0998
(302)
p=.083
-.0595
(268)
p=.332
-.1020
(308)
p=.074
-. 0821
(295)
p=.160
.1241
(263)
p=.044
.1908
(261)
p=.002
-. 1183
(99)
p=.244
-. 0945
(98)
p=.3 56
-. 0169
(104)
p=.865
.0360
(104)
p=.194
.0681
(40)
p=.676
.1995
(40)
p=.217
-.0378
(100)
p=.709
.0221
(81)
p=.844
.1135
(89)
p=.290
.1595
(83)
p=.150
.0752
(104)
p=.448
.1662
(104)
p=.092
.0372
(72)
p=.756
-. 0982
(77)p=.395
.0917
(92)
p=.385
.0476
(74)
p=.687
.0877
(90)
p=.411
.0332
(64)
p=.795
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Wife Awarded Alimony -.0187 -. 034 .1515
(317) (317) (104)
p=.740 p=.952  p=.125
MARITAL DURATION (YEARS) .0511 .0711 -. 0630
(315) (315) (103)
p=.366 p=.208  p=.527
Length of Separation .1046 .0990
(years) (300) (301)
p=.071 p=.086
MARITAL PROPERTY
Net Worth -. 1379 -. 1148 -. 1408
(323) (322) (104)
p=.013 p=.040 p=.154
Marital debt -. 0920 -.0964 -. 1162
(319) (319) (104)
p=.101 p=.086 p=.240
Husband-Owned -. 1056 -. 1012 -. 1516
Property Value (304) (304) (102)
p=.093 p=.067 p=.128
Husband-Owned % of -.2326 -. 2775 -.4914
Marital Property (301) (302) (102)
p=.000 p=.000 p=.000
Husband Owns -.2250 -. 2661 -. 1299
Business, Professional (323) (322) (104)
Degree or License p=.000 p=.000 p=.189
Husband Owns Pension -.0955 -. 0748
(323) (323)
p=.094 p=.180
Wife-Owned Property Value .0552 .0649 .1596
(225) (222) (103)
p=.410 p=.336 p=.107
Wife-Owned % of .0124 .0103 .4331
Marital Property (256) (256) (103)
p=.843 p=.870 p=.000
SEPARATE PROPERTY
Value of Husband .1193 .1174 -. 1261
Owned Property (323) (323) (104)
p=.032 p=.035 p=.202
Ratio of Husband's .1191 .1262 .0700
Separate Property (304) (304) (104)
to Marital Property p=.037 p=.027 p=.480
Value of Wife .0127 .0346 .0443
Owned Property (323) (323) (104)
p=.820 p=.535 p=.655
Ratio of Wife's .0305 .1127 .1043
Separate Property (304) (306) (104)
to Marital Property p=.594 p=.048 p=.292
'Coded as five rankings based on the wife's percentage of net marital assets. 1=less than 34%;
2=between 34% and 44%; 3=between 45% and 55%; 4=between 56% and 66%; 5=more than
66%.
2For nondichotomous categorical variables (i.e., case region, appellate department, and judge's
religion), the table displays the chi-square statistic followed by the applicable degrees of freedom
(in parentheses).
I Coded divorce judgment granted against husband only=1, against both spouses=2, against wife
only=3.
4 Coded 1 through 7, based on combined score taking into account fault judgment (1 through 3)
and basis. Adultery ranked 1, cruel and inhuman treatment 2, abandonment 3, mental illness 4.
SCoded 1=wife, 2-=husband.
6 Coded 2 through 8, based on combined status scores of judge's college and law school.
SCoded 1=Democratic, 2=Republican.
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I Coded 0=attended neither college or law school locally, 1=attended either college or law
school locally, 3=attended both college and law school locally.
I Coded 1=male, 2=female.
10 Coded 1=good, 2=fair, 3=poor.
11 Coded 1=employed, 2=unemployed.
12 Coded 1=high status professional, 2=lower status professional (e.g., accountants, artists,
clergymen, computer programmers, decorators and designers, journalists, librarians, musicians,
nurses, pharmacists, high school or lower teachers), 3=small business owners, white collar
workers (e.g., sales personnel, clerks, cashiers, secretaries), and skilled blue collar workers (e.g.,
machinists, printers, electricians, butchers, machine operators), 4=students, 5=unemployed,
retired, or homemaker.
TABLE A8
PERCENTAGES OF SAMPLE WIVES AWARDED ALIMONY, BY WIFE'S
INCOME (1990 DOLLARS) AND CASE GROUP
Wife's Income ($1990) Judicial Sample Settlement Sample Difference
% (n) % (n)
$0 - $4,999 87% (114) 52% (92) -35***
$5,000 - $19,999 68% (105) 28% (104) -40***
$20,000 or more 33% (92) 8% (80) -25***
p<.001
TABLE A9
PERCENTAGES OF SAMPLE WIVES AWARDED ALIMONY, BY
HUSBAND'S INCOME (1990 DOLLARS) AND CASE GROUP
Husband's Income ($1990) Judicial Sample Settlement Sample Difference
% (n) % (n)
$0 - $39,999 50% (112) 26% (145) -24***
$40,000 - $79,999 75% (120) 37% (60) -38***
$80,000 or more 77% (84) 57% (30) -30*
*** p<.05; * p<.001
TABLE A1O
PERCENTAGES OF SAMPLE WIVES AWARDED ALIMONY, BY
CUSTODY STATUS AND CASE GROUP
Custody Status+ Judicial Sample Settlement Sample Difference
% (n) % (n)
Wife with sole custody 67% (191) 30% (132) -37***
Wife without sole custody 56% (170) 29% (167) -28***
+Cases involving joint or split custody excluded; wife without sole custody category includes
cases involving husband custody and cases without minor children.
*** p<.001
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TABLE All
MEAN RATIO OF WIFE'S POST-DIVORCE ADJUSTED FAMILY
INCOME/HUSBAND'S POST-DIVORCE ADJUSTED FAMILY INCOME
(SETrLEMENT SAMPLE), BY HUSBAND AND WIFE
PRE-DIVORCE INCOME
Wife's Income Husband's Income
$0 - $34,999 $35,000-$59,999 $60,000 +
mean ratio (n) mean ratio (n) mean ratio (n)
$ 0 - $4,999 .24 (26) .20 (23) .21 (21)
$5,000 - $19,999 .84 (42) .41 (24) .51 ( 7)
$20,000 + 1.23 (25) .67 (15) .45 (11)
ALL SAMPLE WIVES .78 (93) .39 (62) .33 (39)
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Independent Variable Case Group
JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT
Trial Appellate
Pearson's R
(n)
p=
CASE CHARACTERISTICS
Fault Judgment2
Fault Ranking
Gender of Plaintiff
4
Length of Proceeding
Region*
Appellate Department*
Year of Decision
JUDICIAL CHARACTERISTICS
Age
Educational Status Score5
Judicial Experience (years)
Political Partny
Regionality of Education 7
Religion*
Sex8
-. 0290
(348)
p=.589
-. 0565
(326)
p=.309
-.0453
(291)
p=.442
11.9(2)
(377)
p=.003
7.2(3)
(377)
p=.067
-. 1222
(376)
p=.018
.1097
(356)
p=.039
.0418
(339)
p=.443
.0160
(362)
p=.761
.0352
(313)
p=.535
-. 0558
(346)
p=.301
5.5(2)
(196)
p=.063
-. 1008
(376)
p=.051
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TABLE A12
ALIMONY CORRELATIONS, BY CASE GROUP ])EPENDENT
VARIABLE=AWARD OF ALIMONY TO WIFE
Pearson's R1
(n)
P=
.0876
(313)
p=.122
.1127
(312)
p=.047
.1067
(314)
p=.059
-.0169
(310)
p=.767
3.6(2)
(315)
p=.169
Pearson's R
(n)
p=
-.0493
(348)
p=.360
-.0776
(326)
p=.162
-. 0123
(291)
p=.823
11.8(2)
(377)
p=.003
7.0(3)
(377)
p=.072
-. 1308
(376)
p=.0 11
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LITIGANT CHARACTERISTICS
AGE
Husband
Wife
CHILDREN OF THE MARRIAGE
Marriage Produced Children
Sole Custody to Wife
% of Obligor Income
Paid in Child Support
Husband's Unrealized
Custody Request
EDUCATION (YEARS)
Husband
Wife
HEALTH9
Husband
Wife
INCOME AND EMPLOYMENT
Husband's Job Status
Husband's Income
Wife's Employment"0
Wife's Job Status"
Wife's Income
Wife's Income/Family Income
MARITAL DURATION (YEARS)
-.0241
(290)
p=.682
.0072
(291)
p=. 903
.1478
(377)
p=.005
.0955
(377)
p=.064
-. 2394
(170)
p=.002
.0431
(169)
p=.578
-.2403
(201)
p=.001
-.0433
(377)
p=.40 1
.1979
(377)
p=.000
.1481
(351)
p=.007
.0278
(316)
p=.623
.3380
(365)
p=. 000
-.3479
(347)
p=.000
-.4518
(311)
p=.00 0
-. 5581
(283)
p=.000
.1199
(367)
p=.022
[Vol. 74
-. 0126
(290)p=.831
.0143
(291)
p=.808
.1473
(377)
p=.004
.0896
(377)
p=.082
-.2092
(174)p=.006
.0431
(169)
p=.578
-. 2466
(201)
p=.000
-. 0126
(377)
p=.807
.2019
(377)
p=. 000
.1448
(351)
p=.0 07
.0248
(316)p=.660
.3367
(365)
p=.000
-. 3502
(347)
p=.000
-.4622
(311)
p=.000
-.5795
(283)
p=.O00
.1041
(367)
p=.046
-.0220
(305)
p=.702
.0371
(305)p=.259
.0652
(315)
p=.249
-. 0255
(315)p=.652
-. 0092
(137)
p=.915
.0870
(200)
p=. 221
.0544
(269)
p=.37 4
-.0404
(261)
p=.516
-. 0238
(315)
p=.674
.1075
(315)
p=.057
.1277
(237)
p=.050
.1077
(235)
p=.05 0
.2435
(286)
p=.0 00
-. 2070
(246)
p=.O01
-. 3725
(258)
p=.000
-.4510
(205)
p=.000
.0703
(313)
p=.215
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MARITAL PROPERTY
Net Worth -. 1236 -. 1280 -. 0340
(373) (373) (315)
p=.017  p=.013 p=.547
Percentage of Marital -. 0441 -. 0739 .1515
Property Awarded to Wife 2  (323) (323) (104)
p=.429 p=.185 p=.125
Value of Wife's Net -. 1287 -. 1358 -. 0362
Property Award (373) (373) (315)
p=.013 p=.009 p=.522
'For nondichotomous categorical variables (i.e., case region, appellate department, and judge's
religion), the table displays the chi-square statistic followed by the applicable degrees of freedom( m parentheses).
ICoded divorce judgment granted against husband only=1, against both spouses=2, against wife
only=3.
3 Coded 1 through 7, based on combined score taking into account fault judgment (1 through 3)
and basis. Adultery ranked 1, cruel and inhuman treatment 2, abandonment 3, mental illness 4.
Coded 1=wife, 2=husband.
5 Coded 2 through 8, based on combined status scores of judge's college and law school.
6 Coded 1=Democratic, 2=Republican.
I Coded 0=attended neither college or law school locally, 1=attended either college or law
school locally, 3=attended both college and law school locally.
8 Coded 1=male, 2=female.
I Coded 1=good, 2=fair, 3=poor.
0 Coded 1=employed, 2=unemployed.
11 Coded 1=high status professional, 2=lower status professional (e.g., accountants, artists,
clergymen, computer programmers, decorators and designers, journalists, librarians, musicians,
nurses, pharmacists, high school or lower teachers), 3=small business owners, white collar
workers (e.g., sales personnel, clerks, cashiers, secretaries), and skilled blue collar workers (e.g.,
machinists, printers, electricians, butchers, machine operators), 4=students, 5=unemployed,
retired, or homemaker.
1 For cases with positive net worth, by five category rankings. For settlement case sample, Valid
Group.
TABLE A13
PERCENTAGES OF ALIMONY AwARDs THAT WERE PERMANENT, BY
WIFE'S AGE AND CASE GROUP
Wife's Age (years) Judicial Sample Settlement Sample Difference
% (n) % (n)
39 or less 26% (66) 26% (50) - 0
40-49 39% (70) 30% (27) -9
50 or more 52% (54) 60% (10) + 8
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TABLE A14
PERMANENCE OF ALIMONY CORRELATIONS DEPENDENT
VARIABLE=PERMANENCE OF ALIMONY AWARD TO WIFE'
Independent Variable Case Group
JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT
Trial Appellate
Pearson's R Pearson's R Pearson's R2
(n) (n) (n)p= p= p=
CASE CHARACTERISTICS
Fault Judgmen .0488 .0005 .1726
(215) (218) ( 93)
p=.477 p=.994 p=.098
Fault Ranking4  .0833 .0261 .1949
(202) (205) ( 93)
p=.23 9  p=.711 p=.061
Gender of Plaintiff5  .1748( 92)
P=.096
Length of Proceeding .0195 -. 0127 -. 0770
(186) (187) ( 91)
p=.792 p=.863 p=.68
Region* 2.4(3) 4.8(2) 1.9(2)
(229) (232) ( 93)
p=.301 p=.091 p=.395
Appellate Department* 4.7(3) 5.5(3)
(229) (232)
p=.191 p=.138
Year of Decision .1516 .1650
(229) (232)
p=.022 p=.012
JUDICIAL CHARACTERISTICS
Age -. 0581
(216)
p=.395
Educational Status Sscore6  -. 1736
(202)
p=.013
Judicial Experience (years) -. 0906
(219)
p=.182
Political Party7  -. 1610
(184)
p=.029
Regionality of Education' .1720
(207)
p=.013
Religion* 4.2(2)
(118)
p=.123
Sex9  .0789
(228)
p=.23 5
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LITIGANT CHARACTERISTICS
AGE
Husband
Wife
CHILDREN OF THE MARRIAGE
Marriage Produced Children
Sole Custody to Wife
% of Obligor Income
Paid in Child Support
% of Obligor Income
Paid in Alimony & CS
Value of Combined
Alimony/Child Support
EDUCATION (YEARS)
Husband
Wife
HEALTH 10
Husband
Wife
INCOME AND EMPLOYMENT
Husband's Job Status
Husband's Income
Wife's Employmente
Wife's Job Status
12
Wife's Income
Wife's Income/Family Income
-. 1123
(183)
p=.130
-. 2130
(189)
p=.003
-. 0258
(229)
p=.698
.1154
(229)
p=.081
-. 0516
(117)
p=.581
-.0868
(117)p=.352
-.0137
(224)
p=.838
.1621
(112)
p=.088
.1131
(136)
p=.190
.0150
(229)
p=.698
-. 1544
(229)
p=.019
.0609
(221)
p=.368
.0073
(208)
p=.917
-.0694
(223)
p=. 302
-.0491
(221)
p=.467
.0173
(198)
p=.809
-. 0042
(186)
p=.954
-. 1870
(185)
p=.0 11
-. 3082
(191)
p=.000
-.0661
(232)
p=.316
.1896
(232)
p=. 004
.0050
(119)
p=.957
.0342
(119)
p=.712
.0016
(227)
p=.981
.0711
(111)
p=.459
.0554
(134)
p=.525
.0390
(232)
p=.555
-.2465
(232)
p=.000
.0793
(220)
p=.242
-. 0069
(211)
p=.92 1
-. 0872
(226)
p=.192
-. 0270
(221)
p=.690
-. 0125
(201)
p=.860
.0148
(189)
p=.840
-.2108( 87)
p=.050
-. 1233( 87)
p=.255
-. 1382
( 93)
p=.106
-. 0624
( 93)
p=.552
-. 3486
( 93)
p=.552
-.2009
( 40)
p=.214
.0287( 89)
p=.789
.1895
( 79)p=.094
.2120
(75)p=.068
-. 0152
( 93)
p=.885
-.2949
( 93)
p=.004
-. 1468
( 68)
p=.232
.0268
(75)p=.819
-.0891( 88)
p=.409
-. 0575( 76)
p=.622
.0915( 82)
p=.414
.0434( 66)
p=.72 9
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MARITAL DURATION (YEARS) -.2551 -.3699 -. 2344
(226) (226) (93)
p=.000 p=.000 p=.024
MARITAL PROPERTY
Net Worth (marital) .0118 -.0104 .1502
(230) (230) ( 93)
p=.859 p=.876  p=.151
Value Wife's Net -. 0759 -. 1057 .1151
Property Award (229) (229) ( 93)
p=.256 p=.lll p=.272
'Coded 1=permanent, 2=durational.
2 For nondichotomous categorical variables (i.e., case region, appellate department, and judge's
religion), the table displays the chi-square statistic followed by the applicable degrees of freedom
(in parentheses).
I Coded divorce judgment granted against husband only=l, against both spouses=2, against wife
only=3.
" Coded 1 through 7, based on combined score taking into account fault judgment (1 through 3)
and basis. Adultery ranked 1, cruel and inhuman treatment 2, abandonment 3, mental illness 4.
S Coded 1=wife, 2=husband.
Coded 2 through 8, based on combined status scores of judge's college and law school.
Coded 1=Democratic, 2=Republican.Coded 0=attended neither college or law school locally, 1=attended either college or law
school locally, 3=attended both college and law school locally.
I Coded 1=male, 2=female.
10 Coded 1=good, 2=fair, 3=poor.
n Coded 1=employed, 2=unemployed.
12Coded 1=high status professional, 2=lower status professional (e.g., accountants, artists,
clergymen, computer programmers, decorators and designers, journalists, librarians, musicians,
nurses, pharmacists, high school or lower teachers), 3=small business owners, white collar
workers (e.g., sales personnel, clerks, cashiers, secretaries), and skilled blue collar workers (e.g.,
machinists, printers, electricians, butchers, machine operators), 4=students, 5=unemployed,
retired, or homemaker.
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TABLE A15
ENHANCEMENTS TO ALIMONY & CHILD SUPPORT, BY CASE GROUP
Type of Benefit Judicial Sample Settlement Sample
% (n) % (n)
Automatic Salary or Cost of Living Adjustments
alimony 1% (148) 5% (94)
child support 1% (235) 2% (220)
Life Insurance on Obligor
when minor children' 44% (212) 47% (200)
spouse only 18% (130) 17% (113)
Medical Insurance Premiums
for minor children2  57% (217) 63% (220)
for recipient spouse 15% (343) 12% (312)
Unreimbursed Medical Costs
for minor children 3  14% (235) 18% (220)
for recipient spouse 0% (383) 0% (315)
Other Child-Related Costs
child care 6% (216) 7% (220)
college expenses4  19% (230) 29% (220)
private school 6% (235) 4% (220)
other 5% (235) 5% (220)
'In the judicial sample, when provision for maintenance of life insurance was made, 96% of the
cases required insurance to be maintained by the father, and 4% by both parents. In the
settlement sample, 82% of the cases required insurance to be maintained by the father, and, 1%
by the mother, and 17% by both parents.
In the judicial sample, when maintenance of medical insurance was required, the father alone
was required to maintain coverage in 89% of the cases, the mother alone in 4%, and both
parents in 7%. In the settlement sample, the father alone was required to maintain coverage in
83% of the cases, the mother in 8%, and both parents in 9%.
3 In the judicial sample, when provision for unreimbursed medical expenses was made, 62%
required payment by the father, 2% by the mother, and 36% by both parents. In the settlement
sample, 52.5% required payment by the father, and 47.5% by both parents.
4 In the judicial sample, when payment of college expenses was required, 71% required payment
of all expenses by the father and 29% required joint payment. In the settlement sample, 39%
required payment by the father and 61% required joint payment.
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TABLE A16
CHILD SUPPORT CORRELATIONS DEPENDENT VARIABLE=VALUE OF
CHILD SUPPORT EXCLUDING ALIMONY ($1990)
Independent Variable
Pearson'
(n)
p=
Case Grou
JUDICIAL
Appellate
's R Pearson's R
(n)
p=
p
SETTLEMENT
Pearson's R1
(n)
p=
CASE CHARACTERISTICS
Fault Judgment2
Fault Ranking
Gender of Plaintiff3
Length of Proceeding
Region*
Appellate Department*
Year of Decision
JUDICIAL CHARACTERISTICS
Age
Educational Status Score4
Judicial Experience (years)
Political Party5
Regionality of Education6
Religion*
Sex7
-. 1620
(191)
p=.025
-. 1026
(190)
p=.159
-. 1246
(192)
p=.085
.2405
(193)
p<.000
3.352
(196)
p=.037
-. 0954
(214)
p=.164
-. 1182
(203)
p=.093
.1097
(176)
p=.147
1.144
(227)
p=.321
3.442
(227)
p=.O18
.2039
(227)
p=.0 02
-.0903
(214)
p=. 188
-. 1101
(203)
p=.118
.0974
(176)
p=.198
1.062
(227)
p=.348
3.578
(227)
p=.015
.2002
(227)
p=.002
.0538
(211)
p=.437
.0284
(202)
p=.688
.1664
(218)
p=.014
-. 0847
(185)
p=.252
.0275
(202)
p=.697
.286
(114)
p=.752
.1822
(226)
p=.006
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LITIGANT CHARACTERISTICS
AGE
Obligor
Recipient
CHILDREN OF THE MARRIAGE
Sole Custody to Wife
Number of Children
Husband's Unrealized
Custody Threat
EDUCATION (YEARS)
Obligor
Recipient
HEALTH'
Obligor
Recipient
INCOME AND EMPLOYMENT
Obligor
Recipient
Recipient's Income/Family Income
Recipient's Job Status
Obligor's Job Status
-.0333
(172)
p=.665
-.1092
(172)
p=.154
.3617
(227)
p=.0 00
.2913
(227)
p=.000
.2503
(112)
p=.008
.1617
(134)
p=.062
-. 0983
(227)
p=.140
-. 1257
(227)
p=.059
.6108
(175)
p=.000
-. 0418
(164)
p=.595
-.2113
(163)
p=.007
.0151
(209)
p=.828
-.2498
(211)
p=.000
-. 0427
(172)
p=-578
-. 1181
(172)
p=.123
.3712
(227)
p=.000
.2838
(227)
p=.000
.2732
(112)
p=.004
.1787
(134)
p=.039
-. 1044
(227)
p=.117
-.1212
(227)
p=.068
.6178
(175)
p=.000
-.0706
(164)
p=.369
-. 2317
(163)
p=. 003
.0129
(209)
p=.853
-. 2689
(211)
p=.0 00
.0283
(190)
p=.690
.0077
(189)
p=.916
.3206
(196)
p=.000
.1581
(196)
p=.027
.1559
(192)
p=.031
.2896
(168)
p=.0 00
.2410
(167)
p=.002
-. 0697
(196)
p=.33 1
-. 1017
(189)
p=.156
.4623
(141)
p=.000
-. 1727
(166)
p=.026
-.4240
(125)
p=.000
-.0871
(160)
p=.274
-.3962
(151)
p=.000
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MARITAL DURATION -. 1612 -. 1578 .0178
(220) (220) (194)
p=.017  p=.019 p=.805
MARITAL PROPERTY
Net Worth .0073 .0073 .0804
(225) (225) (196)
p=.913 p=.913 p=.263
Value of Recipient's .1220 .1237 .1456
Net Property Award (221) (221) (182)
p=.070 p=.066 p=.050
For nondichotomous categorical variables (i.e., case region, appellate department, and judge's
religion), the table displays the F statistic.
2 Coded divorce judgment granted against obligor only=1, against both spouses=2, against
recipient only=3.
3 Coded 1=wife, 2=husband.
4 Coded 2 through 8, based on combined status scores of judge's college and law school.
5 Coded 1=Democratic, 2-=Republican.
6Coded 0=attended neither college or law school locally, 1=attended either college or law school
locally, 3=attended both college and law school locally.
7 Coded 1=male, 2=female.
s Coded 1=good, 2=fair, 3=poor.
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TABLE A17
COMBINED ALIMONY AND CHILD SUPPORT CORRELATIONS (CASES
WITH MINOR CHILDREN) DEPENDENT VARIABLE=VALUE OF
ALIMONY PLUS CHILD SUPPORT ($1990)
Independent Variable Case Group
Trial
Pearson
(n)
p=
CASE CHARACTERISTICS
Fault Judgment2
Fault Ranking
Gender of Plaintiff3
Length of Proceeding
Region*
Appellate Department*
Year of Decision
JUDICIAL CHARACTERISTICS
Age
Educational Status Score4
Judicial Experience (years)
Political Party,
Regionality of Education
Religion*
Sex7
-. 087C
(212)
p=.20
-. 086'
(201)
p=.22
.1512
(174)
p=.04
5.713
(225)
p=.00 4
3.026
(225)
p=.03
.1302
(225)
p=.05
JUDICIAL
Appellate
's R Pearson's R
(n)
p=
0 -. 0966
(212)
)7 p=.161
;7 -. 0899
(201)
1 p=.204
.1850
(174)
p=.015
7.634
(225)
}4 p=.001
3.707
(225)
8 p=.012
.1380
(225)
1 p=.039
SETTLEMENT
Pearson's R1
(n)p=
-. 0829
(190)
p=.255
-. 0390
(189)
p-. 594
-. 0607
(191)
p=.40 4
.2586
(181)
p=.0 00
4.965
(184)
p=.008
.0849
(209)
p=.222
.0912
(196)
p=.204
.0975
(216)
p=.153
.0212
(183)
p=.776
.0015
(200)
p=.983
1.181
(112)
p=.311
.0248
(224)
p=.712
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LITIGANT CHARACTERISTICS
AGE
Obligor
Recipient
CHILDREN OF THE MARRIAGE
Sole Custody to Wife
% of Obligor Income
Paid in Child Support
Number of Children
Husband's Unrealized
Custody Request
EDUCATION (YEARS)
Obligor
Recipient
HEALTH8
Obligor
Recipient
INCOME AND EMPLOYMENT
Obligor
Recipient
Recipient's Income/Family Income
Recipient's Job Status9
Obligor's Job Status
[Vol. 74
.0690
(170)
p=.366
.0679
(170)
p=.379
.1492
(225)
p=.025
-. 0763
(171)
p=.321
.2049
(225)
p=.002
.2574
(112)
p=.006
.2450
(133)
p=.004
-. 1048
(225)
p=.117
.0387
(225)
p=.564
.6294
(175)
p=.000
-. 1899
(164)
p=.0 15
-. 3964
(163)
p=.000
.0998
(208)
p=.152
-. 3277
(209)
p=.000
.0794
(170)
p=.3 04
.0743
(170)
p=.335
.1589
(225)
p=.017
-.0941
(171)
p=.221
.1909
(225)
p=.0 04
.2687
(112)
p=.004
.2770
(133)
p=.001
-. 1042
(225)
p=.l19
.0926
(225)
p=.166
.6286
(175)
p=.000
-.2138
(164)
p=.0O06
-.4131
(163)
p=.000
.1192
(208)
p=.086
-.3206
(209)
p=.000
.0604
(178)
p=.423
.0752
(177)
p=.328
.1190
(208)
p=.087
-. 0092
(137)
p=.915
.1208
(184)
p=.102
.0876
(191)
p=.228
.3210
(132)
p=.00 0
.2266
(158)
p=.004
.0037
(184)
p=.960
.1046
(184)
p=.158
.5924
(140)
p=.000
-. 1703
(165)
p=.029
-.2382
(165)
p=.002
.0902
(164)
p=.211
-.4615
(157)
p=. 000
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MARITAL DURATION .0152 .0230 .0607
(218) (218) (206)
p=.824 p=.736 p=.386
MARITAL PROPERTY
Net Worth -.0160 -. 0107 .0261
(223) (223) (208)
p=.812 p=.873 p=.708
Value of Recipient's .1038 .1126 .0738
Net Property Award (219) (219) (191)
p=.126 p=.096 p=. 310
1 For nondichotomous categorical variables (i.e., case region, appellate department, and judge's
religion), the table displays the F statistic.
2 Coded divorce judgment granted against obligor only=l, against both spouses=2, against
recipient only=3.
3 Coded 1=wife, 2=husband.
4 Coded 2 through 8, based on combined status scores of judge's college and law school.
5 Coded 1=Democratic, 2=-Republican.
6 Coded 0=attended neither college or law school locally, 1=attended either college or law school
locally, 2=attended both college and law school locally.
Coded 1--male, 2=female.
Coded 1=good, 2=fair, 3=poor.
Coded 1=high status professional, 2=lower status professional (e.g., accountants, artists,
clergymen, computer programmers, decorators and designers, journalists, librarians, musicians,
nurses, pharmacists, high school or lower teachers), 3--small business owners, white collar
workers (e.g., sales personnel, clerks, cashiers, secretaries), and skilled blue collar workers (e.g.,
machinists, printers, electricians, butchers, machine operators), 4--students, 5=unemployed,
retired, or homemaker.
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TABLE A18
ALIMONY AWARD VALUE CORRELATIONS (CASES WITHouT MINOR
CHILDREN) DEPENDENT VARTABLE=VALUE OF ALIMONY (1990
DOLLARS)
Independent Variable
CASE CHARACTERISTICS
Fault Judgment2
Fault Ranking3
Gender of Plaintiff4
Length of Proceeding
Region*
Appellate Department*
Year of Decision
JUDICIAL CHARACTERISTICS
Age
Educational Status Score5
Judicial Experience (years)
Political Party
6
Regionality of Education7
Religion
Sex
Case Group
JUDICIAL
Trial Appellate
Pearson's R Pearson's R
(n) (n)
p= p=
.0629 -. 0010
(74) (75)
p=.595 p=.993
.2467 .2439
(66) (67)
p=.046  p=.047
.0580 .0452
(63) (63)
p=.652 p=.725
-1.216 -1.416
(80) (81)
p=.302 p=.249
-. 8.141 -8.310
(80) (81)
p=.000 p=.000
-. 0859 .0330
(80) (81)
p=.448 p=.770
.0612
( 78)
p=.559
.1759
( 76)
p=.12 8
-.0681
(76)
p=.559
-.2545
( 65)
p=. 04 1
-.0042
( 77)
p=.97 1
1.007
(41)
p=.375
-. 1274( 80)
p=.260
SETTLEMENT
Pearson's R1
(n)
p=
-.0431
( 33)
p=. 812
-. 0734
( 33)p=.685
-. 1073
( 32)
p=.559
.0743( 32)p=.686
.827
( 33)
p=.447
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LITIGANT CHARACTERISTICS
AGE
Husband
Wife
CHILDREN OF THE MARRIAGE
Marriage Produced Children
EDUCATION (YEARS)
Husband
Wife
HEALTH9
Husband
Wife
INCOME AND EMPLOYMENT
Husband's Job Status
Husband's Income
Wife's Job Status0
Wife's Income
Wife's Income/Family Income
MARITAL DURATION
MARITAL PROPERTY
Net Worth
Husband-Owned
Property Value
Wife-Owned
Property Value
Value of Wife's
Net Property Award
.1980
( 66)
p=.111
.1232
(70)
p=.310
-.1492( 80)
p=.209
-.0920( 30)
p=.629
.2642( 38)
p=.109
-. 0140
( 80)
p=.902
-. 1151( 80)
p=.309
-.3410
(77)
p=.0O02
.4423
(70)
p=. 000
.1400
( 76)p=.228
-. 2715
( 66)
p=.027
-. 4445
( 63)
p=.00
.1920
( 78)
p=.092
.1165
(79)p=.306
.7848
( 66)
p=.900
.0386
(79)
p=.734
.5273( 78)
p=.000
.1938
( 67)
p=.116
.1406
( 71)
p=.242
.1710( 81)
p=.127
-. 0702
( 29)
p=.717
.2651
( 37)
p=.113
-. 0409
( 81)
p=.717
-. 1057
( 81)
p=.348
-. 2238
(78)
p=.049
.8086
( 71)
p=.000
.1587
(77)
p=.168
-. 2487
( 67)
p=.042
-. 3814
(64)
p=.004
.2401
(79)
p=.039
.3971( 80)
p=.000
.8078
( 67)
p=.000
.0105
( 81)p=.926
.3795
(79)
p=.0 01
.2351( 31)p=.203
.2118
( 31)
p=.253
-.0711( 33)p=.694
.2351( 30)
p=.O01
.2745
(27)
p=.166
-. 0087
( 33)
p=.962
.2247
( 33)
p=.209
-.5534
(24)
p=.005
.9222
( 28)
p=.O00
-.1012
(25)p=.630
.0129
( 30)
p=.946
-.1432
(26)
p=.485
.1921
( 33)
p=.284
.5580
( 33)
p=.0 01
.8006
( 30)
p=.0 00
.1814( 30)
p=.337
.3687
( 33)
p=.035
1 For nondichotomous categorical variables (i.e., case region, appellate department, and judge's
religion), the table displays the F statistic.
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2 Coded divorce judgment granted against husband only=l, against both spouses=2, against wife
only=3.
3 Coded 1 through 7, based on combined score taking into account fault judgment (1 through 3)
and basis. Adultery ranked 1, cruel and inhuman treatment 2, abandonment 3, mental illness 4.
4Coded 1=wife, 2=husband.
S Coded 2 through 8, based on combined status scores of judge's college and law school.
6Coded 1=Democratic, 2=Republican.
7 Coded 0=attended neither college or law school locally, 1=attended either college or law
school locally, 2=attended both college and law school locally.
Coded 1--male, 2=female.
9Coded =good, 2=fair, 3=poor.
10 Coded 1=high status professional, 2=lower status professional (e.g., accountants, artists,
clergymen, computer programmers, decorators and designers, journalists, librarians, musicians,
nurses, pharmacists, high school or lower teachers), 3=small business owners, white collar
workers (e.g., sales personnel, clerks, cashiers, secretaries), and skilled blue collar workers (e.g.,
machinists, printers, electricians, butchers, machine operators), 4=students, 5=unemployed,
retired, or homemaker.
TABLE A19
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF NET MARITAL ASSETS (JUDICIAL
SAMPLE: COUPLES wITH PosITIvE NET WORTH), BY WIFE'S
HEALTH
Percentage Distribution of Net
Marital Assets Wife's Health
Good Fair Poor
(n=273) (n=28) (n=22)
Disproportionate Share to Husband 30% 29% 63%
Relatively Equal* 48% 57% 32%
Disproportionate Share to Wife 22% 14% 5%
* Relatively Equal=Between 45% and 55%
Chi-square=12,88728 D.F.=4; P=.01184
